The United States went to war with Iran in the belief that American power could quickly overwhelm Tehran’s ability to threaten the Middle East. For Saudi Arabia, the war is producing nearly the opposite result.
Iran has been badly hit, but it and its regional allies have demonstrated that they can still threaten Saudi cities, oil installations, pipelines and export routes. At the same time, Washington has shown that even overwhelming offensive power does not necessarily translate into effective protection for its Gulf partners. The consequence is likely to be a historic Saudi reassessment: less confidence in the United States, more reliance on regional partners and a much closer strategic relationship with China.
Saudi Arabia’s geographical problem is not new. In an article published in LobeLog in September 2019 , I described the “encirclement” of Saudi oil production by Iran and Iran-aligned forces. That year, the attack on the Abqaiq processing complex displayed the accuracy and reach of the weapons available to Tehran or its allies . An earlier Houthi strike on pumping stations serving the East-West Pipeline showed that the kingdom’s alternative export route to the Red Sea was also vulnerable. Attacks around Fujairah similarly cast doubt on the idea that tankers and pipelines outside the Strait of Hormuz would remain safe in a crisis.
The strategic message was straightforward. Saudi Arabia could not protect its petroleum system simply by building routes that bypassed one chokepoint. Its fields and processing plants lie near the Gulf; the East-West Pipeline crosses a vast, exposed territory; and the Red Sea outlet can be threatened from Yemen. Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen gave it the ability to apply pressure around much of the kingdom’s perimeter.
In 2019, Saudi leaders were deeply disappointed when the United States did not retaliate against Iran for the attack on Abqaiq. They had invested heavily in their relationship with the first Trump administration. Later, the Saudi Public Investment Fund’s $2 billion commitment to Jared Kushner’s private-equity firm reinforced the impression that Riyadh expected its close connections to the Trump family to bring privileged access and dependable support. Whatever the Saudis expected, Abqaiq had already demonstrated the limits of the American security guarantee.
The present war makes that problem much greater. The United States can destroy targets across Iran, but it has not been able to prevent Tehran and its partners from striking back across the region. Saudi Arabia is now paying for a conflict it did not start and cannot control. Missile and drone defenses can intercept many threats, but no shield is perfect, particularly against repeated, low-cost attacks on sprawling infrastructure.
Recent strikes on the East-West Pipeline underline the point made in 2019: the route intended to insure Saudi exports against the closure of Hormuz is itself a target. The kingdom is surrounded not by conventional Iranian armies but by a network of missiles, drones, militias and maritime threats.
For Riyadh, therefore, the issue is not simply the strength of the U.S. military. It is the mismatch between American power and Saudi security. Washington may be able to punish Iran severely without being able to stop attacks on Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Yanbu or the pipeline between them. Indeed, a prolonged war can increase those attacks by giving Iran an incentive to raise the cost to America’s partners. Saudi Arabia is likely to be even more angered by the ineffectiveness of American protection now than it was by American restraint in 2019.
The deterioration extends beyond immediate defense. The U.S.–Saudi civil nuclear agreement once appeared to be the centerpiece of a broader strategic bargain. Yet after supporting the agreement, President Trump publicly made its political future dependent on Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords . That demand is extraordinarily difficult for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to meet while Israel continues its operations in Gaza, expands pressure in the West Bank and wages war in southern Lebanon. The agreement has been submitted to Congress and is not formally dead but tying it to normalization has placed it in severe political jeopardy.
From Riyadh’s perspective, Washington has again turned a promised strategic benefit into a conditional instrument of American and Israeli policy.
Saudi leaders must now ask whether they have been backing the wrong horse. Their answer is not likely to be a complete break with Washington. The United States will remain an important arms supplier, investor and military partner. But the kingdom is already building alternatives.
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey commits the three countries to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Its practical obligations remain to be tested, yet its political meaning is clear. Saudi Arabia no longer wants its survival to depend on a single outside protector. Pakistan offers nuclear prestige and a long military relationship; Turkey brings a capable defense industry, armed forces and NATO experience. Together, they provide Riyadh with an additional layer of deterrence and strategic autonomy.
China is the more consequential alternative. It is the largest buyer of Gulf oil, an indispensable economic partner for Saudi development and one of the few powers with real leverage in Tehran. Beijing also brokered the 2023 restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations . Unlike Washington, China does not ask Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel or align itself publicly with a divisive regional war. Saudi leaders may increasingly conclude that China, precisely because it maintains relations with both sides, is better placed to restrain Iran and protect the commercial stability on which the kingdom depends.
That does not mean China will replace the United States as Saudi Arabia’s military protector. Beijing has neither America’s regional force structure nor an evident desire to inherit its security burdens. But influence does not require exact replacement. China can supply digital and nuclear technology, investment, diplomatic access and eventually more defense cooperation, while Saudi Arabia assembles a diversified security system involving Washington, Beijing, Islamabad and Ankara. Each disappointment with the United States accelerates that process.
The great irony is that an American war intended to reassert U.S. power may instead reduce U.S. primacy in the Gulf. President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq removed Iran’s principal Arab counterweight and handed Tehran enormous influence in Baghdad. President Trump’s war with Iran risks a comparable strategic reversal. By exposing Saudi Arabia to retaliation, demonstrating the limits of American protection and attaching unacceptable political conditions to cooperation, Washington is encouraging Riyadh to seek security elsewhere.
Bush’s war helped hand Iraq to Iran. Trump’s war may help hand the Gulf—and above all Saudi Arabia—to China.
When Saudi Arabia realizes it's backed the wrong horse
Aggregated summary from an independent source. Read the original at ResponsibleStatecraft.