Donald Trump Unlikely to Meet Kim Jong Un

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un now occupies a different position from the one he had at the Hanoi Summit with Donald Trump seven years ago.

Between 2019 and 2026, in both efforts to arrange a summit, Trump used a similar political approach to engage. But Kim Jong Un was taking a practical and “national interest” approach. Their difference in approach has not changed. For example, Trump is thinking of a political spectacle that will benefit him. Kim, by contrast, wants to address North Korea’s national interest and economy.

In 2019, Trump was taking a political risk. Some specialists in the United States were opposed to the Hanoi meeting, and some politicians opposed the outreach. Trump’s gamble was that the summit would raise his profile ahead of the future election. In the end, they were unable to do the deal, partly because Trump was told he would look weak.

For Kim, symbolic diplomatic issues were pertinent, but they were not the most important. Most important was for any agreement to guarantee his legitimacy and his status as a leader who can deliver economic development. That was more important than any spectacle. Ultimately it was seen as life or death for his regime to protect and grow the economy. Some positive result was needed.

The North Korean leader offered to close the nuclear facilities at Youngbyun. But he wanted in return the non-military, non-security UN sanctions to be lifted. At that time, Kim likely felt that time was important. He was not yet confident in his position.

Now in 2026, the positions are reversed. Kim has more legitimacy, his regime is more stable, and the North Korean economy has more money coming in. He is not in as much of a rush.

Trump, on the other hand, is facing a big, even an existential political crisis. For example, the U.S. president is worried about how to generate benefits from the tariff issue. In addition, the U.S. domestic economy is in a growing crisis. The Iran War continues without a positive result for the United States. Finally, there are the mid-term elections looming in November. It is now Trump who is in a rush, not Kim Jong Un.

One concrete example is Trump’s unilateral and desperate scaling-down of the Ulchi Freedom military exercises. This friendly message to North Korea came out of the blue. There is no indication of any policy framework around these messages.

But much has changed since 2019. First there’s Kim’s new engagement with Russia, which has expanded quickly. North Korea sent troops and weapons to Russia in exchange for hard currency and other financial benefits. It also negotiated a new security agreement with the Kremlin.

Kim probably feels that he showed the world at the Hanoi summit that he could meet Trump as a reasonable partner. He does not have to do that again. His legitimacy would not be bolstered by another meeting.

North Korea, after all, is already a nuclear power, and the government doesn’t see any need to discuss denuclearization. Disarmament may be on the table but only depending on U.S. seriousness and demonstrated good faith. The North Korean constitution was changed to confirm the country as a nuclear power. Kim would be open to arms control and even reductions, but there would have to be a mutual exchange, like a reduction in economic sanctions.

Given these factors, the possibility of a Trump-Kim agreement looks extremely unlikely. The U.S. midterm elections are scheduled for November 3. Any summit would have to take place before these midterms for it to be helpful to Trump.

Regarding South Korea, Trump’s reduction in military exercises was one effort. Trump may be thinking that he is offering a little present to North Korea, and that it should be grateful. But this is unlikely.

If there were a serious discussion, with real offers, North Korea might agree to a moratorium on ICBM deployment and/or development. In return, North Korea would want a U.S. guarantee that it would not launch any hostile actions against the country. Kim Jong Un might discuss an end to the development of nuclear material and weapons, but only from a position of strength.

In the meantime, the only realistic deals that might take place would be modest. The best the two sides could manage would be an agreement to maintain the status quo, and then a small deal on ICBMs and small deal on sanctions. Such an agreement would not be a profound breakthrough, but it would still be a mutually politically beneficial result for both parties.

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