"Stakeholders" Fail to Fill a Perceived "Security Vacuum"

Through December, the political dynamics of Somalia have been determined by the growing expectation on the parts of all actors that exactly two years after Ethiopia invaded south-central Somalia in a campaign to crush the Islamic Courts movement, Addis Ababa would pull the plug on its occupation, opening up a projected "security vacuum" rife with dire consequences - civil war, descent into "anarchy," or a radical Islamist takeover, depending on who was making the prediction.

Whether or not such a "security vacuum" will eventuate from the likely Ethiopian withdrawal - a forecast that is questioned by some analysts and observers, such as Prof. Abdi Samatar, who argue that if left to themselves, Somali factions will reach some sort of modus vivendi, if not reconciliation - the political players were convinced that it would and acted accordingly. Fearful of radical Islam and regional instability, the major external actors - Western powers, regional states, the United Nations and the African Union - engaged in a flurry of diplomacy aimed at trying to fill the perceived vacuum with some sort of force that would replace the Ethiopians: they failed.

Meanwhile, domestic actors moved either to defend interests threatened by an Ethiopian withdrawal or to take advantage of opportunities presented by it, continuing a previous situation marked by increasing fragmentation, shifting alliance formation and mutual distrust of intentions, all spelling radical uncertainty.

The "International Community" Fails to Fill the Vacuum Among the external actors, the ones that stood to lose the most from an Ethiopian pull-out were Uganda and Burundi, which had sent two battalions each (3400 troops) to Somalia's official capital Mogadishu as part of a projected 8000 strong A.U. peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) endorsed by the U.N. that was supposed to have replaced the Ethiopians, but remained - due to lack of force commitments from African states and financial and logistical support from Western powers - confined to guarding key installations. An Ethiopian withdrawal would leave AMISOM unable to defend itself against an ever more powerful Islamist-led insurgency that was encroaching on Mogadishu and already controlled parts of the capital.

On December 3, AMISOM commander, Ugandan Major-General Francis Okello, announced that the peacekeepers did "not have enough forces" to replace the Ethiopians. Okello's plea for help was followed quickly by a visit by A.U. Commission chairman, Jean Ping, and the head of the organization's Peace and Security Commission, Ramtane Lamamra, to Cairo where they held talks with the Arab League on possible contributions by Arab states to AMISOM. Lamamra said that Uganda and Burundi had pledged to contribute another battalion each to the peacekeeping force if they were given financial and logistical help, adding that the pledged forces would "almost make up for" the Ethiopians.

That the U.N. was not ready to respond decisively to fill the security vacuum became evident in a press conference held by Michele Montas, spokesperson for U.N. Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon. Montas said that Ban was "concerned" about a "security vacuum," but had failed in his efforts to find any state willing to lead his preferred solution - a multi-national force composed of a "coalition of the willing" that would function as "peace enforcers" rather than peacekeepers. When asked about the collapse of Somalia's internationally- recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which is dependent for its existence (such as it is) on foreign military support, Montas responded: "The fact that there is a government who is there and who does not control the territory is not something that I can really comment on." Montas concluded: "There cannot be something on the political front if you don't have security
there."

The collision course between the A.U. and U.N. was set on December 11, when Lamamra went to New York on a mission to persuade the U.N. Security council to
"urgently dispatch" a peacekeeping mission. On the same day, reports began to circulate in the media that Washington was preparing a resolution to be put before the U.N.S.C. authorizing a U.N. force. Adding to the pressure, Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, addressed the country's parliament and said that AMISOM had expressed the desire to withdraw from Somalia before Ethiopia did, and that Addis Ababa would "help their safe passage" and then would leave the country. Zenawi stated that Ethiopia would intervene again in Somalia if its security was threatened, but had already "given the international community enough time for peacekeeping force deployment."

Uganda and Burundi quickly responded that they were not contemplating the withdrawal of their AMISOM forces; indeed, Uganda's deputy foreign minister, Okello Oryun, confirmed Lamamra's earlier statement that Uganda was "ready to increase" its presence. The picture changed the next day when Ping said cryptically that the withdrawal of peacekeepers was "subject to a certain number of conditions that are not yet met." He then appealed to African states to beef up AMISOM, to A.U. "partners" to finance a build-up, and to the U.N.S.C. to "join us."

As a scheduled meeting of the U.N.S.C. on December 17 drew close, A.U. special representative for Somalia, Nicolas Bwakira, traveled to Uganda and Burundi on December 13 to pound out a common position. Burundi's president, Pierre Nkuruziza reaffirmed support for AMISOM, but Uganda's permanent secretary for foreign affairs, James Mugume, announced, in a reversal of position, that Kampala would withdraw its forces if Ethiopia pulled out, adding that "our troops are not enough" unless the "international community" provides more forces. Bwakira said that the "responsibility for peace and security" belonged to the U.N.S.C.

