On October 4, tens of millions of Brazilian voters will head to the polls to select the president of the second most populous nation in the Western Hemisphere. Although there is a field of 13 candidates, this crucial contest will likely pit in a second round to be held on October 25, the center-left incumbent, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, against Flavio Bolsonaro, the son of the previous extreme-right president who attempted a coup to overturn the results of the last election.
The entire world is waiting to see if the Trump administration will try to intervene to support Lula’s right-wing opposition.
Two years ago, the United States and Brazil celebrated the bicentennial of official diplomatic relations. At that time, the relationship between the two countries was very constructive and promising. Considering what has happened over the last year and a half under the second Trump administration, that relationship is a distant memory.
Ahead of Brazil’s national elections in October 2022, the Biden administration sent a very clear message to the then-government of Jair Bolsonaro that the United States would not tolerate any coup attempt or attack on the integrity of the Brazilian electoral system. Lula subsequently won the elections. Exactly one week after Lula’s inauguration, Bolsonaro and high-ranking members of the Brazilian Armed Forces directly orchestrated a coup attempt at the Three Powers Plaza in Brasília. Although concerted diplomatic efforts by the Biden administration did not prevent this destruction, Biden immediately condemned the attack on Brazilian democracy.
The Trump Shift
All this goodwill and potential for cooperation between the two largest democracies in the hemisphere began to disintegrate beginning with Trump’s second term in 2025.
In July 2025, President Trump used his Truth Social account to criticize what he termed a “witch hunt”—namely, the prosecution and trial of former President Bolsonaro and his military accomplices for various crimes associated with the January 8, 2023 coup attempt. Bolsonaro himself received a sentence of over 27 years from the Federal Supreme Court.
In the same post, Trump announced that the United States was imposing a super-tariff on Brazilian exports equal to 40 percent above the baseline 10 percent rate, resulting in a 50 percent tax on Brazilian goods —even though the United States had maintained a cumulative trade surplus with Brazil of $424.5 billion over 15 years. This super-tariff took effect on August 6, 2025, affecting 36 percent of Brazilian exports. (The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the tariffs in February 2026.)
On September 23, a sudden shift occurred in Trump’s rhetoric and behavior Immediately after Lula’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly. When President Trump spoke, he praised Lula in his closing remarks. He proclaimed that he liked the Brazilian president, that there was chemistry between them, and that the two would meet the following week.
Although this in-person meeting did not occur until nearly a month later at the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, the two presidents held a constructive phone call on October 6, which both described as “friendly” and “good.” Lula urged Trump to remove the super-tariffs and lift sanctions against Brazilian government and judicial officials; the call laid the groundwork for further diplomatic engagement and trade talks. When the two finally met in Kuala Lumpur 20 days later, both leaders agreed to pursue trade negotiations and improve Brazil–U.S. relations.
On May 7, approximately two months after the start of the U.S. war with Iran, Lula met for three hours with Trump at the White House to discuss outstanding bilateral trade issues, potential cooperation on critical minerals, and the U.S. pressure campaign on Cuba. The main outcome was the creation of a joint Brazil–U.S. working group on tariff disputes and pending the U.S. Section 301 investigations into Brazilian trade practices, including e-commerce tariffs. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was notably absent from the meeting, as he was visiting the Pope at the Vatican. Trump described the meeting as “very dynamic” and Lula indicated he was “very satisfied.”
Less than three weeks later, the constructive dialogue between Lula and Trump began to unravel. On May 26, Trump hosted Senator Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party (PL)—the leading opposition presidential candidate—his brother, former PL Federal Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro (currently residing in Texas), and journalist/Bolsonaro ally Paulo Figueiredo, for a closed-door meeting in the Oval Office.
Just two days later, and at the request of Flávio Bolsonaro, Marco Rubio announced that the Brazilian criminal factions Comando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital would be designated as international terrorist organizations, potentially serving as a pretext for future U.S. military intervention. Lula had specifically asked Trump to avoid such a designation so that regular joint and multilateral law enforcement efforts could proceed. However, Trump yielded to the demand of the opposition presidential candidate.
