This week, President Donald Trump formally submitted the U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement to Congress for review, moving the deal forward despite continuing to insist that Saudi Arabia normalize relations with Israel before it can take effect.
This condition could stall the agreement indefinitely: Riyadh demands a clear pathway toward Palestinian statehood before normalization, and Israel is dead set against statehood. Israel had strongly opposed the deal as originally negotiated, while Netanyahu had privately expressed hopes of delivering “ the next big thing ” by securing Saudi normalization before Israel’s October elections. Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney described Trump as inserting normalization “ at the last minute ,” throwing the agreement into uncertainty.
Trump’s decision to submit the agreement for congressional review further adds to this uncertainty. The president appears to want it both ways: his latest move is signaling to Riyadh that the agreement is moving forward even as he assures Tel Aviv that the deal is contingent on normalization.
Creating yet more confusion is the timing of the agreement. As four congressional Democrats pointed out last month, Trump launched war on Iran to prevent it from enriching uranium, yet is prepared to grant Saudi Arabia the means to do the same. “That contradiction,” they wrote, “makes American policy impossible to take seriously and undermines any chance of reaching a durable agreement with Iran.”
A not-so-gold standard
The nuclear deal is designed to meet Saudi Arabia’s domestic energy needs, according to a statement from U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright. Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s economic plan , the country will use nuclear power for electricity generation, thereby freeing up more oil to be sold globally rather than consumed domestically.
The deal would allow American companies to compete for a central role in the development of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure . Supporters argue that access to the Saudi nuclear market could generate tens of billions of dollars in business and thousands of American jobs. Furthermore, Saudi cooperation in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, AI, and critical minerals is increasingly important to Washington as it seeks to secure critical supply chains, maintain U.S. technological leadership, attract Saudi investment, and limit China’s growing global role.
Washington is also concerned that, if it refuses to accommodate Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, Riyadh could turn to Russia or China, which may offer cooperation with fewer nonproliferation restrictions. China has historically provided nuclear assistance under conditions Washington would not accept, including assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program, although Beijing has since strengthened its nonproliferation policies. Russia similarly participates in the international nonproliferation regime and requires safeguards on civilian nuclear exports, but its cooperation is not subject to more stringent U.S. legal requirements.
In any event, Riyadh appears determined to develop a nuclear program regardless of U.S. involvement. Saudi Arabia has already solicited bids from Russian, Chinese, French, and South Korean companies to build its first two nuclear power reactors, underscoring that its nuclear plans are not dependent on U.S. participation. This pressure, combined with Riyadh’s pledge to get a nuclear weapon if Tehran develops one, has pushed Washington to pursue nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia; indeed, such discussions have taken place since the George W. Bush administration .
Trump appears prepared to relax some nonproliferation conditions for Saudi Arabia, like the requirement that the kingdom renounce domestic enrichment and reprocessing. Although the Trump administration signed a Section 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia, the legal framework required under the Atomic Energy Act for significant U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with another country, this did not include the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol.
The IAEA’s Additional Protocol goes beyond what is required by U.S. law, requiring full inspections of all declared and undeclared nuclear sites and mandating that the aspiring country forgo nuclear fuel technologies that could be used to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium . The 2009 U.S. nuclear agreement with the United Arab Emirates required Abu Dhabi to implement the Additional Protocol and separately commit to forgoing domestic enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. This deal is considered the “ gold standard ” for civil nuclear agreements.
No such standards exist in the Saudi deal. Critics warn that the safeguards are insufficient to prevent future Saudi enrichment or weapons development. The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral safeguards agreement to cover sensitive fuel cycle facilities last year. The two countries plan on using a “ black box ” approach, in which enrichment technology is physically sealed and inaccessible to Saudi personnel, to protect sensitive technology. Although Trump stated that “there would be no enrichment,” nothing in the deal makes this permanent.
Between Riyadh and Tel Aviv
Following the announcement of the deal, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. is “not going to reach any agreement with any country in the world that leads to the risk of proliferation .”
Yet almost immediately, Israeli leaders and politicians criticized the deal, claiming it would allow Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons that would threaten Israeli security. Former defense minister Avigdor Lieberman warned that the agreement could lead to a regional nuclear arms race and called on Israel to lobby Congress to stop the deal . Trump responded the next day on Truth Social by declaring that the kingdom would have to join the Abraham Accords in order to keep the agreement moving, an announcement welcomed by the Israelis.
Trump’s willingness to jeopardize a deal he appears to want by introducing an Israel-related condition indicates the influence of Israeli preferences on his decision-making.
Saudi officials view the nuclear agreement as mutually beneficial and have pushed to separate it from normalization with Israel. The 90-day review period will begin now that the agreement has been submitted to Congress . Unless Congress passes a joint resolution rejecting it, the agreement can take effect without an affirmative vote. Despite bipartisan concerns over its safeguards, opponents are unlikely to have the veto-proof majority needed to stop it.
Trump’s decision to submit the agreement to Congress while maintaining the normalization condition leaves its future uncertain. Trump appears intent on advancing nuclear cooperation with Riyadh but has tied that cooperation to normalization that remains unlikely under current Saudi and Israeli positions.
Israel is not the only source of opposition to the agreement, as the nonproliferation community and lawmakers from both parties have raised independent concerns about enrichment and the deal’s safeguards. Yet Trump’s decision to introduce normalization following Israeli opposition demonstrates that Israeli preferences remain an important part of Washington’s calculations. Whether the agreement ultimately survives may now depend on which strategic relationship the administration values more: Saudi Arabia or Israel.
Did Trump put a poison pill in his own Saudi nuclear deal?
Aggregated summary from an independent source. Read the original at ResponsibleStatecraft.