Saudi Arabia’s reported interest in supporting the development of, and potentially acquiring, Turkey’s fifth-generation fighter , the Kaan, has generated unease in Washington.
US officials reportedly expressed frustration over Riyadh’s exploration of alternative advanced aerial capabilities , particularly following the 2025 agreement to supply the Kingdom with Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II.
These dynamics have taken on new urgency in the wake of the Israel-US-Iran war , which is reshaping regional security calculations. In an increasingly volatile security environment, regional states are seeking suppliers that offer advanced capabilities alongside technology transfer and opportunities for domestic development.
The US push for greater allied burden sharing is another dynamic driving regional states toward alternative partnerships; however, it may ultimately cost the United States its dominance in regional arms markets. Reassessing the Middle East's place in US strategy Alongside advocating for a reduced global military footprint, the Trump administration has identified the Middle East as a region of diminished strategic importance.
The 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly states that the emergence of the US as a net energy exporter relegates the region’s strategic significance, a shift that has consequently prompted regional powers to diversify their partners and procurement strategies.
For Saudi Arabia, this has translated into expanded cooperation with regional and extra-regional actors such as Turkey and Pakistan . These diversification efforts, however, are not intended to disrupt the relationship with Washington but to adapt to a new strategic reality.
Both Ankara and Islamabad maintain robust ties with the US, and renewed discussions regarding Turkey’s potential re-engagement with the F-35 program underscore the strengthening of ties between the two countries. Similarly, Pakistan-US relations have expanded considerably since President Trump’s re-election.
However, the US’s inability to manage the regional spillover from the Iran war could push regional states to look elsewhere for security .
The “US prioritised protecting Israel during the [Israel-US-Iran] war, and that will change the Gulf countries' strategic outlook,” explained Barin Kayaoglu, Assistant Professor in the Institute for Area Studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara, to The New Arab .
Saudi Arabia’s diversification strategy has been carefully calibrated to preserve its security relationship with Washington while expanding its partnerships. The announcement of a mutual defence agreement between the Kingdom and Pakistan exemplifies this approach, reflecting Riyadh’s effort to operationalise burden-sharing in a shifting regional security environment.
That said, diversification efforts have encountered limits when they conflict with US interests. Saudi Arabia’s interest in acquiring the Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 reportedly faced resistance, highlighting Washington’s opposition to the integration of Chinese-origin systems in Gulf defence. Riyadh’s procurement strategy, therefore, relies on balancing diversification against Washington's redlines.
“Washington appears comfortable with Riyadh participating in the Kaan project, as long as Saudi Arabia also purchases F-35s,” explained Ragip Soylu, Turkey Bureau Chief at Middle East Eye, to TNA .
Despite these tensions, the US remains the region’s preferred security partner, owing to decades of institutional integration, interoperability, and embedded defence infrastructure. However, the US-led burden-sharing push inevitably introduces friction, as diversification could reduce Washington’s leverage over regional procurement decisions. US dominance in arms markets is here to stay, for now Washington confronts a complex strategic dilemma. On the one hand, the US security umbrella continues to serve as a defining marker of the Gulf's security architecture.
On the other hand, looming doubts around the reliability of the US as a guarantor, compounded by the heightened insecurity generated by the Israel-US-Iran war and Washington’s pivot towards the Western Hemisphere, have accelerated regional powers’ hedging strategies.
Riyadh’s exploration of Ankara’s fifth-generation fighter fits squarely within this dynamic. Washington tentatively agreed in 2025 to move forward with an F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia, but the deal is complicated by significant constraints.
Chief among these are concerns tied to maintaining Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), a commitment mandating that any transfer of advanced US systems must preserve Israel’s military superiority in the region.
The prospective F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia will therefore likely involve aircraft with relatively limited capabilities and significant restrictions on future modifications, restrictions that limit the recipient’s operational autonomy. Given these limitations, Riyadh is compelled to seek partners that offer access to advanced capabilities with fewer restrictions.
While Saudi participation in Turkey's stealth fighter program presents opportunities for technology transfer and co-production, full co-production would require a degree of flexibility and trust on both sides that does not yet appear to have materialised.
Additionally, "Turkey's fighter jet program has been progressing well, but is not yet in a position to surpass American capabilities. Turkey likely needs at least five to ten years to match some American platforms in missile defence," Soylu told TNA .
Even before its interest in the Kaan, Saudi Arabia explored joining the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a sixth-generation fighter initiative led by the UK, Italy, and Japan. Riyadh’s participation was reportedly opposed by Japan, which cited concerns over export controls. More recently, the UK has renewed calls for Saudi’s participation in the consortium amid financial constraints and delayed progress on the program’s development.
Riyadh is also mindful of complications that could delay or derail the F-35 sale despite initial agreements. In 2021, Abu Dhabi also struck a deal, with the US initially approving the sale of F-35s; however, the agreement eventually collapsed due to US concerns over Chinese technology in the UAE’s networks, and later Emirati frustration with the process.
This precedent raises the appeal of alternatives that can contribute to Saudi Arabia’s aerial modernisation. Through joint development and acquisition of the Kaan, Ankara offers Riyadh potential industrial participation, greater flexibility in technology transfer, and fewer politically imposed operational restrictions. It also aligns with the Kingdom's ambitious Vision 2030 targets, which aim to localise 50% of military spending by 2030.
While the US has gradually displayed increasing openness to limited technology transfer and supporting local production, its partners are demanding more. In the short term, these dynamics pose no immediate threat given Washington’s dominance in the region’s arms market.
Between 2021 and 2025, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Saudi Arabia was the largest recipient of arms from the United States, accounting for 12% of US arms transfers. The price of retrenchment Washington should carefully consider the strategic trade-offs embedded in its push for greater burden sharing. The Kingdom’s modernisation drive, growing indigenous defence industrial base, and efforts to reduce strategic dependence on any single external supplier are steadily advancing its diversification agenda and expanding avenues for alternative security partnerships in the process.
The Israel-US-Iran war will also likely push regional "countries to focus on strengthening their defence capabilities and expand discussions surrounding the creation of a regional security framework involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Egypt," noted Ali Bakir, Assistant Professor of International Affairs, Security, and Defence at Qatar University, to TNA .
These dynamics are reinforced by the increasing deployment and demonstrable effectiveness of advanced non-Western systems in combat. Pakistan’s use of China’s J-10C fighter during its May 2025 confrontation with India and the UAE’s use of South Korea’s Cheongung-II surface-to-air defence system to intercept Iranian attacks, for example, highlight the operational viability of alternative platforms.
As these systems build operational track records, the appeal of highly conditional and restrictive US arms transfers may erode. Gradually, deeper cooperation between regional partners on defence modernisation may come to fill that space. Hana Elshehaby is a Research Assistant for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs’ Foreign Policy Program. Her research interests include GCC foreign policy, regional security frameworks, and the Asian powers' expanding political relations with the Middle East Follow her on X: @hanaeIshehaby Edited by Charlie Hoyle