During the first weeks of spring, Somalia's newly expanded Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) shifted its focus from the issue of implementing Shari'a law in the country to the problem of providing military security for itself and for the capital Mogadishu, which has continued to undergo armed civil conflict.
Shari'a and security topped the agenda of the Islamic Clerics Coouncil (I.C.C.), which forms the religious base of the T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmed, and which had issued demands that Shari'a be implemented within 90 days from March 1 and that the small African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) be withdrawn from Mogadishu within 120 days from March 1. With Sh. Sharif and the T.F.G.'s cabinet having agreed to the implementation of Shari'a pending parliamentary approval, that issue was temporarily deferred, although it will surely arise again if the transitional parliament does not take action within the time limit or fails to pass a version of Shari'a that is satisfactory to the I.C.C. The problem of security is even more fraught with difficulty, because the T.F.G. depends upon AMISOM for its own protection and for safeguarding key installations such as Mogadishu's seaport and airport. In addition, the international coalition of Western donor powers and the United Nations, upon
which the T.F.G. depends for financing, insists that AMISOM remain in place, leaving Sh. Sharif cross-pressured by the donors and his base.
Conflict over security began in earnest on March 20 when the T.F.G.'s foreign minister, Abdullahi Omar, addressed the U.N. Security Council, urging it to support AMISOM and saying that the T.F.G. would welcome U.N. peacekeepers. Almost immediately, the I.C.C. condemned Omar's appeal and was joined by Sh. Abdirahman Al-Nueimi, who is leading a delegation from the World Islamic Organization, which is attempting to mediate between the T.F.G. and its armed opposition. The Tradition and Unity Council (T.U.C.), an umbrella group representing powerful sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family in Mogadishu that works in tandem with the I.C.C., called on Omar to rescind his appeal, adding that Hawiye militias would fight against any foreign troops. Members of the transitional parliament also came out against Omar, with Ahmed Abdullahi Fanah telling the press that foreign troops were not needed and that AMISOM should be removed now that Somalia was on track to implement Shari'a. A group of M.P.s led by Abdinasir Garane declared that "Islamic law and foreign peacekeepers cannot go hand-in-hand."
As opposition to Omar's appeal mounted, the T.F.G.'s information minister, Farhan Mohamed, denied that Omar had requested foreign forces at the U.N.S.C., stating that if he had, he would have been "alone in his position," and that "the government has already said that it would wholeheartedly follow the accord of the Islamic scholars." Omar responded that AMISOM was in Somalia at "the government's request" and that "they will stay until peace is restored."
By March 24, resistance to Omar's appeal had become so intense that Sh. Sharif, who was on an extended trip through Arab countries seeking diplomatic and financial support, said from Khartoum that he was not in Sudan to request troops for AMISOM. The T.F.G.'s prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke, apologized for Omar's remarks at the U.N. and said that the foreign minister should hold a press conference to clarify what he meant. Omar complied, saying that he had meant that military aid, especially training for government forces, was needed rather than more foreign troops, and that AMISOM would withdraw "when our forces are trained and equipped." "The government is obliged to do what the Somali people want," Omar said.
Meanwhile, the African Union, which follows the lead of the donor coalition, appeared to be unaffected by the controversy swirling in and around the T.F.G. Speaking from an A.U. consultative meeting in Addis Ababa on March 24, the A.U.'s peace and security commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra, said that statements about pressures on Sh. Sharif to have AMISOM withdraw proceeded either from "ignorance" about the peacekeepers' role or from a "pre-judged hostile position toward every friendly force, so I would not be worried the the statements either way." Lamamra added that the A.U. was planning to beef up AMISOM and was speaking with African countries, notably Rwanda, about contributing forces to the mission, which now includes troops from Uganda and Burundi. The A.U.'s special representative to Somalia, Nicolas Bwakira, reported a "strong sense" that Sh. Sharif was "making political progress," although security conditions were hindering the distribution of humanitarian aid. Uganda announced that it had sent a fresh battalion to Mogadishu, bringing AMISOM to half of its projected force level of 8000 troops.
Opposition to AMISOM's deployment continued as March drew to a close. M.P.s continued to speak out and T.U.C. spokesman Abduallahi Dheere said that the group was waiting for AMISOM to withdraw before the I.C.C.'s 120 day deadline, warning that "our mujahideen are present" and that "we will not at any time welcome the foreign troops." On March 26, parliamentary pressure forced Speaker Adan Madobe to announce that he would schedule a debate on AMISOM in the near future.
On March 28, the T.U.C., which had sent a delegation to Nairobi to press AMISOM withdrawal on the donor powers, reported through its spokesman, Ahmed Diriye Ali, that the donors had agreed and that the U.S. had assured the delegation that AMISOM would leave Somalia within four months. On the same day, Sh. Sharif finally made his decision, announcing that AMISOM would remain in Mogadishu until the T.F.G. could handle security for itself. Deputy Prime Minister Abdiwahid Ilmi Ganjeh added: "We cannot do without AMISOM at this time." Bwakira quickly announced that more AMISOM forces would be deployed and that the T.F.G. had requested the full complement of 8000.
