In an apparent step forward in longstanding plans to bring Iraq’s militias under state control, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr pledged on 27 May to disband Saraya al-Salam , his affiliated militia.
The populist leader in the same statement called for other armed groups in Iraq to “hand their weapons over to the state”.
Days later, two other Iraqi militias - Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Imam Ali Brigades - made similar announcements, saying they would begin handing in their weapons to Iraqi authorities.
The move comes amid increased US pressure on Baghdad to rein in Iran-linked groups in Iraq.
Following the appointment of Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, Washington renewed calls for Baghdad to integrate the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) into Iraq’s security forces. The PMF, formed in 2014 to combat the Islamic State (IS), is an Iraqi state institution composed largely of militias with varying degrees of ties to Iran.
US President Donald Trump has also called on Baghdad to disband and disarm Iran-linked militias that operate outside of state control and prevent militia leaders from taking senior political roles in Iraq’s government.
While these are longstanding US demands , President Trump appears increasingly willing to leverage military and financial threats against Baghdad to achieve them.
During the Israel-US war with Iran, Washington repeatedly struck both Iraqi militia and PMF bases in the country. Similarly, in February this year, Washington seemingly threatened to sanction Iraqi state institutions if Nouri al-Maliki, who has close ties to Tehran, assumed the Iraqi premiership.
Increasing US pressure on Baghdad also comes amid both a potential US-Iran framework for a nuclear deal and continued diplomatic engagement, as well as an apparent willingness by some Iran-linked groups to integrate further into the state.
As a result of these shifting dynamics, the question for Baghdad is: what are the constraints, what are the risks, and what would a successful disarmament process look like? Disarmament requires a political bargain The disarmament process in Iraq also likely depends on whether some armed groups can be incentivised to work within state structures.
“Some Iran-linked groups may accept tighter state oversight if their political and economic objectives are protected,” Hayder Shakeri, a Research Fellow at Chatham House, told The New Arab .
This is likely the case for armed groups such as the Badr Organisation and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), which also maintain an influential presence in the Iraqi parliament through political wings. This has resulted in these groups’ deep embedding in Iraq’s political, economic, and social structures.
In a sign of this, AAH announced on 2 June that it would withdraw from the PMF and place all of its weapons under state control. This followed a landmark announcement the day before by the Iran-linked Coordination Framework - a constellation of Iran-linked political parties - expressing support for initiatives to place all weapons under state control.
Still, whether or not AAH and other militias affiliated with the Coordination Framework are willing to surrender their arms likely depends on what political and economic incentives they receive in return.
In addition, maximalist demands by Washington could further complicate disarmament efforts. The US has previously demanded the exclusion of AAH’s leadership, some of whom are sanctioned by the US, from any senior governmental positions in Iraq’s new government.
In such a scenario, the group is unlikely to give up its arms in the event that it remains politically excluded. Risks of partial disarmament One of the more complex issues for Baghdad now is how to deal with Iran-linked groups that operate largely independently of the Iraqi state. Some such groups, such as Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), have indicated that they remain unwilling to disarm.
Given that these groups form part of Iran’s regional security architecture, Tehran is also likely unwilling to greenlight their disarmament, while in active conflict with the US. Under the banner of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq (IRI), these groups have claimed hundreds of drone attacks on US interests in Iraq since the US and Israel first attacked Iran in February.
As a result, Baghdad’s room for manoeuvre remains constrained by both Tehran and Washington.
The US has previously avoided differentiating between these groups and the PMF more broadly. During the US-Iran-Israel war, the US launched repeated military strikes on both PMF bases and bases affiliated with these militias. As a result, these groups’ refusal to disarm could plausibly result in renewed US attacks on Iraqi state security institutions.
In addition, these groups' unwillingness to disarm could also result in intra-militia conflict, explained Jaafar Al-Fekaiki, founder of Zagros Intelligence, to TNA .
“If Washington decides not to distinguish between the PMF and the 'Islamic Resistance', sanctioning associates of the former for the actions of the latter, a confrontation between 'state militias' and 'outlawed militias', not dissimilar from the Green Zone clashes of 2022, could very well be a possibility.” What does success look like? Given these constraints, a successful disarmament process would likely recalibrate, rather than eliminate the influence of Iran-linked militias and parties in Iraq.
Recent statements by the Coordination Framework may also point to a broader shift in incentives. While groups such as AAH continue to maintain close ties to Tehran, they have in recent years become increasingly embedded within Iraq’s political institutions and developed interests tied to the stability of the Iraqi state.
The question is not whether these groups remain linked to Iran, but whether enough incentives now exist for them to prioritise Iraqi political and economic objectives over regional ones.
“The real benchmark is whether Iraq moves closer to a system where armed groups, regardless of ideology or affiliation, operate under state authority rather than alongside it,” Shakeri explained.
“This would include limiting unilateral attacks, integrating command structures, reducing armed groups’ control over economic and security spaces and ensuring no faction can independently decide war and peace.” Zahra Ladha is a geopolitical analyst focused on Iran, Iraq, and transnational Shiaism. She holds an MSc in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford Follow her on X: @zahrariy_ Edited by Charlie Hoyle