Caught between an increasingly confrontational United States and an emboldened Iran unwilling to surrender, the Gulf Arab monarchies face mounting security challenges.
As Washington and Tehran become locked in a dangerous cycle of escalating hostilities, the regional security framework established under the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has steadily eroded .
With fighting over the Strait of Hormuz having reached an impasse, US President Donald Trump is threatening to strike Iranian power plants following days of attacks on targets in Ahvaz, Bandar Abbas , Bushehr , Chabahar , and other locations across the country’s southern and western regions.
This is unfolding alongside the renewed American blockade of the Strait of Hormuz following Tehran’s own closure of the waterway in response to US military strikes.
Iranian and Houthi missile and drone attacks on all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member-states in recent days have only further exposed the region’s profound vulnerability to conflict dynamics it cannot control.
Rather than shaping the course of events, the GCC states increasingly appear to be absorbing the consequences of the US-Iran confrontation. The central question facing the Gulf Arab monarchies is how to navigate a dangerous environment in which their security interests are directly threatened by a war over which they have limited influence.
Largely because of their geographic exposure and the uncertainty surrounding the commitments contained in the Islamabad MoU, the GCC states find themselves trapped in a deeply constrained strategic predicament .
Situated in close proximity to Iran and within range of Iranian and Houthi missile and drone capabilities, the Gulf Arab monarchies cannot distance themselves from these hostilities that directly affect their national security, economies, and critical infrastructure.
At the same time, the ambiguity of external security guarantees leaves them without a clear framework for deterring future attacks or managing escalation. The GCC states must now pursue multiple, often competing objectives: strengthening deterrence against Iran and its partners, protecting vital energy and maritime infrastructure, maintaining economic confidence, and avoiding steps that could trigger an even broader regional conflict.
Their dilemma is therefore both immediate and structural, given that any effort to demonstrate resolve risks further escalation, while attempts at restraint may be interpreted as weakness. Caught between the need for greater security and the imperative of regional stability, the Gulf Arab monarchies face a narrowing set of choices at a moment when the costs of miscalculation have rarely been higher.
Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, outlined the three major concerns shared by the GCC states. First is the issue of safe navigation in the Gulf and particularly through the Strait of Hormuz. “Closures, and there will be more of them in the days and weeks ahead, limit global commerce. This does not serve GCC interests,” he told The New Arab .
Second are serious issues surrounding this question of payment for services for all ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz . “It is now clear that some form of payment will be instituted, which will illustrate a major American loss, given that Washington wants no fees,” observed Dr Kéchichian.
Third is the longer-term positioning of Iran in the region as a “hegemonic neighbour that is going nowhere, and with whom Arab Gulf monarchies must learn how to live after the latest war,” he noted.
Diverging strategies toward Iran
The Gulf Arab countries have responded to the latest escalation with Iran in markedly different ways, reflecting the absence of a unified regional strategy toward Tehran.
On one end of the spectrum, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Kuwait - the three GCC members most heavily targeted by Iran during this conflict - have adopted predominantly security-focused approaches to dealing with the Islamic Republic.
At the other end, Qatar and Oman have remained committed to diplomatic engagement, continuing their mediation efforts despite coming under Iranian attack themselves. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has pursued a strategy of strategic hedging, seeking to balance deterrence with diplomatic flexibility.
“Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral exemplifies the different ways GCC states are positioning themselves vis-à-vis Iran in the wake of the apparent collapse of the US-Iranian ceasefire. Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar sent representatives to the funeral earlier this month, while Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE stayed away,” explained Gordon Gray, a former US ambassador to Tunisia, in a TNA interview.
These divergent responses have left the GCC without a publicly articulated, coherent strategy toward Iran, even if some analysts believe coordination may continue behind the scenes. Tehran is eager to exploit this lack of unity among the Gulf Arab monarchies.
As long as the GCC states remain divided in their approaches, Iran can continue tailoring its policies toward individual members in ways that advance its own interests.
Before the 7–8 April Pakistani-brokered ceasefire , Iran concentrated its missile and drone attacks on the UAE to a far greater extent than on any other GCC state and, in fact, more than on any country in the Middle East, including Israel.
This strategy sought to maximise economic and commercial disruption by targeting the Gulf’s principal financial, logistical, and commercial hub, while simultaneously punishing Abu Dhabi for normalising relations with Israel and attempting to further exacerbate Emirati-Saudi tensions, which had worsened in late 2025 and early 2026. Yet these attacks on the UAE only strengthened Abu Dhabi’s partnership with Tel Aviv.
