To see what even a blind person could see, takes a constant effort – George Orwell
Paweł Mościcki is a professor at the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the author of numerous books and a blog: pawelmoscicki.net as well as substack pawelmoscicki.substack.com
Cross-posted from Pawel’s Substack
Poland is a beautiful country. It is a country of open-minded and tolerant people. At the very top of this hierarchy, of course, are educated people who hold important social positions. For they are tolerant not only toward disadvantaged, marginalized, and persecuted groups. They are able to rise above primitive divisions and tribal disputes to such an extent that they demonstrate tolerance and openness even toward fascists—even though, until recently, they did not believe such people existed at all.
I am, of course, referring here to the uproar caused by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who named one of his military units after the “heroes of the UPA.” In fact, it must be said right away that it was not the President of Ukraine who sparked the controversy, but the reaction of Karol Nawrocki, who broke the code of silence that had been in place for years and stripped Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle, which had been awarded to him back in 2022. If it weren’t for Nawrocki, no one would have batted an eye at yet another military unit alluding to Banderism, just as the state funeral for Andriy Melnyk—which took place a week earlier—caused incomparably less of a stir. There were worse things that went unnoticed.
It is puzzling that, especially among the progressive segment of the Polish intelligentsia, it is not the glorification of the UPA but opposition to it that provokes a collective reaction in which it is hard not to recognize signs of genuine panic. How did we end up here? How did it come to pass that leftists and liberals—united on the front lines of the fight for “Cool-o-Poland”—are today defending the right to commemorate and hold aloft as heroes the murderers of their own ancestors?
This is nothing new, but I don’t want to write about the history of this process (though I should), but rather about the techniques emerging in this context to sell us Ukrainian nationalism and neo-Nazism, to relativize it, and to blur the responsibility of those who cultivate it. And about how this is spreading through various circles of the Polish political hellhole.
Some techniques.
1. Technique number one: “It’s Russian propaganda.” For years now, in the Polish “public debate,” this kind of suggestion has not at all meant that a given statement is untrue. The distinction between truth and falsehood has long been consigned to the dustbin of history, and the automatically uttered phrases about the “Russian narrative,” “repetition,” and “convergence” serve as an effective way to refuse to engage in a discussion about reality. The Polish intelligentsia has long since consented to its own instrumentalization in this matter. It is even proud to be tasked by the state apparatus—whether domestic or not. At the same time, it believes that in this way it will curry favor with—and even become more like—the Western mainstream, which continues to set the standard for it, provide prestige, organize resources, ensure visibility, and so on. The condition is the fulfillment of its comprador tasks—that is, the effective implementation in Poland of the point of view of the imperialist core. For years, progressives in Poland have been a kind of missionary corps sent to “civilize” the eastern frontiers of authentic civilization. Russia lacks a similar infrastructure here, so it becomes all the easier for the local intelligentsia to demonstrate its usefulness by focusing on this topic.
When Russia says something, it defines the world for Poles. Negatively, but still. So one must constantly define one’s own position in relation to, in the face of, and in defiance of Russia. This is a secondary, symbolic subordination that means, by definition, Poles cannot have their own autonomous stance until they check whether, by any chance, “champagne corks are popping in the Kremlin.” And why can’t they? Because they cannot have an autonomous and independent foreign policy. Why? Because then Poland would fall into Russia’s clutches. And so it goes, round and round.
Secondary variants: “it’s all a Russian disinformation campaign,” or: “an element of the Soviet mentality.” This means that Ukrainian ultranationalism, which has been exploited against Russia (then still the USSR) since at least the 1950s, is in reality a figment of Russian propaganda; yet when it turns out to be real, Russia is once again blamed for creating it. This reveals the mechanism of a taboo around which the strangest stories can be spun, just to avoid acknowledging the obvious and drawing conclusions from it.
2. Technique number two: “They’ve moved on.” According to this version, Ukraine did indeed have groups and parties that harbored sympathy for Nazi collaborators from the UPA and OUN, but that’s all in the past, and now that entire side of the political spectrum has been deradicalized. How did this happen? Well, it happened thanks to the integration of volunteer groups with fascist leanings (such as Azov, Aidar, Tornado, and others) into the ranks of the regular Ukrainian army. It’s obvious, isn’t it? It’s almost strange that no one had previously thought to solve the problem of extremist groups by supplying them with weapons, granting them political influence, and subordinating official state institutions to their symbolism. And this despite the fact that we’re familiar with similar positive transformations from history, such as when the Weimar Republic dealt with Hitler by handing him the office of chancellor, right?
