As India and Pakistan deepen their roles in the Gulf’s evolving security order, their decades-old rivalry is spilling into what may prove to be its most consequential external theatre yet.
But while New Delhi has always had a more economic, diaspora-driven presence in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Islamabad has been able to carve out an important mediatory role with Saudi Arabia’s support.
Led by Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan has been facilitating a peace deal between the US and Iran after hosting talks between the two sides in Islamabad last month.
During Munir’s visit to Tehran this weekend, developments gathered momentum, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio talked of “slight progress” and President Donald Trump said both sides are edging closer to an agreement.
Although nuclear negotiations remain a major sticking point, Pakistan may yet help to bridge the dangerous regional impasse between Washington and Tehran.
By combining proactive diplomacy with on-the-ground strengthening of Saudi Arabia's defence architecture , Islamabad’s role in the Gulf is yielding tangible results. India sets foot in the GCC Having upgraded defence, energy, and infrastructure investment ties with the UAE during a recent visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has suddenly aligned with positions that sit uneasily with Iran’s strategic calculus.
Since the UAE’s decision to leave the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) last month, Abu Dhabi is expected to increase its output and give priority to large oil-consuming countries like India.
With the US-Israel war on Iran in its third month, and the Strait of Hormuz blockade by Washington disrupting global oil supply, New Delhi’s primary concern may have been energy security, but it also entered a defence partnership with the UAE.
Having signed an MoU on defence cooperation with Iran in 2001 and the New Delhi Declaration for strategic partnership in 2003 , India may have to navigate and potentially help de-escalate friction between Tehran and Abu Dhabi in the future, to preserve strategic ties with both its partners.
Holding special strategic importance, Tehran offers New Delhi access to the port of Chabahar, creating direct routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia, as Pakistan restricts overland transit for India to pass through. Located further inland from Pakistan’s key port of Gwadar, this reinforces India’s alternative connectivity.
Now, if the UAE attacks Iran or vice versa, India cannot really take a side without compromising its long-term national security interests in the region. While Pakistan can link up to Central Asia via China, Iran or Afghanistan, India only has Iran for implementing its most important Connect Central Asia policy.
“India is dependent on both Iran and the UAE; on Iran for oil at a discounted price and on the UAE for its migrant labourers working there,” Torek Farhadi, a senior geostrategic analyst based in Geneva, told The New Arab . “Despite the optics of the last three months, India will keep the previously existing balance in the long run,” he added.
“It is too early to say how the new Gulf architecture will emerge after this war, even concerning the Pakistan-Saudi alliance, which in fact existed before. The region is going through unprecedented stress, especially economically. But it will be trade and economics which will create new relations in the long run.”
Discussing whether India would tilt towards Iran or the UAE, Junaid Javeed, a security and risk management expert based in Islamabad, told The New Arab that India would manage the tightrope walk between Iran and the UAE with “strict compartmentalisation”.
But this balancing act could get tricky, he said, due to India’s deepening alignment with Washington, Tel Aviv, and the Gulf “squeezing” how close it can get to Tehran. “Iran is leaning harder into a nationalist, civilisational rhetoric that doesn’t leave room for ambiguity,” he added.
Noting that India might pull off this balancing act during quieter times, Javeed said that if “a full-blown war breaks out between Iran and the Gulf states, sitting on the fence would be nearly impossible”.
Meanwhile, Ayesha Ijaz Khan , a journalist based in London, told The New Arab that the India-Iran relationship has already deteriorated, especially with India's strategic withdrawal from Chabahar Port due to US sanctions in January of this year.
In Khan’s opinion, “India has factored in the growing wedge between Saudi Arabia and UAE after it left OPEC into its decision-making and decided that the emerging alliance among UAE-India-Israel is more in line with their strategic calculation”.
However, Javeed, a security expert, pointed out that despite the headlines, there is no NATO-style clause between Iran and the UAE, unlike in the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact.
