On September 21, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq officially announced the completion of the long-delayed unification and reorganization of its Peshmerga paramilitary forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA).

The Peshmerga are Kurdish armed forces, with roots going back to Kurdish guerrillas who fought as a more or less united front against successive Iraqi governments for most of the 20th century. After the 2003 invasion, though, they never came together as one Kurdish national army. Instead, they split into two separate party forces, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), each tied to one of the region's dominant political factions.

Kurdish leaders hailed the September unification announcement as a historic victory for the Kurds in Iraq. Notably, the unification happened nine days before the final U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq.

The timing raises an important question: as Washington shrinks its direct military presence in Iraq, what security architecture will it leave behind?

A unified Peshmerga could provide a key part of the answer.

From coalition dependence to security partnership

The U.S. has been supporting Peshmerga reform for years, mainly as part of the international coalition's support for the Kurdish fight against ISIS . A memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2022 set out how the U.S. could transform the Peshmerga into a professional military partner.

A newly unified Peshmerga could end up on the front line against Iran-aligned militias and a possible resurgence of ISIS. For the Kurds, this may be part of the logic behind the timing of unification itself: a fragmented Peshmerga would be far less equipped to absorb pressure than a unified one.

There is no clear indication that Washington planned the September 21 announcement as part of its withdrawal strategy. Peshmerga reform has been underway for years. Still, the timing is hard to ignore, and it makes sense to look at the two developments side by side.

For Washington, ending a military mission doesn't mean surrendering its interests in the region, particularly amid a war with Iran . The U.S. interests in Iraq are as follows: first, keeping ISIS from coming back and tempting the U.S. to intervene once more; and second, containing Iran's influence and preventing its spreading into Iraq's state institutions and armed groups, especially with the wider U.S.-Iran standoff still playing out.

Going forward, the plan is for Iraqi and Kurdish institutions to carry more of the load for ensuring security themselves. Meanwhile, the U.S. and its European partners will shift to other kinds of support: training, advising, intelligence sharing, and helping local forces build their own capacity.

The Peshmerga force is situated to help secure U.S. interests, particularly since the Kurdish region’s territory borders Iran. The real question is whether the reform and unification of Peshmerga forces go according to the plan that has been set by the Kurdish leaders under Washington's watch, or the intra Kurdish division prevents the united Kurdish army from materializing.

Can the unification process overcome intra-Kurdish fragmentation?

The real test is whether the new structure that has been outlined by KRG officials changes who commands in reality. Critics highlight that the new Regional Command 1 of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces is led by KDP and that the Regional Command 2 is led by PUK. Also, each command can still appoint their own division and brigade commander.

This suggests that loyalty and allegiance to political parties remains the decisive mechanism through which each command functions. The MoPA did not hide the reality that there is still significant work to be done for the unification to be concluded. In response to the critiques, the Ministry highlighted some achievements that can elaborate on how the KRG can overcome the obstacles of the unification process.

One of the crucial accomplishments of the unification process in recent years is that, nowadays, the payments of the salaries of all Peshmerga forces, regardless of their different commands, have been united through a central ministry account. This means that soldiers’ salaries are tied directly to the ministry, not to political parties.

Kurdish officials say they hope to end party influence throughout the Peshmerga by the end of this year. Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, Masrour Barzani says unification is only “the first phase of a long path.”

Whether leaders will truly set rivalries aside is unclear. It has been two years since the region held parliamentary elections, yet it still has not formed a new government. This is due to political deadlock between the two major political parties over sharing the core ministerial and high governmental offices of the KRG.

The question now is whether external pressure can help force the two sides to set aside their differences. Washington has long made unification a condition of providing aid, and its military departure will now increase the incentives for the sides to reach a unified front. As it leaves the country militarily, Washington will have to refocus its diplomatic efforts on encouraging unification in order to help overcome political deadlock.

The Iran factor

If Iran-aligned armed groups refuse to lay down their weapons or turn them over to the state, this presents another issue for the U.S. withdrawal. The duty of disarming the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq — a key step in strengthening the Iraqi state — now falls on the Iraqis.

The American side is leaving Iraq according to a previous agreement with the Iraqi government, which hoped it could disarm Iranian-backed militias ahead of the U.S. withdrawal. However, these groups have resisted calls to give up weapons, saying foreign forces should leave first before disarmament can take place.

At this stage, the groups remain too powerful to easily control, and the Iranian government has a strong interest in supporting them, particularly when they can threaten the U.S.-aligned forces across the region. The coming weeks and months will thus bring a battle of wills between the Iraqi government and the militias it has long sought to control.

What happens now?

The real test starts now that the Coalition has completed its withdrawal.

Iraq appears to be entering a new phase, with fewer foreign troops but continued foreign security partnerships. The Peshmerga's September 21 unification could facilitate this shift, particularly if it overcomes the difficulties inherent to any military unification effort.

What matters now is whether the United States and its European partners can cut back their direct military presence and still leave behind local institutions strong enough to prevent a return of ISIS and keep regional rivals and militia groups in check.

Thus, the U.S. may be leaving Iraq militarily, but the security relationships it spent years building aren't necessarily leaving with it.