Secondary variant: “They don’t take this symbolism seriously,” “it’s just trolling.” I think a quote from Groucho Marx will suffice here: “If he looks like an idiot and talks like an idiot, don’t be fooled. He really is an idiot.” There’s no reason to apply a different standard to the far right.
3. Technique number three: “They have little support in parliament.” Unfortunately, the example of Ukraine shows precisely that one does not need to have broad electoral support to effectively influence the ideological direction of a country. It is enough to have influence in key areas of the state, which the Ukrainian far right first gained in the post-Maidan government (the security and police ministries were controlled by the Svoboda party), and then filled the void left by deserters when, as part of the Anti-Terrorist Operation, the Ukrainian government decided to pacify the rebellion in the Donbas.
Extremist groups are effectively using the levers of power they gained in this way, as evidenced by their success in derailing Zelensky’s peace initiatives early in his presidency. In today’s Ukrainian political landscape, there is no candidate for the country’s new leader who is not sympathetic to Bandera’s ideology. Among the most frequently mentioned (e.g., by Yaroslav Hrycak) are Budanov, Biletsky, and Zaluzhny. The first described Bandera as an immortal figure and compared himself to him; the second founded the Azov movement; the third became famous for an online interview in which he managed to fit a large portrait of the OUN leader into the computer screen frame.
In any case, let’s take an example from our own backyard. Did support for Zbigniew Ziobro’s party ever exceed 3%? No, and yet, for example, women in this country still live in a reality defined by his anti-abortion obsessions.
4. Technique number four: “The cult of the UPA may be wrong, but Ukrainians are defending us against Russia.” This is perhaps the linchpin of the entire ideological construct, because without the threat of a Russian invasion hanging over us, this kind of emotional excitement would not be possible. The understandable fear of war has been channeled to further stoke it, which is precisely what the narrative of a planned Russian invasion of NATO is intended to do. Moreover, it completely absolves Western countries of responsibility for any actions that escalate the situation, including those that preceded the war itself. It also allows for obscuring the fact that the presence of Banderism in Ukraine—and its growing influence—was also one of the causes of this war, rather than merely an exaggerated reaction to its outbreak, which we must tolerate in the name of higher values. The Russian invasion has, of course, led to an increase in the popularity—rather than a weakening—of this political line.
Incidentally, it’s very interesting that the world’s most powerful military alliance—NATO—needs a country that isn’t a member to defend it. It’s interesting that a defensive alliance also defends itself beyond its own borders against a state that hasn’t attacked it.
Russia somehow decided to attack us Poles (because this is all, of course, about us) and the rest of NATO in a rather peculiar way. Not directly, but via the longest land corridor separating it from us. It’s a shame it didn’t decide to do so from the other side of the world—then we would finally have a chance to be actually, and note merely verbally, defended against Russia by the U.S.
Unfortunately, the Polish information bubble is not inclined to undertake any serious analysis of the origins of this war, because it has been taught to treat any questions or arguments that do not fit the narrative as part of a disinformation campaign and evidence of foreign influence. It therefore settles for slogans, even if they have little to do with reality and sometimes even turn it completely upside down.
Timothy Snyder, a historian of such outstanding expertise that he once managed to see both Hitler and Stalin (sic!) in Putin, even stated that unconditional support for Ukraine is a prerequisite for preserving Polish independence. That’s an interesting definition of independence, given that it depends on unconditional support for another country’s policies. And it’s even being defined from the outside by an American member of the Council on Foreign Relations!
Secondary variant: “Maybe the UPA was terrible, but it fought the Soviets.” Well, the Third Reich also fought the Soviets. Perhaps even more effectively than the UPA. So why doesn’t Polish public opinion seize on this fact to erase from the collective memory the other things the Nazis did? Let’s wait and see; let’s give it a chance. It’s just the beginning. These arguments show what prolonged training in historical revisionism—and its subordination to current geopolitical needs—brings. They, in turn, like a vicious cycle, often stem from an ideologized and infantilized version of history. First, we had the symmetrization of totalitarianisms, then the whitewashing of the West’s reputation, and subsequently the systematic rehabilitation of nationalisms.
Today, this cycle has reached a stage where even liberals and leftists share the same historical imagination as extreme nationalists. And its pivotal point is the relentless criminalisation of communism and socialism, from which fascism and Nazism are, however, slowly being excluded. Progressives and nationalists share the same common enemy, so they are slowly beginning to share the same friends. And this is not changed by the fact that only a few are willing—and even then, reluctantly—to admit it.