As Bwakira threw the ball to the U.N., Nicole Deaner, spokesperson for Washington's U.N. mission, dealt the final blow to Ban's plan for peace enforcers, claiming that in addition to the absence of a lead state, such a mission would rely on individual states to provide forces and equipment, and to bear the costs. Deaner concluded: "AMISOM is an effective peacekeeping force and will provide a good starting place in developing and deploying a future U.N. mission." Reuters quoted a diplomat at the U.N.S.C.: "No one wants to go to Somalia; it's too risky.

From then on, the fate of U.N.S.C. backing for a more robust peacekeeping mission was sealed, although Washington continued to press for a more modest force that would build on AMISOM at a meeting of the U.S.-inspired International Contact Group (I.C.G.), composed of Somalia's "stakeholders," ahead of the December 17 U.N.S.C. deliberations. The chair of the I.C.G., U.N. special representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, promised that the group would come up with "positive concrete measures" at its December 16 meeting.

With Burundi continuing to pledge another battalion to AMISOM and Uganda announcing that it had not yet decided on withdrawal and was conferring with "stakeholders," Washington failed to gain sufficient support within the I.C.G. for a U.N.S.C. resolution that would enhance AMISOM. Rather than reporting any "positive concrete" action, the I.C.G.'s communique expressed appreciation for AMISOM and recognized the "urgent need" to provide it with greater support. In the most telling phrase in the document, the I.C.G. "recalled" its support for a U.N. stabilization force, adding that its possibility was discussed, with some participants backing the idea and others desiring "more discussion."

When the U.N.S.C. met on December 17, it was a foregone conclusion that no resolution would be presented authorizing an enhanced U.N. force. Briefing the
U.N.S.C., Ban reiterated his preference for a multi-national mission with "full military capabilities" to stop "armed confrontations," but acknowledged that he had found scant support for the plan. As a fall-back position, he urged providing AMISOM with "substantial and credible resources," building up Somali security forces and creating an international maritime rapid-response force that would undertake operations on the ground in Somalia when U.N. political, development and humanitarian missions were threatened, and when AMISOM needed help (the last proposal partaking of fantasy).

None of Ban's requests was tabled and the explanations for inaction offered by Council members and stakeholders revealed major differences in the "international community." U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that Washington still believed that it was "time to authorize a U.N. operation" and would continue to press for one that would be approved by the end of December, adding that she could not "imagine American forces" being part of it. Italy stated that support for AMISOM was the "best option" and that perhaps a trust fund could be set up to finance a "phased U.N. involvement" contingent on "political progress" in Somalia. The Arab League expressed a preference for a multi-national force. The A.U.'s Lamamra asked for a U.N. mission to be incorporated in an enhanced AMISOM, and called for stronger political support for the existing mission. France's U.N. ambassador, Jean-Maurice Ripert, was blunt, stating that a U.N. mission was neither "feasible nor desirable," and that Somalia needed to be "stabilized" before peacekeepers could be contemplated.

On Dec 20, Nigeria announced its commitment to bolster AMISOM with three battalions by the end of the first quarter of 2009. According to minister of foreign affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, the contingent would be heavily armed, able to defend itself and function as "peace enforcers." Maduekwe added that the battalions would be sent whether or not Great Britain supported the deployment financially.

The addition of the Nigerians would bring AMISOM up to a strength of 6000 and, if Burundi and Uganda came through with previous pledges, AMISOM would be at its originally projected level of 8000. Even then, AMISOM commanders have said that they would need 17000 troops just to secure Mogadishu in a deteriorating situation, and Ban projected an initial force of 10000 "highly-skilled" troopsm to prepare the way for a 22000 strong mission in his proposal.

The question of adequate force levels, of course, does not even touch the issues of whether a mandate can be secured for "peace enforcement," what the results of AMISOM taking sides in violent conflict would be, and whether a peacekeeping/ stabilization/enforcement mission would fill a purported security vacuum or - as is more likely - would incite more intense conflict, not to mention whether donors would come through with the adequate material support (on December 18, the A.U.'s Bwakira said that (U.S.)$200 million would be needed to bring AMISOM to the 8000 troop level). Those issues are beyond the scope of the present analysis, which is devoted simply to reporting the failure of external actors to serve what they claimed to be their own interests.

Conclusion

Tragic travesty is the appropriate term for describing the "political theater" - as the diaspora group Canadian Friends of Somalia calls it - that characterizes the present behavior of all Somalia's political actors, external and domestic. They strut around grandiloquently and come up impotent. Based on their track record, it was to be expected that the external "stakeholders" would fail to fill the "security gap" that they claimed to perceive and seemed to fear so much that it was an "urgent need" to address. The reason to describe their failure in some detail is not to provide any new insight, but to make it crystal clear that Somalia can expect nothing from the "international community" but the accustomed malign neglect accompanied by fits of destructive meddling.

No more than the domestic factions in Somalia are able to evince political coherence is the divided "international community" capable of coherent policy and decisive action, even when its members believe - if they actually do - that disaster is on the doorstep.

No doubt, the external actors will continue to mount their dreary performance and continue to cripple Somalia thereby.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University