Why China needs Russia more than you think
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Tue, 09/08/2026 - 08:55
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Sep 08, 2026
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Why China needs Russia more than you think
It’s wrong to conclude that stark economic disparities prove Moscow needs Beijing more than Beijing needs Moscow. Andrew Scobell argues that China is well aware of that.
Chinese analysts often frame China-Russia relations in the context of the “triangular relations” ( 三角关系 ) between China, Russia and the US. This geometric conception not only implies that bilateral relations between Beijing and Moscow can be understood only as part of a trilateral configuration with Washington, but also that Russia remains a pivotal player, roughly on a par with the two most consequential great powers. It is also a revival of the Cold War era “strategic triangle” conception. Whereas in the 1970s, Beijing and Washington drew closer to counter-balance Moscow, today, Beijing cultivates Moscow as a counterweight to Washington.
This makes Russia more than the junior geoeconomic partner to China that it is often taken to be. Conventional wisdom holds that Beijing dominates the relationship with Moscow because Russia is vastly more dependent on China economically than vice versa. For example, Moscow conducts at least 34 percent of its total global trade with Beijing , while Moscow constitutes only around four percent of Beijing’s overall two-way trade. Moreover, China’s economic output is about eight times the size of Russia’s : Beijing’s gross domestic product (GDP) is second only to that of the US, while Moscow’s GDP ranks only ninth in the world. But this prevailing view is wrong.
Russia’s enduring heft
Russia’s geopolitical weight, strategic geography, natural resources and a congruent anti-Western worldview are of immense value to China when dealing with the US. No other great power has the same potent mix. While no longer the superpower it was in the days of the Soviet Union, Russia retains substantial heft as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and a key partner in high-profile Sinocentric forums such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Additionally, Moscow has a nuclear arsenal with roughly 5,500 warheads, nine times as many as China, and a potent conventional military machine, including a large arms manufacturing industry. Russia also holds vast oil and gas reserves and is a leading energy exporter. In 2025, Russian crude accounted for 17% of China’s oil imports and Russian natural gas for 30% of its gas imports . Moreover, its agricultural sector is substantial and Russia is a major grain producer and exporter . With China dependent upon imported energy and grains and eager to diversify its sources of supply, Russian exports of these strategic commodities are valuable to Beijing.
Geography also makes Russia particularly valuable to China. From Beijing’s perspective, the country occupies prime real estate: Russia’s geographic contiguity to China means an extended common land border. This boundary is both peaceful and free of territorial disputes, making Russia a rarity – a non-threatening neighbor in a neighborhood Beijing perceives as teeming with traditional and nontraditional threats. Russia remains a key player in Central Asia as well as a frontline polar state, with an expansive northern coast hugging the Arctic Ocean and its northern sea route stretching from the Pacific Ocean in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west. This makes Moscow a gatekeeper to two regions of growing strategic importance: the vital landlocked expanse of Central Asia and the growing maritime domain of the Arctic.
Russia’s congruent worldview
Equally importantly, Moscow is neither allied nor aligned with Washington. That makes Russia the only permanent member of the UN Security Council other than China that is not in the US orbit. In a world where almost all sizeable powers have found themselves allied, aligned, or otherwise associated with the US, militarily, economically, and/or politically, Moscow stands out as the only one that perceives Washington as an implacable adversary. It regards the US as intent on containing Russia, weakening it strategically and ultimately undermining its position as an independent great power – an antagonism that predates Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The combativeness of the second Donald Trump administration towards US allies and friends has prompted many capitals to reassess Washington’s suitability as the partner of choice. But despite sundry humiliations, none have yet broken with it: Europe remains bound to the US through NATO; Japan, South Korea and Australia remain core US allies in the Indo-Pacific; and even countries pursuing strategic autonomy, such as India, continue to deepen security and economic ties with Washington. Russia is not alone in being unhappy with Washington, but it is unique in having broken with the US-led order and embraced China as its main strategic partner.
This has made Moscow’s worldview strikingly congruent with Beijing’s. Both capitals view the US as aggressive and meddlesome and are highly critical of US attacks on Iran . They consider Washington intrinsically antithetical to their vital national interests, posing existential dangers to their respective regimes. Both see NATO and other US alliances as threats. On a personal level, Chinese leader Xi Jinping enjoys a better relationship with Russia’s Vladimir Putin than he does with any other foreign leader. Having met more frequently than any other two sitting world leaders, the two appear to have great respect for each other and see eye to eye on most issues.
This does not mean that there are no differences of opinion or areas of friction in China-Russia relations, or that Beijing is totally content with Moscow. China is unhappy with Russia’s recently expanding security ties with North Korea, for example, viewing Pyongyang as rightfully being within Beijing’s sphere of influence. It is literally on China’s doorstep and its economy has been overwhelmingly dependent on its neighbor for decades. Beijing was also unhappy with Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The attack and the ensuing war have greatly complicated China’s foreign relations with Europe and proved very disruptive to China’s international trade.
Triangulating Russia
Despite Moscow’s diminished global standing since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has plenty of good reasons to still see Russia as an essential international actor – the only power on the world stage with anything approaching the strategic weight of the US and China. In “triangulating” 21st century Beijing-Moscow ties against both capitals’ ties to Washington, China is demonstrating the tremendous value it continues to attach to its bilateral relationship with Russia. And Moscow’s value as the third point in a geostrategic triangle will only increase if US-China rivalry intensifies.
The views expressed in this piece are those of the author.
Author(s)
Andrew Scobell
Senior Associate Fellow
Author(s)
Andrew Scobell
Senior Associate Fellow
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Aggregated summary from an independent source. Read the original at Merics.