Since the ceasefire entered into force, Iran has shifted much of its military pressure toward Bahrain and Kuwait. In Bahrain’s case, Tehran’s targeting is driven in no small part by Manama’s status as the second GCC signatory to the Abraham Accords.
More broadly, however, both Bahrain and Kuwait’s close military alliances with the United States, coupled with their geographic proximity to Iran and domestic vulnerabilities, appear to explain the intensity of Tehran’s recent attacks against these two Gulf Arab countries.
By contrast, Oman and Qatar, despite also coming under Iranian attack (though Iranian officials denied responsibility for strikes on Oman before 11 July), have remained committed to mediation efforts.
According to Dr Mehran Haghirian, Executive Director of Research and Programs at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, the two states have assumed complementary diplomatic roles, with “Qatar...protecting Gulf interests at the negotiating table and Oman...leading on Hormuz while carrying the GCC’s interests,” he explained in a TNA interview.
Saudi Arabia, as Gray noted, has continued the “strategic hedging approach” that gathered momentum following Israel’s military aggression against Qatar on 9 September 2025, preserving room for diplomatic engagement while avoiding full alignment with either side.
“The much-hoped Gulf unity has yet to materialise as a result of this war. Instead, there are even unconfirmed rumours that several Gulf states have made their own, individual, secretive deals with Iran. There is no evidence for that at this stage, but what is indisputable is that most of the Gulf states have returned to engagement with Tehran on a state-on-state level, with no clear or coherent GCC strategy, at least none that is articulated publicly,” Dr Rob Geist Pinfold, who teaches International Security at King’s College London, told The New Arab .
“This is a dangerous precedent that could sow the seeds for further instability and conflict. That many have done so while Iran continues to target Bahrain and Kuwait indicates that regional unity is lacking when the Gulf states need it the most to defend their collective sovereignty,” he added.
Dr Haghirian, however, cautions against equating differing public approaches with a genuine rupture within the GCC. While acknowledging that member states are engaging Iran in different ways, he argues that these approaches may instead reflect an informal distribution of diplomatic roles.
“Some [GCC] states are engaging Iran publicly, while others are withholding engagement to preserve leverage ahead of eventual future negotiations,” he told TNA , adding that this may function as an “informal division of labour, provided there is coordination behind the scenes, which seems very likely given the frequency of diplomatic calls and high-level visits between GCC states following every meeting or incident.”
Challenge of deterring Iran without escalating conflict
In terms of military, political, and economic leverage, no single GCC member has what it takes to deter Iran all on its own. Tehran’s ability to selectively target different Gulf Arab states underscores the limitations of unilateral responses.
Yet with Iran set to remain a central feature of the Gulf’s strategic environment, regardless of how its neighbours see the Islamic Republic, GCC governments must accept that they will not be able to rely exclusively on either deterrence or diplomacy. Instead, they must pursue a combination of stronger defensive capabilities, credible deterrence, and continued political engagement to manage an enduring regional rival.
Within this context, it will be easier for the Gulf Arab states to achieve security once coordination among the six GCC members is stronger. Whether through integrated air and missile defence, closer security cooperation, or more coherent diplomatic messaging, the GCC states’ ability to respond effectively to future Iranian pressure will depend less on the capabilities of individual members than on their willingness to act collectively.
At this juncture, the GCC members face a defining strategic choice. Will they continue pursuing largely national approaches to Iran or will they develop a more coordinated regional strategy capable of balancing deterrence, diplomacy, and long-term stability? While too early to tell, the effectiveness of the GCC members’ responses will depend on their ability to act collectively in an increasingly uncertain regional environment.
“At the end of the day, and notwithstanding differences in perceptions, GCC states are fully united against Iran, which has now divulged its regional cards - to behave as a hegemon - something that is fully rejected by all six GCC partners,” said Dr Kéchichian.
“There have been intra-GCC divergences in the past but seldom on vital matters. Survival falls in this category, and there are no arguments on this score,” he added.
Gray maintains the same perspective. “Notwithstanding their recurrent disputes, the GCC states have always been able to set aside their differences because they realise in the end that they stand more to gain by cooperating,” noted the former US ambassador.
“To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, the GCC states seem to realise that they must all hang together so that they will not hang separately.”
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero
Edited by Charlie Hoyle