12.31.2004 Friday
With only a few days to go until 17 December emotions are running high. What we have seen in Brussels and Turkey over the last few weeks is something bordering on hysteria.
While EU Member States have been engaged in a "war of words" over the language of the draft conclusions being prepared by the Dutch Presidency, Turkey and particularly the Turkish media, has been engaged in what seems like a non-stop round the clock analysis of who has said what, when they said it and what the implications are. More often than not these shenanigans have had a negative spin and have created unnecessary panic. On the one side, Turkey believes that the EU is moving the goal posts, failing to deliver the equal and fair treatment that it had promised suggesting that the EU is suffering from "selective amnesia". On the other side the EU is complaining about Turkey's continual griping, grunting and excessive demands.
It would have been naïve to believe that the drafting of this document was going to be a straightforward affair. The decision on Turkish accession is without doubt one of the most important decisions the EU will ever face with the results having far reaching implications for the EU, Turkey and, not least, for individual heads of state and government. The original decision to make Turkey a candidate country in 1999 was made by 15 countries. Today, with the enlargement of the EU the number of cooks in the kitchen has grown to 25. Producing a mutually acceptable text was always going to involve lots of talking, debating, arguing and redrafting. The Dutch Presidency is faced with a difficult task. Although there now seems to be unanimous agreement that accession talks should be opened, it is very clear that a number of Member States are doing all they can to produce a document that will be full of conditions and unclear wording. The fact that the conclusions continue to be leaked to the press and others has not made the task any easier. There is a clear balancing act that needs to be carried out and lets expect many, many versions until 17th December. In any event, the final text will almost certainly be agreed before the summit by France, Germany the UK and the Dutch Presidency. Chirac leads the group of those countries most skeptical so whatever he agrees to should be acceptable to them.
The final conclusions should reflect the Commission's Progress Report. Many things that Turkey did not like in this report will remain but that was only to be expected. For example, Turkish resistance over the reference to accession depending on the EU's capacity to absorb new members is futile. This wording has always been part of the Copenhagen Criteria and will be part of the negotiations as it was with all previous candidate countries. For Turkey the two most important phrases that should come out of this document are: a) that the process is for full membership, and b) that the Council agrees that talks should begin without delay. Either a precise date for opening talks will then be given or the Council will request the European Commission to fix a date for opening talks. This latter option would be a very good compromise for the French President.
For the European Union the most important factor, not least for its own credibility, is that it treats Turkey in the same manner that it has all other candidate countries. Among other things this means no permanent safe guard clauses, no mention of any type of privileged partnership, and no extra conditions regarding Cyprus.
The Privileged Partnership: A Non-Starter. There has been a lot of talk and speculation in the media and at seminars about a "Privileged Partnership", or a "B-Plan". Although some Member States - namely France, Austria and Denmark - have suggested that a reference be made to it in the Conclusion as a possible alternative, if Turkey's accession process was to run out of steam, it looks highly unlikely that this will happen. Accession negotiations must be conducted with membership as the end goal, in accordance with EU law. There is no alternative goal of negotiations as foreseen in the Acquis Communautaire. Why then is there a need for such a statement? The inclusion of such a plan would clearly bring into question the EU's "Turkey is being treated the same as other candidate countries" declaration.
What is a Privileged Partnership? Portrayed by those who support it as a "win-win" alternative, to my mind it would seem rather this "deal" would be a winner for the EU and Turkey would end up with a second-class status so to speak. Anything else but full membership would be no-more than a jazzed up, extended version of the current Customs Union or something along the lines of the "Four Spaces" arrangement the European Union is trying to put together with Russia. I still fail to see what Turkey would win out of such a deal.
Turkey should not concern itself with this subject. The idea has been batted about for long time. There has never been any real substance behind it, nobody is able to clearly define what such a partnership would amount to and it has no serious support. More than anything else it has been used as some sort of tool to calm public opinion. No previous candidate country has failed to complete the accession process. Why should Turkey be any different?
Regarding the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, firstly it should be recalled that the European Union imported this problem into its own back garden on the day that it decided to permit the accession of a divided Cyprus to the EU. Turkey did its utmost to have the resolution to this issue before 1 May 2004 when Cyprus entered the EU firstly by supporting the UN plan of Kofi Annan and secondly by encouraging Turkish Cypriots to vote for it at the 23 April 2004 referendum. It was the Greek Cypriots who decided at that referendum that it would be a better idea to maintain the division. The reasons for this "no" outcome will be debated and analysed for years to come. However, the fact still remains that it was they who decided to keep Cyprus divided.
Moreover, the issue of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus has been on the cards for months. The Dutch Presidency has made a terrible blunder over this. Instead of seeking to resolve the matter behind closed doors a number of months ago the issue has pretty much been disregarded by everyone but the media which has made full use of the opportunity to fire up the debate. There is no doubt that it would be highly inappropriate at this point in time for the EU to make recognition of the Republic of Cyprus a precondition for receiving a date to open accession talks. Not only is it not part of the Copenhagen Criteria and, has never at any time been a precondition for accession talks, but, the EU is risking sending out a clear message of opportunism on its part if it decides to go down this route. Although it is obvious to all concerned that the issue needs to be dealt with and there are certainly realities that Turkey will have to face up to, it would nevertheless be very "opportunist" for those states who are dubious about Turkey to use this issue to block the opening of talks.
Let us also bear in mind that Prime Minister Erdogan, when referring to this issue, has consistently placed emphasis on there being no change in the Turkish position before the 17th December summit thereby leaving the door open for some developments in period that follows.
Of course, the Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos is still threatening to veto Turkey if Ankara does not recognise before 17th December and insisting that the issue be included in the Conclusions. Without doubt he remains a wild card. It is up to the Dutch Presidency to find some way around this debacle, as they have already committed themselves to doing, before the Summit.
No candidate country to date has ever faced any type of permanent safeguard clause. EU legislation itself reveals that it is not legally possible - either in the current structure or in the new constitution. Any sort of adherement to a permanent safeguard clause would imply that country was not a real member state. Therefore, such a clause cannot be used. Fears of mass migration of workers should be dealt with as with other candidates by introducing a long transitional period.
The EU should avoid sending out the message that they are only opening talks out of sheer obligation. Turkey does not want to be a burden. Turkey wants to be welcomed as others before it have. On the other hand, Turkey needs to stop emotionally over reacting to everything the EU proposes which it does not agree with. Being part of a 25 member club means compromises are very often necessary. This is something that Turkey will have to get used to and to a certain extent this will involve a change of mentality.
There should be no question over Fridays result. When this war of words is over the EU should bring to the table a fair and honest document. Turkey has done all that was asked of her and Ankara has asked to be treated no differently than any other candidate country. The EU must now deliver on its side of the bargain. 17th December will be a historic day indeed.
Amanda Akçakoca
December 12, 2004
Amanda Akçakoca is a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Center in Brussels. She writes in a personal capacity.