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Here’s a brief theoretical digression. In her political theory, Chantal Mouffe distinguishes between antagonism and agonism. The former is a relationship with an enemy in which it is impossible to find any common ground; mutual hostility cannot be overcome. In the case of agonism, however, despite extreme differences or conflicting interests, there is a common ground—if only in terms of how to wage the struggle against one another. This is a relationship not with a metaphysical enemy, but with a political opponent.
The peculiarity of today’s ideological landscape in Poland is that communism (and Russia, along with it as its heir) is regarded as a metaphysical enemy (Nawrocki himself stated that Russia is our “eternal enemy”), while Ukraine, even with its cult of Nazi collaborators, remains our metaphysical (see Snyder) ally. In neither case is it even possible to articulate an agonistic position that would restore political realism and make our own strategy contingent on the actual actions of our neighbors.
In a more general sense, our states have an ideological profile that completely and unconditionally rejects communism, while fascism and Nazism are increasingly rejected (if at all) only relatively. Only the latter are subject to the weighing of merits and faults.
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5. Technique number five: “an isolated incident.” A side effect of the uproar in the Polish public sphere over naming an army unit after “UPA heroes” is a focus on a single decision rather than on the broader process. Commentators are quick to admit that Zelensky made a mistake, a faux pas ; he got carried away and failed to take into account Polish sensitivities.
The thing is, this is not an isolated incident, but the culmination of a long process of rehabilitating the UPA and OUN and of building the ideological foundations of the Ukrainian state after the Maidan based on this politics of memory. This phenomenon has been thoroughly described and analyzed, and it encompasses hundreds of similar decisions in which Ukrainian fascists have been honored as patrons of schools, streets, and institutions, and as heroes in textbooks and on monuments, etc. The reactions of Ukrainian politicians to Nawrocki’s gesture perfectly confirm this. It turns out that, for them, the cult of the UPA and OUN is now indistinguishable from Ukrainian statehood itself. If it were otherwise, where would the problem lie? If it were a single isolated incident, there would be no incident at all.
Meanwhile, the Polish political class is now confronting—admittedly, reluctantly—the consequences of its own political blindness and the extent to which our region’s historical memory has been instrumentalized in the service of American imperialism. Without the Banderites—as they themselves readily admit—there would have been no “Revolution of Dignity” on the Maidan, and support for political extremists was a necessary element of NATO’s strategy to weaken Russia, which is no longer a secret to anyone who listens carefully even to the statements of American politicians.
We will, of course, be left to deal with the consequences of this strategy on our own. Just as, in the past, the inhabitants of other regions of the world (such as the Middle East) have done, where the U.S. also unscrupulously rehabilitated the most reactionary and brutal movements and groups, as long as they could serve to advance its goals.
6. Technique number six: “We have our own sins, too.” This is, admittedly, a specific kind of “whataboutism”—a form of assertiveness on behalf of others. It is, in fact, part of a broader phenomenon that is particularly prevalent among the “Cool-o-Poles,” for whom Ukraine has become an opportunity to escape their own insecurities regarding the symbolic hegemony of the Polish right wing. This has given rise to a kind of borrowed, compensatory patriotism—secondhand patriotism. For these circles, Polish patriotism immediately smacks of fascism. But Ukraine is something else. There, everything is somehow different, better, more authentic. Even fascism is de facto emancipation.
But if Nazi symbolism and the cult of brute force serve as a platform for liberation for a certain group, then perhaps its innermost self is more tainted by fascism than its daily witch hunt against Polish “patriots” would suggest? Perhaps those who constantly warn that “fascism is on the rise” should finally hear: “Yes, hand in hand with you”? It is they who, through their Ukrainian compensation—which they chronically confuse with genuine empathy—have done more than the right wing to normalize and legitimize Ukrainian fascism.
Amid this scuffle, the possibility of criticizing both one’s own and others’ transgressions in the name of universal principles and beliefs completely disappears from view. To do so, however, one must actually possess some principles and beliefs; yet here, as we can see, what prevails are rather unconditional reflexes tailored to the current needs of media cycles, rather than attitudes stemming from any deeper reflection.
The argument that, after all, Poland also venerates nationalists and fascists with blood on their hands is both historically accurate and politically irrelevant. The transgressions of Polish fascists do not absolve the transgressions of fascists in other countries. Though it must be acknowledged that Nawrocki’s circle has gained strength and visibility through mechanisms similar to those used in Ukraine to rehabilitate the UPA and OUN. In this sense, the dispute between the two presidents is, after all, a family quarrel—which does not change the fact that it exposes much deeper problems and neglect.
