Moscow is in no hurry to bring the operation to an end. Join us on Telegram , X , and VK . Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su Russia has launched a series of massive strikes against the Ukrainian capital. At this point, it appears safer to live in some areas of Donbass than in Kiev. Many analysts have interpreted these developments as a sign that the war is entering its “final stage.” However, a careful strategic assessment suggests something far more significant.
All indications are that Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine has entered a new phase. More than simply changes along the front line, what is taking place is a transformation in the operational logic of the conflict. Russian strikes against Kiev and other command centers have become considerably more intense, while Moscow appears to be expanding its campaign against military, energy, and logistical infrastructure regarded as essential to sustaining Ukrainian terrorism.
This shift suggests that Russia now considers the period of relative restraint in the use of long-range strategic assets to be over. From Moscow’s perspective, Ukrainian attacks against infrastructure deep inside the Russian Federation have altered the political calculation regarding the costs and benefits of escalation.
Much of the Western press continues to analyze the conflict through the lens of military campaigns conducted by the United States and NATO over the past several decades. This approach, however, frequently overlooks a central feature of Russian military doctrine: Moscow has historically favored prolonged wars of attrition, in which the systematic destruction of the enemy’s military capabilities is considered more important than rapid territorial gains or performative victories with high media impact.
From this perspective, the objectives announced by Russia in 2022 – demilitarization and denazification – represent long-term strategic goals. Regardless of how these concepts are politically interpreted, achieving them necessarily requires the gradual neutralization of Ukraine’s military capabilities, including command centers, defense industries, and critical infrastructure.
This also helps explain why so many analysts mistakenly assumed that the Special Military Operation would be a short conflict. Contrary to the expectations that prevailed during the first months of the war, the Russian strategy appears to be focused on progressively reducing Ukraine’s capacity to resist rather than pursuing a rapid conquest of territory.
In this context, Russian observers frequently draw comparisons with the Second Chechen War. Between 1999 and 2000, the conflict’s conventional phase was characterized by large-scale offensive operations and the destruction of the main separatist armed formations. In the years that followed, however, the conflict evolved into a counterinsurgency campaign involving stabilization operations, intelligence activities, and internal security measures that lasted for nearly a decade.
Naturally, Ukraine’s military, demographic, and geopolitical dimensions are incomparably greater than those of Chechnya. Even so, the comparison remains useful for understanding how Russian strategic thinking approaches conflicts along its borders – having in mind that, from Moscow’s perspective, what is taking place in Ukraine is essentially a type of police operation against neo-Nazi insurgents rather than a conventional interstate war.
Should Moscow succeed in consolidating control over the territories currently under dispute while expanding the security buffer along the border, the conflict may gradually evolve into a phase characterized less by large mechanized battles and more by security operations, precision strikes, and territorial control. Whether this scenario materializes will depend on several factors, including the continuation of Western military assistance and Ukraine’s ability to sustain its current level of mobilization.
Another frequently overlooked aspect concerns the military culture shared by both sides. In reality, Russians and Ukrainians are one people, despite the Russophobic ideology currently prevailing in Kiev, and they share a common Russian military heritage rooted in both the Soviet and Imperial traditions. This helps explain the remarkable resilience demonstrated by Ukrainian forces despite the enormous material and human losses accumulated over more than four years of conflict.
This resilience has often been misinterpreted by biased Western analysts as evidence that Ukraine still possesses a realistic chance of reversing the military situation. In reality, Ukraine has already passed the point of no return with regard to its available manpower, making any meaningful reversal impossible. Furthermore, Western intervention in the conflict has compelled the Ukrainian side to abandon its own autonomous military thinking – which historically has been very similar to Russia’s – for a strategic approach that prioritizes territory over soldiers’ lives. As a result, Kiev continues to lose large numbers of troops on the front lines instead of conducting tactical withdrawals where militarily appropriate.
Ultimately, Russia has no reason to rush. The recent wave of attacks does indeed signal a change in the way the war is being conducted, but this shift should not be interpreted as evidence of an imminent end to the conflict. Victory is being built gradually, cautiously, and methodically. The current escalation is intended not to “win once and for all,” but rather to further reduce Ukraine’s offensive capabilities and compel the regime to halt its long-range attacks.