Gaza Strip - US envoy Steve Witkoff announced Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire in January 2026. The plan on paper detailed how Israeli forces would begin withdrawing, an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) would move in to fill the security vacuum, and a Palestinian technocratic committee would take over civilian governance. Five months later, none of that has happened. Negotiations remain deadlocked over Hamas disarmament; Israel refuses to advance without visible progress on that condition; and Hamas rejects disarmament as a precondition for anything. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza does not govern in Gaza.
Washington has formally approached roughly 70 countries to contribute troops, aiming for 10,000 by the end of 2026. At its February peak, the Board of Peace meeting in Washington saw 40 countries attend and roughly $17 billion pledged. Only five - Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania - committed actual troops.
But support for the ISF has been faltering. The clearest case is Indonesia, which had made the largest single troop commitment, up to 8,000 personnel, and was to serve as the force's deputy commander. Foreign Minister Sugiono announced a full suspension of all participation discussions, citing the military escalation in the region and the shift in international attention toward the consequences of the US-Iran conflict.
The most concrete sign of forward movement came on 5 June, when the Board of Peace announced Egypt's commitment to the ISF, posting photos of an Egyptian officer receiving the force's insignia.
Egypt had already established a command centre for the force in El Arish in December, making it the natural anchor for any eventual deployment given its shared border with Gaza. In late June, a Hamas delegation led by Zaher Jabarin arrived in Cairo for talks with Egyptian officials and mediators, alongside representatives of other Palestinian factions. Analysts say the Cairo talks and Egypt's recent commitment to the force suggest the international community is trying to build momentum around the ISF without waiting for the core political deadlock to resolve itself first.
Observers, however, point to the fact that how this new reality gets built, who it serves, and what it asks Palestinians to accept in exchange for a reduction in immediate violence are questions that no official statement has yet answered. Groundwork, not deployment Conflict researcher Said Abu Rahma says he is cautious about what the current positioning means. “What is visible now is that the full deployment of thousands of soldiers requires three conditions that remain unmet, and these are a clear political agreement, a defined legal mandate, and security guarantees from all parties. None of those exists,” he told The New Arab .
That said, Abu Rahma does not dismiss recent developments. The international community, he argued, is signalling that it intends to move from theoretical planning to practical preparation for the day after the fighting ends . “It is a message that the future of Gaza will not be held hostage indefinitely to the negotiating positions of either side.” For Gazans, even that signal carries weight. “After everything that has happened,” he explained, “the mere prospect of a force designed to prevent a security vacuum and allow reconstruction to begin represents a form of hope that has been largely absent.”
Abu Rahma also argues that if the mission is confined to protecting aid deliveries, securing crossings, and supporting reconstruction, “the chances of it functioning become more meaningful”. “If it is handed security and political tasks of real complexity, it will face the same obstacles that have defeated every international intervention in a destroyed environment without full party consent.” A mandate nobody agrees on Israeli affairs analyst Ismat Mansour disagrees with Abu Rahma, arguing that the problem is that Israel and Hamas have defined the ISF's purpose in directly incompatible ways, and every country considering participation knows it.
“Tel Aviv wants a force that will contribute to disarming Hamas and the factions, or at minimum one that will confront them if they resist,” he explained. “Hamas wants the opposite, and that is a force whose primary function is to push the Israeli military out and take its place.” The Arab and Muslim states that have agreed in principle to participate have made their position equally clear. “They will not act as proxies for the occupation against Palestinian factions, certainly not in this opening phase. That is the reason troop commitments have eroded since the force was announced.”
Netanyahu faces a separate constraint in his electoral survival. Israeli elections are due no later than 27 October 2026, and the Knesset has advanced a bill to dissolve itself early, after ultra-Orthodox coalition partners pulled support over a stalled military draft exemption law.
Most surveys show his coalition falling short of the 61 seats needed for a majority, and head-to-head matchups against former prime minister Naftali Bennett are increasingly competitive. Mansour argues that any withdrawal from Gaza before Hamas visibly disarms would be read domestically as surrender. “Netanyahu will not step back and grant Hamas the chance to survive before its weapons are gone,” Mansour told TNA . “Withdrawal becomes politically possible only once a disarmament process is under way, and the prime minister can stand in front of Israeli voters and claim he won.”
Disarmament by force, however, is a different matter. Abu Rahma argued that coercive disarmament is among the most difficult tasks any international mission can be assigned, because it transforms a stability or peacekeeping force into a direct party to the conflict. “The historical record on this is consistent,” he added. “Disarmament succeeds when it is part of a comprehensive political agreement that includes security arrangements and mutual guarantees. It does not succeed when it is imposed.” The Lebanon scenario Political analyst Iyad al-Qurra framed what is happening now as a US attempt to generate movement through partial facts rather than comprehensive agreement. Washington, he argued, is trying to implement what can be implemented from the ceasefire deal without waiting for either party to fulfil its core demands, and their “template” in doing so is Lebanon .
“In Lebanon, a partial arrangement produced a limited withdrawal and gave Netanyahu a political claim to achievement without requiring a final resolution of anything,” he added.
Al-Qurra believes the Trump administration is now building toward a similar formula for Gaza: international forces present, at least nominally; the National Committee for Gaza Administration introduced; Israel pulled back from selected areas; and Netanyahu given a version of victory he can sell at home.
But on-the-ground realities point to Israel pushing beyond the Yellow Line into Palestinian territory. The Yellow Line originally divided Gaza roughly 47-53 in favour of Israeli control. Since the ceasefire, Israel has repeatedly moved the line further west. By May 2026, Israel had extended its control to 60 percent and Netanyahu ordered the army to push towards 70 percent . Israel has declared everything east of the line a free-fire zone.
“Hamas is also playing the waiting game,” al-Qurra told TNA . “The group is betting that Israeli politics will shift, that Netanyahu and the ministers driving the hardest positions will eventually leave the government, and that what follows will be less severe than the present situation, even if it still falls short of what the factions want.”
Talal Abu Rukba, professor of political science at Al-Azhar University, described what is happening as 'Plan B' - a framework that was always in reserve in the event Hamas refused disarmament. “The stability force secures zones under Israeli military control, and Palestinians from Hamas-held areas further west are moved gradually into those zones under the rubric of humanitarian cities.” The force provides security for those relocations without being directly tasked with confronting the factions, at least in the first phase, he added.
Abu Rahma did not exclude the possibility that Gazans themselves would accept the introduction of the ISF. After 20 months of war, trust in the factions, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community has “largely collapsed”. “Many people,” he said, “are now looking for the minimum conditions for life, not for a political framework around it.” Mohamed Solaimane is a Gaza-based journalist with bylines in regional and international outlets, focusing on humanitarian and environmental issues This piece is published in collaboration with Egab . Edited by Charlie Hoyle