The position of the “Cool-o-Poles” is, once again, more complex than that of the “Ortho-o-Poles.” [This is my invention] The latter have their own nationalists and will not hesitate to pit them against their Ukrainian counterparts in a historical showdown. In the dispute between Polish nationalism and Ukrainian nationalism, however, the “Cool-o-Poles” will side with the latter, so as not, God forbid, to come across as… nationalists.
They have long since convinced themselves that they possess no other political language that could help them in this situation. Especially since their position in society depends on their connection to the imperialist core, and no calls for consistent anti-fascism have come from there.
7. Technique number seven: “They simply view history differently.” This is part of a strategy to achieve consensus through relativization. In this way, the crimes of Banderism are reduced to some kind of Polish obsession. But the crimes of the UPA and OUN are not repugnant simply because Poles hold this narrative and memory. Ukrainian fascism is not worthy of condemnation because it is Ukrainian, but because it is fascism. The same applies to Polish fascism or any other form of it. And any reasonably thinking person should have no trouble at all acknowledging this fact. Hitlerism is not worthy of condemnation because Poles or Jews say so, but because it systematically murdered entire nations in the name of its own racist ideology.
The fact that such an attitude is not self-evident in either Poland or Ukraine is the result of a long-term ideological transformation, the foundation of which is, of course, the criminalization of communism—and, along with it, the erasure from the collective consciousness of the postwar “civil religion” that was, after all, anti-fascism on both sides of the Iron Curtain (albeit in different forms). Today, Europe’s civil religion is anti-communism, and its latest incarnation is Russophobia. And these justify increasingly radical transgressions in the manipulation of history.
Secondary variant: “Everyone has the right to choose their own heroes.” This, too, is a form of relativism, but one that paradoxically invokes the supposedly universal concept of “right.” The “right” to fascism thus becomes almost a “right” to self-determination. And in the Polish public sphere, an interesting rift is emerging once again. The “Cool-o-Poles” would be inclined to admit: “Yes, everyone—but not Poles,” because otherwise they’d have to come to terms with the local cult of the ‘cursed soldiers,’ which Nawrocki now somehow presides over.
He himself and the rest of the “Ortho-o-Poles” don’t fully believe in that statement either, but they’ll use it in the same way as the “Cool Poles” as soon as someone attacks their pantheon of heroes. I wonder if, when someone with a soft spot for an unsuccessful Bavarian painter comes to power in Germany, that right will apply to him as well?
8. Technique number eight: “That was a long time ago; why bring it up now?” This is essentially a variation on the narrative of an isolated incident, only shifted in the temporal dimension. I’m setting aside the important issue of exhumation, because it’s just one element of a larger whole. And the problem with this bigger picture is that the Ukrainian state is currently erecting monuments to criminals and perpetrators of genocide in order to raise new generations of its citizens in the cult of Banderism. And opposition to this policy concerns, above all, its effects in the near future.
Secondary variant (also related to time “Let’s give them some time.” Let’s be patient. Setting aside the hidden condescension in this attitude—which treats Ukraine as a country of little children whose national consciousness is still in its infancy—this is simply a nonsensical argument. The last time Ukrainians were captivated by Dontsov’s ideas, they murdered thousands of Poles, Jews, Russians, and their own compatriots. Now that such fervor is building up again, are we supposed to let it fully develop? After all, what could possibly go wrong, right?
This contemporary dimension of the problem is often overlooked even by those who criticize Ukraine’s historical policy. They are capable of condemning the past, yet they are exceedingly lenient toward the present. This is all the more strange given that if anything threatens us, it is the contemporary Banderist movement, not the historical one. Bandera himself—though I’m not sure if even this is not a controversial view in Poland today—is no longer alive.
Some remarks.
I. As you have probably noticed, I use the argument— ad hitlerum —quite often here. Well, I’m trying to make use of it while I still can. It’s telling that the taboo responsible for the unfailing effectiveness of this rhetorical device is crumbling right before our eyes. Anti-fascism has ceased to be the lowest common denominator, the moral minimum in public life. Perhaps it never really was, or at least not to a sufficient degree? Today, when the most progressive segment of the intellectual elite is stepping up to defend the honor of Nazi collaborators, one might conclude that the last bastion of historical awareness has fallen. Anything goes now; there are no limits. Soon it will turn out (what am I saying—it has already turned out) that it is the Poles who should apologize for Volhynia massacre.
“Gazeta Wyborcza” has even launched the slogan: “Auschwitz didn’t fall from the sky.” This refers directly to the nationalist fervor of the right wing, which now wants to verify the nationality of members of parliament. However, in the context of the substance and essence of this dispute, to say that such lofty moral gestures come across as an unintended caricature is an understatement. After all, it’s not just Auschwitz that didn’t fall from the sky. Volhynia didn’t either. Gaza didn’t either. It’s rather the editors of “Gazeta Wyborcza” who sometimes seem to fall from some unreal heights and, when confronted with the real world, look thoroughly battered.
