Let’s imagine a bit of “future history” in Ukraine.

It is February 2027. The Ukrainian winter has been unusually cold, and Russian air strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, transportation grid, and communications networks have been increasingly destructive. Ukraine has no effective defenses against massive barrages of Russian missiles, glide bombs, and jet-powered drones, as Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks both to cripple Ukraine’s ability to field an effective military and to break its will to continue fighting.

Lacking heat, water, and electricity, millions of Ukrainians are fleeing Kyiv and other major cities. Western embassies are temporarily relocating from the capital to safer environs. Russian attacks on data centers and Starlink terminals begin to erode Ukraine’s battlefield targeting and communications, jeopardizing its prospects for holding the last two “fortress cities” in the Donbas region once warmer weather allows ground combat to intensify.

Amid growing fears of starvation and hypothermia, international aid organizations declare a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. Western media accuse Putin of perpetrating crimes against humanity, and NATO allies press Washington for action, worried that their vision of Ukraine as an enduring “ steel porcupine ,” armed to the teeth against Russian aggression for decades to come, looks increasingly illusory. The U.S. Congress – now controlled by Democrats following their resounding victories in mid-term elections – demands that Trump stop Russian attacks and rally the NATO alliance around defense of Ukraine.

Trump’s menu of diplomatic options to halt or deter Russia looks disturbingly thin, however. Neither the threat of new economic sanctions nor the lure of new business deals has dented Putin’s opposition to a provisional ceasefire arrangement. Moscow continues to insist that no ceasefire is possible absent a broader peace settlement that addresses key political and security issues in Ukraine and ends NATO enlargement. But there is little appetite in Washington or Europe for negotiating with Russia over such matters, particularly in the midst of an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Ukraine.

The military menu looks similarly unappetizing. Western stockpiles of Patriot air defense missiles have all but disappeared, depleted by years of war in Ukraine and many months of intense missile combat with Iran. New production will take years to meet Ukraine’s needs. Ukraine’s small fleet of F-16 fighter aircraft – perhaps its most effective defense against jet-powered drones – has been largely grounded by maintenance woes , and Europe worries that large-scale transfers of additional fighter aircraft to Ukraine could leave NATO uncomfortably vulnerable should war erupt with Russia.

Given the paucity of alternatives, Western planners gravitate toward a high-risk “escalate to de-escalate” strategy. Some call for imposing a “no- fly zone,” using NATO combat air patrols over Ukrainian airspace to shoot down Russian jet-powered drones and cruise missiles. Not wanting to risk direct combat in Ukraine, however, NATO ultimately decides to position ground and naval forces around the land and maritime borders of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, warning Moscow that continuing its efforts to deprive Ukraine of heat, electricity, and other vital supplies will produce a corresponding squeeze of Kaliningrad’s population.

Russia and the West soon find themselves in a genuine military crisis. Moscow reiterates its warning that it will respond to a blockade of Kaliningrad with its full arsenal of armaments, including nuclear weapons. In turn, the United States and NATO effectively dare Russia to fire the first shot against Western forces threatening Russia’s access to Kaliningrad through Lithuania and the Baltic Sea.

Such a scenario is far from inevitable. Lamentably, however, it is becoming not only imaginable but increasingly likely, as U.S.-mediated peace talks stall and Russia becomes convinced that the Trump administration has no ability – and Europe has no desire – to orchestrate a settlement that addresses Russia’s core concerns anytime soon.

What might Team Trump do to reduce the odds of such dangerous developments? The most effective approach would also be the most unlikely under present circumstances: to broaden the scope of its negotiations with Moscow to include talks on European security issues beyond Ukraine. Such talks would consider new mechanisms for crisis management and risk reduction with Russia, confidence- and security-building measures, and conventional and nuclear arms control. The prospect of new accords on matters critical to Russian security would provide Putin with a significant incentive to soften his demands over Ukraine.

Nonetheless, U.S. officials have so far not pursued this course, and key European leaders have ruled it out.

Short of formal talks,Trump could take two steps that might reduce the risks of a future crisis. The first would be to recognize that the “escalate to de-escalate” strategy – which the West has pursued in various forms since early in this war – has consistently led to Russian counter-escalation rather than concessions. Moscow insists that its increasingly brutal air campaign is a response to Ukraine’s campaign of long-range drone attacks on Russian energy and commercial targets, and it has hardened its negotiating demands as Ukrainian attacks have continued.

Given that Kyiv has not achieved its goals (witness the meager impact of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proclaimed “Forty-Day Influence Campaign” on Russian decision-making), while providing Putin with a ready justification for intensifying Russian air strikes, it makes little sense for the United States to continue enabling Ukrainian long-range strikes with critical targeting data.

The second would be to open what is often termed a “back channel” with Moscow: a private, informal dialogue between a trusted Trump envoy and a Kremlin designee aimed at clarifying each side’s redlines and discussing in advance how to avoid or manage the kinds of crises that might emerge between Washington and Moscow in the coming months and years.

In view of the robust media attention that White House envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner attract every time they meet with Putin or their Russian counterpart, Kirill Dmitriev, they are ill-suited to play such a discreet role. The publicity surrounding CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s recent visit to Moscow underscores how difficult it is for prominent American officials to conduct such talks in secret. However, Trump certainly has access to experienced but lower-profile American experts well suited to perform this role.

Sooner or later, Washington and Moscow will have to discuss these matters, whether the Ukraine war ends at the negotiating table or escalates into a larger crisis. The time to start discussing them is now.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.