India might only provide logistical and intelligence support to Abu Dhabi, as going to war against Iran could ruin India’s economy and shut down the trade routes it relies on. “It wants to be a stabilising force in the region, not a policeman,” he said. Pakistan's ties in the Gulf In comparison to the recent India-UAE defence agreement, Saudi-Pakistan defence relations are tried and tested .
With joint army and air force training, military exercises, and round-the-year deployment of thousands of Pakistani troops in the Kingdom since the 1970s, Saudi-Pakistan bilateral ties have been exemplified as one of the closest relationships in the world between any two countries.
Even before their defence pact, Riyadh provided financial support for Islamabad’s nuclear program and helped it survive crushing economic sanctions after its first nuclear blast in 1998. Formalising bilateral defence ties with the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement ( SMDA ) only became a necessity in September last year, due to worsening regional instability.
Though it has no defence agreement with Iran, Islamabad has always sought to stay out of Riyadh-Tehran tensions, as the 900 km border it shares with the Islamic Republic remains sensitive, and sectarian tensions inside Pakistan are a source of worry.
As soon as the US-Iran war started, and Tehran started attacking Gulf states , Islamabad officially reminded Iran about its security pact with Riyadh. Along with mediation efforts between the US and Iran, Islamabad has made sure that regular engagement takes place between the Saudi and Iranian foreign ministries.
Then, just before US-Iran talks started in Islamabad, Pakistan deployed 8,000 additional troops, a fighter jet squadron, and air defence systems in the Kingdom under the SMDA, ready for a long-term security role and affirming its strategic leanings.
Currently, a non-aggression pact between Iran and several Middle Eastern states is being discussed to end the crisis in the Gulf. Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Doha, meanwhile, have reportedly adopted a more unified stance , with the UAE reaching out to Pakistan as momentum grew towards a diplomatic solution, and Kuwait expressing interest in defence ties with Pakistan.
But if tensions flare between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, India is uniquely placed to mediate, being the defence partner of both countries. The impact of Gulf tensions on South Asia Both South Asian rivals want to avoid being pulled directly into internal Gulf politics. Pakistan wants to support Saudi Arabia without provoking Iran, while India wants to strengthen ties with the UAE without jeopardising its relationship with Tehran.
A worsening security environment in the Gulf would impact both Pakistan and India by complicating their ties with Iran or the two main GCC allies.
India and Pakistan have enjoyed good relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but while Islamabad is used to balancing Iran and Riyadh, New Delhi is exploring the implications of defence ties with both Abu Dhabi and Tehran for the first time.
Having large diasporas working in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, citizens of both countries could face setbacks if Abu Dhabi feels Islamabad is not taking its side, or if Riyadh feels New Delhi is going against its interests.
With Riyadh announcing plans for financing a $10 billion refinery at Gwadar, Abu Dhabi might also speed up investments in India. Last week, for example, the UAE announced $5 billion in investment in Indian infrastructure and financial institutions.
"The India-UAE nexus must be viewed alongside the fact that Indians constitute 40% of the residents of the UAE, the largest expatriate population in the country,” journalist Ayesha Ijaz Khan said.
It is possible that India and Israel would jointly defend the UAE “as an outpost that serves their interests in the region”.
Therefore, in her opinion, “just as the India-UAE-Israel alliance seeks to expand, so does the Saudi-Pakistan pact, with the possible inclusion of Turkey and Qatar soon”.
According to Javeed, New Delhi and Islamabad are already locked in a quiet but intense scramble for influence in the Gulf.
Noting that though Pakistan had “a massive head start” in the GCC, he said that India has aggressively pushed back with commerce and anchored itself in mini-lateral groups like I2U2.
Pakistan “holds the edge” in military credibility, while India’s massive market gives it economic leverage, but “the Gulf will not pick a side, Pakistan is seen as a traditional, trusted hard-security partner and India as a critical economic and technological anchor”. Sabena Siddiqui is a foreign affairs journalist, lawyer, and geopolitical analyst specialising in modern China, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle East, and South Asia Follow her on X: @sabena_siddiqi Edited by Charlie Hoyle