How is it that these “priests of morality” are unable to demonstrate even such a minimal virtue as an unequivocal and consistent condemnation of Nazism (since Bandera’s movement was a variant of it)? Where does such selectivity come from among these moral maximalists? There seem to be two answers.
First: geopolitical factors. For a long time, elements of the most reactionary and dangerous ideologies have been considered acceptable—or even cool . Fostering nationalism in the countries of the socialist bloc has been a cornerstone of American strategy since the beginning of the Cold War. After the collapse of the USSR, glossing over U.S. alliances with the far right was a necessary element of the pro-Western narrative. “Gazeta Wyborcza” excelled at this, falling in love at first sight with every Western illegal war, intervention, coup d’état, or economic plunder. Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria—take your pick. Polish authorities stood at attention every time to represent the moral justifications of arms dealers and global mafiosi. Their position within a system deeply penetrated by the interests of Western countries, led by the U.S., demanded it.
Second: the internal evolution of the comprador intelligentsia. Having held sway over public opinion for some time, the liberal elites lost the ability to engage in any kind of debate, as they won every one in advance by virtue of their institutional advantage. The aftermath of the habitus developed in this way is today’s practice of labeling opponents using categories such as disinformation, conspiracy theories, Kremlin narratives, and so on. This tactic effectively replaces the need to engage in substantive discussions, since such discussions would inevitably weaken the coherence of the dominant narrative. And yet the comprador intelligentsia is supposed to stand guard over it, not get bogged down in nuances. This is the source of the kitsch of moral exaltation, which, in the context of the dispute over the UPA, sometimes borders on the grotesque. While aesthetic kitsch can be defined as being emotionally moved by one’s own emotional response, moral kitsch is a sense of superiority stemming from a sense of one’s own superiority. Why give up such an advantageous position?
II. Currently, the mainstream media is already protecting two forms of fascism: Israeli and Ukrainian. Both, incidentally, for the same geopolitical reasons and amid simultaneous attempts to erase this political continuum. Perhaps, however, it is worth considering how to properly define the overall political project in which we are participating, since it requires us to constantly enter into alliances of this kind?
What kind of world are we building, given that today, in polite society, it is considered tactless to point out to Israeli and Ukrainian fascists that they are—or are becoming—fascists? Why is this gesture forcibly equated with fascism itself, motivated by anti-Semitism or Ukrainophobia? How did this seemingly completely natural moral impulse come to be so costly?
III. All of this is, of course, happening over the heads of—and against the vital interests of—not only the overwhelming majority of Polish society, but also the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland. “Polonobanderism”—as Bronisław Łagowski once described this phenomenon—also silences Ukrainians who do not share the fascination with the UPA and OUN, and who have themselves sometimes fallen victim to the rehabilitation of these organizations. First, they were silenced in their own country; now they are being silenced a second time here. And it is these Ukrainians—just like Poles who want to stay as far away as possible from the cult of the “cursed soldiers” and other nationalist farces—who represent a chance for amicable coexistence, mutual aid, and future peace. The political class’s opportunism is throwing them all onto a minefield and sacrificing them on the altar of its own interests.
The “Ortho-o-Poles” first turned Nazis into “normal people,” only to now turn “normal people” into Nazis and, as part of a retaliatory “fight against the UPA” (about 12 years too late), fight against them as well. The “Cool-o-Poles,” in turn, will endlessly die for Polish-Ukrainian friendship, including the Banderites in it, who—for reasons fundamental to their doctrine—regard this friendship, at best, as a necessary evil. The former have the wrong enemies, and the latter have the wrong friends. In practice, both sides perpetuate the equation between Ukrainian identity and Banderism. Neither side is capable of having normal political allies or opponents, because that requires a certain “strategic culture”—as they say today—and we haven’t developed that here, because why should one complicate the job of subcontractors?
Meanwhile, anti-fascism could serve as a unifying myth for Poland and Ukraine (and, by extension, for the entire region). It might be a myth, and like any myth, it would simplify relationships, histories, and so on, but it would at least have positive, peaceful, and solidarity-building potential. The fact that such a proposal sounds like a science-fiction scenario today only demonstrates the depth of the mental, political, and institutional dependence into which the countries of the former socialist bloc havefallen. The lack of a consistent, left-wing anti-fascist stance means we will be doomed to identity-based rivalries that will not only fail to resolve the crisis but will actually reinforce it. For the key to the problem lies far beyond their reach.
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