On August 18, Israel bombed a non-operational Syrian air base , reportedly to derail Turkish plans to deploy military forces to the installation. The move drew swift condemnation from the United States, which did not receive prior notification despite its growing support for Syria, its alliance with Turkey, and the presence of thousands of U.S. military personnel based nearby, in Jordan and other parts of the region.
Is this the behavior of a “ model ally ”? The Jewish Institute for National Security of America seems to think so.
The group, which promotes "strategic cooperation" between the United States and Israel, tries to defend this position in its new report , “Shifting the Center of Gravity: Transforming the U.S.-Israel Security Partnership.” It also lays out an ambitious set of proposals JINSA hopes will be part of a renewed 10-year U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (the current one expires in 202 . JINSA wants this "final" direct aid package to include $38 billion total and be "paired with new, mostly non-monetary initiatives that deepen and expand the U.S.-Israel partnership."
The recommendations in this report — which also include signing a mutual defense pact, basing U.S. military forces in Israel, and integrating Israeli technology into U.S. homeland defense — should be rejected as threats to U.S. national security. Not only would they cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, but the prescriptions would make the United States less safe than it is today, by institutionalizing U.S. military entanglement with (and even dependence on) Israel and increasing the risk of future wars.
Instead the Trump administration should instead let the current MoU expire in 2028 with no replacement. With a strong military and nuclear arsenal, Israel can defend itself.
The JINSA report opens by heralding Israel as “America’s most important ally,” praising its military prowess, technological capability, and willingness to project military power in pursuit of supposedly shared goals. Missing from its account of Israel’s support during Operation Epic Fury, however, is any mention of Israel’s role in starting, escalating, or widening the war. These are certainly relevant details if we are judging whether the bilateral relationship is an asset or a liability to the United States.
The report sidesteps these realities and instead moves quickly to a set of 10 proposals that it argues will take the bilateral partnership to the “next level.” From the perspective of protecting U.S. national interests, these ideas range from bad to insane.
Among the more worrying recommendations are those that suggest the United States should form a mutual defense treaty with Israel and begin shifting U.S. assets away from current positions in the Persian Gulf to a wider and permanent force posture in Israel — including a new CENTCOM headquarters and a "regional U.S. prepositioned arsenal hub." These would break long-established firewalls in the U.S.-Israel relationship and undermine U.S. interests.
Since 1975, the United States has had a security commitment to Israel , formalized in a memorandum of agreement, that promises “remedial action” should Israel face external threat. In recent years, this commitment has functioned as a de facto security guarantee on par with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Still, the United States has intentionally refrained from signing a more explicit mutual defense agreement with Israel or basing U.S. personnel inside Israel’s borders for two reasons.
First, it was Israel’s preference. Jerusalem has long prided itself on the fact that only its soldiers directly defend the country and that it could fight its own battles as long as the United States offered military support. Second, Washington feared a more formal defense obligation or forward bases in Israel would increase the risk that the United States would eventually become entangled in Israel’s ongoing border skirmishes or complicate relationships with U.S. Gulf state partners, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on whom the United States relied to keep oil prices low.
The recommendations by JINSA, which count 43 retired U.S. officers — including 24 generals and nine admirals — on its roster discard these redlines. The mutual defense agreement they describe is framed as a narrow one that would be triggered “by the high bar of existential threat to Israel or Iranian use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. bases in the region.” But history tells us that, for Israel, the “existential threat” threshold is met easily and often.
In recent years, Israel has argued that Iran posed an existential threat while also claiming Hezbollah and Hamas as existential challenges to Israel’s security. In other words, signing onto this agreement would all but guarantee U.S. involvement in future Middle East wars against Iran or possibly even Turkey , which some in Israel have already identified as the next target despite the fact that it is a NATO ally.
Of course, this is the goal of the recommendation: to ensure that no matter how far Israel falls in U.S. public opinion, the United States will be obligated to come to its defense, or risk undermining the credibility of its other commitments.
Basing U.S military forces inside Israel would only worsen the moral hazard engendered by U.S. support to the country. With U.S. personnel as a tripwire, Israel’s leaders would feel assured that any attack would almost certainly drag in the United States, giving them little incentive to act with restraint. The risk that the United States might be ensnared in Israel’s future military adventures would be high.
The second major focus of JINSA’s recommendations covers the sharing of military technology and joint industrial projects between Israel and the United States. Most of these proposals demand that Israel gain the same level of access to U.S. technology as is enjoyed by the closest NATO allies who have spent years working to meet U.S. security standards. That Israeli officials are suspected of spying on the United States should be warning enough that giving Israel this type of access to sensitive U.S. technology would be a mistake.
The most dangerous of these tech sharing ideas, however, is one suggesting that Israeli technologies should be directly integrated into U.S. air and missile defense, specifically the Golden Dome project. This provision would mean that, if the Golden Dome project or something like it eventually covers the United States, Israeli technology would be part of its foundation, making the U.S. dependent on Israel for its own defense.
The United States tried something similar once before with Israel and the project had to be cancelled. The reason? Israel refused to allow the United States access to the source code needed to integrate the Iron Dome systems it planned to purchase into the U.S. air defense network. Experimenting with this type of cooperation a second time would be an act of self-harm on the part of the U.S. government.
Taken together, then, the JINSA proposals do not advance U.S. interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. In fact, they do just the opposite. They will increase the U.S. security burden and tie the United States down in the Middle East in ways that may quickly become irreversible while also undermining the physical security of the homeland. And they will do so at a cost of $38 billion from U.S. taxpayers in the form of annual military aid.
This outcome should be entirely unacceptable to any American president, regardless of the specific ally or partner in question and especially for a president who ran on promises to put U.S. interests first.
Elsewhere, President Donald Trump is pushing allies to defend themselves without so much (or any) U.S. support. He should do the same with Israel. The endless cycle of MoUs has run its course. The current one should be the last.
Pitch for defense treaty and moving US military to Israel is insane
Aggregated summary from an independent source. Read the original at ResponsibleStatecraft.