In the first round of the presidential election in Brazil, the son of the disgraced former leader of the country managed to eke out a first-round victory against the incumbent. Flávio Bolsonaro won about 47 percent of the vote to 45 percent for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). They will go head to head in a run-off on October 25. For many analysts, Donald Trump is the key factor in the race, both his influence and his active intervention in the elections.

But Trump is not a concern for many Brazilians. Rather, populism is: specifically, Lulaism and Bolsonarism. These two camps are divided into center left and far right, and this division has made Brazil into a mirror of U.S. politics. This is not because of outward influences, but rather governmental frustrations that have turned into finger-pointing. Brazilians have realized that their country of the future—Brazil’s alternative to the American Dream—has veered off into disillusionment. The elections have become a process to select the least offensive candidate (Lula), the most aggressive candidate (Renan Santos), or anybody who differs from Lula (Bolsonaro). The apathy that prevails among young voters might lead to the election of authoritarian leaders for the foreseeable future.

What allowed Flávio Bolsonaro to court so many voters pre-dates Trump, and it can be divided into two main factors. The first is how politics works in Brazil, and the second is how corruption has become so infused into the governmental process that most Brazilians did not know it existed until it became headline news in 2014 during the Lava Jato scandal.

Picanha Every Night

To say that all of these events were part of some Orange Wave stemming from the “Donroe Doctrine” diminishes Brazilians as the victims of their own decisions and indirectly points to outside influences. Interference in the election was of little concern to many of the Brazilians I interviewed. In response to tariffs, they reminded me that their main trade partner is China, not the United States. Lulaists restated similar talking points Lula has made in past speeches, most notably in front of the United Nations, to the effect that the United States, as an imperialist nation, has and will continue to interfere.

The Bolsonarists had much more to say. They claimed that Lula is a liar and a corrupt politician, that he works with the criminal organizations Comando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital. The poor adore him, the Bolsonaro camp argues, because he gives them free money after they vote for him. Lula promised the middle and upper classes picanha (a choice sirloin cut of beef) on their tables every night. But he didn’t deliver.

Their candidate, by contract, is not corrupt. Bolsonaro supporters will wave away any mentions of the corruption scandal of Banco Master, the embezzlement during his term as the senator for Rio de Janeiro, and the Bolsonaro’s family connections to organized crime. He will work, they say, with Trump to remove the criminal organizations. Lula turned down Trump’s offer to label them as terrorists because Lula let them into government. Some Bolsonaro supporters say that they don’t know if Flávio will be better than Lula, but they know that he is certainly not Lula.

In their recent book on Brazilian populism , Daniel De Mendonça, Bianca Linhares, and Mark Devenney break down Lula and Bolsonaro into symbols:

Lula represents a simple man of the people, a worker, holding the highest power in the republic. Bolsonaro represents a radical response to Lula’s break with Brazilian elites, a violently disproportionate political reaction against what they viewed as the cosmic misalignment caused by the success of Lula.

As such, Lula’s popularity is separate from his Worker’s Party (PT). As I was told on many occasions, “We vote for Lula, not for a party.” The PT will not likely endure after Lula, regardless of whether he wins another term or loses the runoff election. Simply put, no other candidates can be considered a successor.

Defender of Democracy

And Lula will not likely win the runoffs. Despite his pledge to reach those who did not vote on October 4, no presidential candidate in Brazil has ever finished second in the first round and then won a runoff. Political scientist Gabriel Elias points out that even if Lula wins, the Liberal Party (which is very much anti-Lula) will control both houses of Congress: “Lula would find it practically impossible to govern. It’s not worth governing like that.”

Others are more optimistic. Daniel De Mendonça, co-author of the aforementioned book on Brazilian populism, believes that Bolsonarism is just plain elitism. Many in the upper and middle classes simply hate poor people, he argues, and they don’t want to share resources or see any group whether poor, black, or indigenous move up and use the same resources, opportunities, and advantages they have enjoyed. Economist Thomás Zicman de Barros adds that many retirees and poor people are behind Lula, but they rarely come out to vote. Lula “has the right strategy,” he notes, but getting them to vote is a different matter. Both De Barros and De Mendonça note that the many grievances voters have taken to the ballot box are beyond Lula’s control.

De Barros adds that the favorable conditions that existed in the early to mid-2010s are no longer present. During his first two terms, “Lula took 40 million people out of poverty” with programs such as Bolsa Familiar, and he ended his second term with an approval rating of 97 percent. During his third term, Lula has been less a galvanizing voice of the radical left and more a “defender of institutions of democracy,” De Barros continues.” “They (Brazilians) don’t live democracy in their daily life. Democracy has always had something to do with equality, with inclusion, and for many people, they don’t feel included and don’t feel heard.”

Economics plays a major role here, given Brazil’s identity as a commodity exporter. During times of economic growth, Brazil is fine. But after four years of far-right rule, COVID, and now inflation, many voters want to return to what it was like during Lula’s first two terms. “We are living in an economic crisis,” De Mendonça adds. “The interest taxes in Brazil are 14 percent per year, which is among the highest of the world.” It is “impossible to develop an economy” in this situation, he concludes.

A Far-Right Revolution

Let’s imagine what a Flávio Presidency will be like.

The corruption charges lobbied against both him and his father Jair Bolsonaro will disappear. Most likely, the elder Bolsonaro will heavily influence the government. Whether Jair will ever run again is unlikely due to his age and medical condition. The efforts of his other son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, will allow Trump to exploit opportunities in the oil sector and exert influence in Brazilian politics. The BRICs will most likely see a return to a hands-off approach reminiscent of Jair Bolsonaro’s first term. The Brazilian Supreme Court will become much more conservative with the addition of four or more conservative justices. Major social programs will continue to function but will not receive much more resources.

None of this will help Brazil. Yet, at the moment, a large number of constituents want this kind of change.

As a commenter who works off of São Paolo’s Avenida Paulista told me, “Things could get ugly without Lula, though I hope those aligned with him carry that strength forward to fight for a better Brazil.” Other options, like the failed presidential candidate Renan Santos who cites Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele as an inspiration, could become more popular if Bolsonarism fades. “If he really steps up his game and becomes much more transparent, I think [Santos] could garner a lot of support,” he adds. “Still, he scares me a bit because, at times, he acts just like a product of the Bolsonarista mold. If he ever came to power, he might turn out to be just like the fake patriots we see today.”

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