On March 29, Bwakira met with Sh. Sharif, welcoming the latter's decision to have AMISOM remain and promising to help the T.F.G. establish a "professional security force." In short order, on March 30, the A.U. Commission and the T.F.G. signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for the A.U. to train the first 2700 troops of a National Security Force, pending establishment of a U.N. trust fund to finance the project. Bwakira announced that the A.U. would contribute US$1 million as "seed money" for the force at an April 22 donor's meeting in Brussels. The Memorandum made it clear that the T.F.G. had requested the agreement and that the agreement was consistent with the recommendations of the International Contact Group, the organization of donor powers inspired by Washington and chaired by the U.N.'s special representative to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah.
On April 4, speaking in Abu Dhabi, the T.F.G.'s ambassador at large, Abdi Jama, appealed to Arab states for aid, saying that "we just don't have the infrastructure" to train security forces. The T.U.C.'s chair, Mohamed Hassan Haad, grimly retracted the group's statement that the donor powers had agreed to an AMISOM withdrawal, commenting that the A.U., E.U., and U.N. want foreign troops in Somalia and do not trust the T.F.G. and the Somali people. Denying the claim that Somalia is a "failed state," Jama told his audience in Abu Dhabi that "we are a weak state, not in control and without proper security."
Analysis
In promising to implement Shari'a law in Somalia, Sh. Sharif temporarily appeased his base and alienated the donors; in agreeing that AMISOM should remain in Somalia, he satisfied the donors and alienated his base, as well as stiffening the resolve of the armed opposition to the T.F.G., which is dominant in the country's southern regions, contests control of its central regions with administrations that are loosely allied with the T.F.G., and is active in and controls parts of Mogadishu.
It would be a mistake to view Sh. Sharif's attempts to split the difference as an indication of calculated strategy; it is, instead, a sign of weakness and expedient capitulation that simply defers his having to come to terms with the intense cross-pressures on him.
Push will come to shove on Shari'a when the day arrives - as it will - that the version of Islamic law to be implemented has to be decided. The problems and conflicts ahead were made clear by Sharmarke in a March 22 interview with the Toronto Star, in which he commented that the implementation of Shari'a is "really kind of a long discussion and a dialogue amongst scholars on how this could actually be implemented." Sharmarke added that whatever form of Shari'a was adopted, women would have to serve in the cabinet, a requirement that would not rest easy with some of the I.C.C. and certainly not with clerics supporting and leading the armed opposition.
As for Sh. Sharif's decision to accept the presence of AMISOM, Hassan Haad is correct that the donors do not trust the T.F.G. and insist on having foreign forces in Somalia, if only to protect their meager "investment" of support for the government. Having acquiesced in the implementation of Shari'a (in the hopes that it would simply be cosmetic), they put their foot down on AMISOM. If Sh. Sharif wanted AMISOM to remain and, indeed to be expanded - and it is not clear that he did - it would only indicate the weakness of his position and his dependence on external actors - a signal to domestic actors that he is vulnerable.
The motives of the donors for wanting AMISOM expanded are not entirely clear, despite Haad's perceptive reading. Islamic scholar Imam Kasoori commented to Kenya's East African newspaper on March 29 that Uganda is in Somalia "on behalf of the U.S." and that after a two-year deployment without effect, "it appears they are now preparing for war." Although that judgment might appear to be extravagant, it needs to be kept in mind. In any case, a source who is close to AMISOM reports that it is not possible for the peacekeepers to withdraw in anywhere near three or four months, particularly if the mission is tasked with training a "national security force." Again, Sh. Sharif has merely deferred the reckoning that lies ahead.
It is also not clear that the donors, which have not made any public statements recently, will back their pressure with tangible support; their track record in the past is, to be generous, unpromising. In its April 3 report, "Political Progress, Humanitarian Stalemate," Refugees International commented that AMISOM is currently operating "without basic systems of command and control," that international support for it is "uncoordinated and inconsistent," and that its response fire to attacks on its forces is exploited by the armed opposition. Yet the report says that AMISOM "is still critical" for the surivival of the T.F.G. and recommends that its mandate not be expanded beyond protecting government officials, key installations, and delivery of humanitarian aid; and that its force levels not be increased. A better picture of the international coalition's intentions and AMISOM's future might appear after the April 22 donor's
conference in Brussels.
During the last half of March, Sh. Sharif was away from Mogadishu most of the time, begging for financial support in the Arab world and ending up with a pledge of US$18 million from the Arab League that was far short of what he was reported to have expected (he was reportedly told that he should continue to speak with Arab governments about financial contributions). An earlier swing through East Africa also netted him very little. Sh. Sharif now finds himself praised for making "political progress," but with very little tangible help. If Sh. Sharif ever had a honeymoon, it has ended with the dawn of spring.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University