Alain Antil, Director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Centre at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), is in conversation with Hichem Ben Yaïche . He talks about Rwanda’s soft power, Russia’s Africa strategy and the fraught situation in the Sahel.
What overall conclusions have you drawn from the research and studies carried out by your team?
We aim to refresh the frameworks through which Africa is understood – some of which are still outdated, both in France and elsewhere – and to identify the major new trends that are transforming African countries, their relations with one another, and their relations with the outside world.
I can mention a briefing we published in July on Rwandan diplomacy and how it has developed since the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) came to power under President Paul Kagame.
We are very focused on what is happening in Eastern DRC, but we have been particularly interested in how Rwanda has built its diplomatic strategy, relying on a highly educated diaspora, a small group of officials steering this diplomacy, and various levers, notably military interventions in other countries.
One such intervention is being carried out in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. It enables Rwanda to establish a direct relationship with several global powers investing heavily in that region.
Rwanda’s Power
Can we describe it as Rwandan soft power?
Yes. There is hard power, but behind this, several factors contribute to Rwandan soft power, notably tourism and sport.
Another, lesser-known fact is the reception of refugees. Rwanda has had a long history of exile: following the events of the 1950s (The Hutu Uprising. Triggered by political friction and the shifting loyalties of Belgian authorities – who began moving support away from the traditional Tutsi elite toward the Hutu majority – violent clashes erupted in late 1959, and many Rwandans left the country.
President Paul Kagame and many senior figures in the Rwandan Patriotic Front are representative of this history, having spent part of their lives in Uganda.
As a result of their experience, Rwanda welcomes refugees. The most recent example is the agreement signed with the UK to take in asylum seekers, which the latter ultimately reneged on. However, Rwanda has also taken in other migrants and refugees, making this a key element of its policy to exert influence.
The results speak for themselves. Although per capita GDP remains fairly modest, Rwanda has rebuilt its economy since the genocide and the war that brought it to an end. Whilst the country was in ruins, new economic sectors have emerged.
It is also worth highlighting the importance placed on education and training. At IFRI, we regularly meet with Rwandan delegations, and what strikes us is the excellent level of education and training of the people with whom we engage.
Added to this is discipline and, underpinning it, an extremely strong and authoritarian government. Some Rwandans believe that it would not have been possible to achieve so much in such a short time without such a strong government.
However, some criticise the Rwandan leadership, and President Kagame in particular, for not making their regime more flexible.
What is Kagame’s stance on sovereignty?
Among the factors to be taken into account is Rwanda’s desire to make African security issues the responsibility of Africans themselves, with fewer and fewer external actors. This has even become something of a hallmark of the country.
Paul Kagame notably sought to promote this view whilst he was Chair of the African Union; in particular by advocating greater financial autonomy for the organisation, which remains heavily dependent on European funding to this day.
The argument is that one cannot complain about foreign imperialism and interventionism whilst being incapable of resolving one’s own security problems.
The issue of eastern DRC, however, is on an entirely different level. There are enormous tensions between the two countries. These are linked in particular to the presence in this region of Rwandan armed groups hostile to Paul Kagame’s regime.
They are also linked to Rwanda’s view that this area must be controlled, more or less directly, in order to prevent problems arising there from threatening Rwanda.
Can Rwanda move beyond this ambivalent image?
That does not seem to be the trend, given that there is direct intervention. We shall have to see what comes of the ongoing mediation efforts. Agreements have been signed, but they are struggling to be effectively implemented. So, for the time being, from an outside perspective, we are unfortunately not seeing an improvement in the security situation or any progress on this issue.
The country seems to be establishing a role as a mediator in both national and international issues. Is it working?
The strategy is about providing services to countries in the hope of receiving something in return and carving out a place for itself on the diplomatic stage, both within Africa and beyond. There is also a high level of diplomatic engagement with European nations, as well as with the Gulf states. Rwanda aims to be a leading diplomatic and security player in Africa.
This contrasts with the decline of the diplomatic apparatus of certain major African powers, notably Algeria, Nigeria and, in some respects, South Africa.
Russia’s Game
To switch to another area, what is Russia’s strategy in Africa?
Their strategy is pursued with Russia’s limited resources. There are, of course, mining agreements, but above all, sales of arms, cereals and fertilisers. By 2022, Russia had become a leading supplier of arms to Africa.
More specifically, the Russians have begun to sign security cooperation agreements with several dozen countries. This does not mean that signing an agreement immediately leads to substantial cooperation, but the legal basis is there and allows progress to be made.
Is Russia’s role on the continent being overstated? It has very limited resources but a considerable capacity to cause disruption.
This paradox stems from the fact that Russia has specialised in information warfare.
For example, in the Sahel, it has been able to mobilise and disseminate propaganda. It has also partnered with local actors to promote what was referred to at the time as ‘anti-French rhetoric’ in that region.
Indeed, it has achieved strategic victories at very little financial cost thanks to information warfare, the dissemination of fake news and narratives in collusion with actors in the countries concerned. Hence the paradox between limited resources, notable results and a particular lever for action.
In October, we will publish another article on Russia which will focus on the networks recruiting African fighters for the Ukrainian front on the Russian side. This is a blind spot, and it is good to be able to address it.
At present, there are a few of us working on this issue, but it must be said that these are mainly journalists, with very few research centres involved.
One of our researchers was particularly fortunate to gain access to a Ukrainian prison, where he was able to spend two full days conducting interviews with African prisoners captured on the front line. For our forthcoming reports, we are continuing to work on developments in the central Sahel, notably by examining how jihadist groups govern the territory they control.
