In October 2001, a U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, following the September 11 attacks in the United States, initially drove the Taliban from power. But 20 years later, after a war that took a terrible toll, the Taliban regained control of the country. Both the U.S. and its allies, who have yet to reckon with the history of that conflict, now find themselves tied in knots over what to do about Afghanistan.
Afghanistan remains in the throes of a grave human rights crisis. The Taliban have reimposed authoritarian rule, quashing any dissent, severely curtailing women’s rights, and pressuring religious minorities to abide by their rules. Countries that had supported the former Afghan government are divided about how to respond. Some governments assert that engagement with the Taliban is necessary to advance other interests, principally counter-terrorism and migration control. Others say no such engagement should happen without meaningful change inside Afghanistan, which is unlikely so long as the Taliban are in power.
Both these approaches fail to recognize one crucial fact. While its top leadership has imposed a strong and brutal system of government, the Taliban are not monolithic. Their edicts are draconian, but not all officials implement them uniformly. Their supreme leader and inner circle may seem insulated from pressure, but many provincial and district-level officials are not.
That gap matters. There is ample evidence of disagreement inside the Taliban. Senior figures have publicly expressed opposition to the ban on girls’ education, even as the leadership in Kandahar has hardened its position. Humanitarian organizations can, with varying levels of success, and province by province, negotiate access and employ women. In some provinces, women face stricter enforcement of male-guardian requirements or dress rules; in others, enforcement is looser and dependent on local authorities.
These variations are not evidence of Taliban moderation, but they do represent opportunity. Local Taliban officials make choices. They interpret orders and decide how aggressively to enforce them. This situation can provide incentives for change. The pursuit of accountability is therefore not only the pathway to satisfy the demands of victims of abuses for long overdue justice — it is also a practical tool for changing behavior now.
In October 2025, the United Nations Human Rights Council created an independent investigative mechanism for Afghanistan to collect, preserve, and analyze evidence of serious crimes and prepare case files for future proceedings. The mechanism is expected to examine abuses by all actors, including Taliban officials responsible for enforcing edicts that violate international law.
The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for the Taliban supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, and the chief justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, over alleged crimes against humanity, including gender persecution. But provincial governors, police chiefs, judges, prosecutors, prison officials, morality police, and district authorities surely are aware that they have something to lose by joining that list. They may want to travel and hold future political roles. They should know that committing abuses may not remain anonymous, and that “following orders” does not erase liability.
Governments should identify officials who enforce these abusive policies. They should support evidence gathering that links abuses to identified decision-makers at the provincial and district levels. And they should coordinate diplomatic messages so that local authorities hear the same warning from multiple capitals: human rights abuses carry personal consequences.
Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups have documented how impunity also protected powerful figures before the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, such as Asadullah Khalid , former head of the National Directorate of Security and former defense minister; Atta Mohammad Noor , the former governor of Balkh; Ismail Khan, the former governor of Herat; and Abdul Rashid Dostum , the former Vice President.
That history of impunity reinforces the conviction of those in power now that they will never face consequences. Breaking the cycle requires justice that is comprehensive, impartial, and focused both on those responsible for grave crimes of the recent past and officials committing abuses today.
What makes many diplomats from concerned countries uneasy is that they know they cannot on the one hand seek accountability for Taliban abuses while ignoring the fact that international forces and officials from the former government — who may now live within their own borders — also committed egregious abuses and, in some cases, war crimes. A selective approach focused only on the Taliban would likely drive more pragmatic officials — those who might be open to moderating their policies — into the arms of the hardliners.
A strategy of pursuing justice for past abusers will not end Taliban repression overnight. But in a country where Taliban policies have denied women and girls post-primary education and severely restricted other rights, even limited openings matter. A clinic that can employ women can treat female patients. An aid program that can hire women can reach women-headed households.
The Taliban leadership wants the world to believe that their rule is unified. It is not. The uneven implementation of its own edicts proves that pressure can shape behavior. The task now is to use that pressure strategically: support Afghan civil society, fund the new investigative mechanism, ensure it focuses on all actors, preserve evidence, and put every regional authority and former official on notice that the world is watching not only what the Taliban decree now but also who enforces it.
Governments should support international accountability efforts, like the International Criminal Court, as well as pursue justice for serious crimes in Afghanistan at home by looking at the potential responsibility of their own nationals — as some are already doing — and through universal jurisdiction, bringing charges against those implicated in abuses who turn up in their own countries.
This is not a call for unreasonable optimism, as it is a tough road ahead. But given the stakes, it is a call for action to look for opportunities to improve the lives of the Afghan people.
The post The Taliban Aren’t United. Accountability Can Exploit the Gaps. appeared first on Foreign Policy In Focus .
The Taliban Aren’t United. Accountability Can Exploit the Gaps.
Aggregated summary from an independent source. Read the original at FPIP.