At the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains on June 17, Trump stated publicly that Brazil had become “politically dangerous” and that the Lula administration wanted to arrest “Bolsonaro Junior,” who was “doing well in the polls.” Flávio Bolsonaro was not being arrested. Rather, the Brazilian courts had convicted Eduardo Bolsonaro for pressuring the U.S. government to interfere in his father’s trial before the Federal Supreme Court.
Informed of Trump’s comments, Lula retorted : “He can keep liking Bolsonaro—the father, the son, the grandson—that’s not my problem, it’s his… But do not meddle in Brazil’s elections, because Brazil’s elections are Brazil’s business.”
By August 2026, relations between the two governments had reached an unprecedented crisis point. The Trump administration decided to impose an additional 25 percent tariff on select Brazilian products. Rubio personally attacked Lula, claiming without basis that the Brazilian president was not negotiating in good faith regarding impending trade issues and was putting his ego ahead of his own country’s national interests. The Trump administration announced an additional 12.5 percent duty on Brazilian goods based on alleged unfair trade practices, claiming that Brazil was doing “too little” regarding forced labor.
Brazil, in response, has threatened retaliatory tariffs. Unlike Canada, in its dispute with the Trump administration, Brazil hasn’t immediately implemented them.
The diplomatic dispute escalated further over the North America summer. Brazil refused to grant entry visas to two U.S. government officials intending to investigate and question the Brazilian electoral system. It also delayed approval of Trump’s nominee Daniel Perez (a right-wing Republican and former Speaker of the Florida House) as U.S. ambassador to Brasília, Brazil has indicated that it will not grant diplomatic credentials to Pérez prior to the October elections.
In retaliation, U.S. authorities disqualified the visa of Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti on August 4. Viotti has served as Brazil’s ambassador to the United States since 2023.
On August 21, Lula placed an 80-minute phone call to President Trump. During the conversation, the Brazilian president argued that the reasons cited by the United States to justify new tariffs—forced labor, ethanol, anti-corruption efforts, intellectual property, preferential trade agreements, and deforestation—were “unfounded.”
Electoral Impact
Given this crisis in relations, many in Brazil worry that the Trump administration will try to influence the outcome of the upcoming elections and undermine the integrity of the Brazilian electoral system. It is not clear, if Lula is re-elected in October, that the Trump administration will recognize and respect the result.
If Trump is driven by “America First” interests, he will not interfere. Pragmatic U.S. interests dictate non-interference to achieve several goals: signing a critical minerals agreement with Brazil; genuine cooperation in combating organized crime; and safeguarding US national security by preserving stability in South America’s largest country. Furthermore, a segment of the U.S. business community—traditionally a dominant influence in the Republican Party— favors this pragmatic approach.
If Trump pays closer attention to ideologues in his administration—including Marco Rubio and Darren Beattie, senior advisor to the State Department for Brazil policy, who advocate for a radical distortion of the original Monroe Doctrine in order to achieve total U.S. hegemony and a right-wing alignment in the hemisphere—the chances of greater U.S. interference in the Brazilian elections will increase. Leaders of major tech companies such as Elon Musk would readily support and fund such interference.
Progressive civil society organizations in both Brazil and the United States are acutely aware of this danger and have brought delegations of Brazilian congressional representatives and NGOs to Washington to alert receptive members of Congress. The challenge, of course, is that the U.S. midterm elections—which could shift the balance of power in Congress—take place on November 3, 2026—after the second round of Brazilian elections on October 25.
A shift of power in Congress in November could be significant if Lula wins re-election in October and extremist elements in the Trump administration, in collusion with bolsonaristas , push the United States not to recognize or accept the result. If Democrats gain control of the House of Representatives and potentially the Senate, they could thwart maneuvers by the Trump administration in favor of the bolsonaristas . Polarization in Brazil could thus become a dividing line within the U.S. government itself.
The future of constructive relations between the hemisphere’s two largest democracies is unquestionably at stake, with serious consequences for the entire planet.
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Brazil Faces Key Democratic Test
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