Sahel and the international community
How do you assess the situation in the Sahel?
It is worrying. There have been no major victories by the national armies so far. At best, we have a status quo: the state controls part of the territory and other armed groups, notably jihadists, control the other part, to varying degrees across the three countries.
Nevertheless, we are not seeing any improvement; this is true even in Mali, despite significant reinforcements from Russia.
The situation has spilt over into certain countries in the Gulf of Guinea. The two areas most affected by this spread of the crisis linked to the central Sahel are northern Benin and, although it is less widely discussed, north-western Nigeria.
This has nothing to do with the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa are active. In north-western Nigeria, we see the presence of both the JNIM movement, linked to Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State.
What explains the international community’s wait-and-see approach, despite the risk of the conflict spreading?
Well, the international community isn’t adopting a wait-and-see approach. Remember: no one is offering a solution.
The three countries of the central Sahel have experienced coups, and the three leaders of these countries are sovereigntist and pan-Africanist leaders who wanted to regain control of the counter-terrorism effort.
They had agreements with the French and with the Europeans. In Mali, in particular, there was also a presence of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali, even though it was not involved in counter-terrorism.
They wanted to break away from all these actors, regain control and set the agenda for this counter-terrorism effort, including by bringing in new actors. It was they who drove the other actors out. So, it is not the international community that has abandoned the Sahel.
The danger remains. Partnerships are being established with the neighbouring countries of these three states to prevent the jihadist threat from spreading further, particularly into the countries of the Gulf of Guinea.
Is there a ‘Mauritanian approach’ to combating radicalism and extremism?
You are right to highlight the case of Mauritania, one of the Sahel countries first affected by terrorism, as early as 2005.
It was not until the arrival of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and his right-hand man, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani – who later became President – that a counter-terrorism policy was jointly developed which did not rely solely on force.
Of course, combating terrorists requires a credible and robust response from a security perspective, but security must be understood in the broadest sense. One must have the capacity to fight, but also to control the territory, to gather intelligence and to rely on other pillars.
Mauritanians often cite the example of de-radicalisation policies, which began with that famous dialogue organised in a Mauritanian prison under the auspices of a well-known and highly respected imam, involving even jihadist prisoners.
This marked the start of a de-radicalisation programme which some countries in the Sahel subsequently sought to draw inspiration from, or even to adopt certain elements of.
Some countries are said to have concluded non-aggression pacts with certain movements. I am not saying that this is the case in Mauritania, but it may be a factor in explaining why certain countries have been spared violence for several years.
Is the Mauritanian approach transferable to other countries in the Sahel?
I would reply: yes and no.
On the security front, one of the game-changers from a military perspective in the fight against terrorism has been the creation of what are known as the GSI – that is, units of the Mauritanian army that are constantly on the move, patrolling the border with Mali.
This border has become very dangerous for traffickers and jihadists. This is one aspect of this success. This border, which was once very porous, has become much less so, thanks in particular to intelligence efforts.
Some Mauritanian tribes do indeed have branches on the northern side of Mali. The Mauritanians therefore have the ability not only to anticipate danger, but also to maintain a military presence in the area.
In particular, there is a military zone in eastern Mauritania, and anyone familiar with security matters knows this: shots may be fired without warning if you have not passed through a checkpoint known to all those travelling in the area.
What distinguishes this approach from the Algerian strategy?
The two examples are very different indeed. In Algeria, there was a civil war – a full-scale war – which was not the case in Mauritania.
Where the Mauritanian doctrine is applicable is in the determination to occupy areas of the territory that were not previously under military control. New forts or settlements have been established to ensure that no part of Mauritanian territory is left unguarded.
It is a doctrine from which other Sahelian countries have drawn inspiration, or can draw inspiration.
But the key difference – which explains my ‘ yes and no ’ answer – lies in the strength of the Mauritanian army. It is an army that is quite at home in Saharan terrain and highly mobile. It has its limitations, like all armies, but it is far more seasoned in desert combat than, for example, the Malian or Nigerien armies.
Obviously, this is a statement that would need to be qualified considerably.
In your view, what are the key points to bear in mind since the arrival of Donald Trump, who has profoundly disrupted the international order?
Trump is dismantling the international order, which obviously has an impact on the security architecture across the globe. During his first term, Trump considerably weakened the State Department. It is worth remembering that there were many resignations at the time.
For Africa in particular, USAID, as you know, has virtually disappeared. It was the main channel for US aid to Africa: around two-thirds of their aid went through USAID.
This had a knock-on effect, the consequences of which are only now beginning to be felt, particularly in terms of loss of life. There were extremely valuable US programmes addressing health and poverty alleviation, which supported a whole network of NGOs operating in various African countries.
Then there is Trump’s utter contempt for the African continent. He constantly insults certain countries; consider, for instance, what he has said about Somalia or other nations.
Sanctions and customs duties have also affected certain African countries in rather curious ways. Finally, the only areas where efforts are being made are certain mediation efforts. We were discussing this earlier in relation to eastern DR Congo, but this is also the case in Sudan and Libya. For the time being, it is fair to say that the results are not yet conclusive.
The post Rwanda’s diplomacy, Russia’s game and Sahelian instability appeared first on New African Magazine .
Rwanda’s diplomacy, Russia’s game and Sahelian instability
Aggregated summary from an independent source. Read the original at NewAfricanMagazine.