The fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s government in Syria in December 2024, coupled with successive Israeli military campaigns against Iran since October 2024 and the setbacks endured by Hezbollah during the 2023–24 conflict, have fostered a prevailing sense in Tel Aviv that Iran and its ‘Axis of Resistance’ have entered a period of unprecedented vulnerability.
Although Israeli leaders have seemingly persuaded Trump that Tehran’s weakness is even greater than reality indicates , there has been a broader consensus in Israel since 2024 that a rare window is currently open to solidify Israeli dominance while the Islamic Republic remains relatively weak.
Against this backdrop, Turkey has increasingly asserted itself as a pivotal regional counterweight to Israel and its ambitions in the Middle East.
All indications suggest that Israel’s drive to exploit Iran’s perceived vulnerability is likely to bring it into direct contention with Ankara . These evolving dynamics promise to play a decisive role in shaping the region’s geopolitical balance.
A central concern for Israel lies in Turkey’s rise as a dominant external actor in post-regime change Syria. With Iran and Hezbollah’s influence in Syria sharply diminished since Assad’s ouster two and a half years ago, Tel Aviv has acted decisively to capitalise on the resulting power vacuum .
Yet, Ankara now stands as the principal obstacle to Israeli ambitions in the “New Syria,” prompting Israeli policymakers to conclude that, sooner or later, they will need to confront Turkey.
“Once you remove Iran from the equation, there’s really just one major counterweight to Israeli influence in the Levant. That’s Turkey. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf countries matter, to be sure, but they aren’t there on the ground in the same way as Turkey,” explained Aron Lund, a non-resident fellow at Century International, in an interview with The New Arab . Turkey as the new counterweight Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett employed particularly forceful language to underscore what he perceives as a significant Turkish threat to Israel.
“Turkey is the new Iran,” he declared , noting that “Turkey, along with Qatar, has gained influence in Syria, and they are seeking to expand that influence elsewhere and across the region.” Bennett characterised President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “cunning and dangerous,” asserting that he seeks to encircle Israel.
“Israeli political elites have begun framing Turkey the way they once framed Iran - as a country that should be targeted for military action. That project against Iran was launched forty years ago, and it took them forty years to bring the United States into a war against it,” Dr Mustafa Caner, an assistant professor at Sakarya University Middle East Institute, told TNA .
“It is likely that similar long-term strategies are now being developed toward Turkey. Why Turkey? Because Israel does not want any state in the region to be stable and strong outside of its own orbit. Its expansionist agenda requires the absence of powerful states in the neighbourhood,” he added. Tel Aviv's ambitions and constraints With the second Trump administration in office, Iran perceived as weakened, and power vacuums persisting in Syria, Israeli policymakers view the current moment as unusually favourable for advancing Tel Aviv’s regional ambitions.
Nonetheless, officials are acutely aware that this window will not stay open forever, prompting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to recognise the urgency of acting decisively while the opportunity remains.
Israel’s seemingly unconstrained, borderless aggression has been evident not only in Syria but also in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Iran, Qatar, and Yemen. Ankara regards Israel’s military actions and its complete disregard for the norms of international law as a grave threat not only to Turkey itself but also to the broader region.
“Israeli regional ambitions have gone into overdrive, and that unsettles regional leaders, including those that aren’t in active conflict with Israel. They see Netanyahu’s Israel as a bull in a china shop. It doesn’t care about regional stability, and it is unconstrained by the rules and norms that used to govern regional politics. There are no red lines anymore,” noted Lund.
“The attack on Hamas leaders in Doha last year must have rung alarm bells in other regional capitals, too. That includes Ankara,” he added.
All of Turkey’s actions in response to the Israeli threat suggest that Ankara is intent on deterring Israel by leveraging its conventional military superiority and its position within NATO, while carefully avoiding direct confrontation with Tel Aviv.
Although Lund does not anticipate an Israel-Turkey war in the near term, he cautions that, over time, tensions could escalate, potentially leading to military clashes.
“The most likely arena would be in Syria, or possibly over Mediterranean boundaries. If things are allowed to deteriorate to a point where there’s Turkish-Israeli bloodshed, it could poison the relationship in a much worse way,” he explained to TNA .
Looking ahead, developments along the Lebanese-Syrian border will merit close attention, given their profound implications for the Israeli-Turkish rivalry . Equally significant are Israeli military operations in the Golan Heights and Tel Aviv’s broader expansionist ambitions deeper into Syria. Would the US support Israel against Turkey? In evaluating Israel’s options for curbing Turkey’s role as a regional counterweight to Tel Aviv’s expansionist ambitions, Washington’s stance must be taken into careful account. The dynamics of US-Turkey and US-Iran relations are pivotal, as they directly shape Israel’s capacity to challenge Ankara.
While Iran has long endured stringent US sanctions, Turkey remains a NATO ally with an economy deeply integrated into the global system, adding multiple layers of complexity to any Israeli strategy aimed at diminishing its regional influence.
“Israel finds it very difficult to wage wars without American support. Factors like NATO membership and the US alliance make any Israeli attack on Turkey an enormously complicated proposition. And Turkey's conventional military superiority over Israel is not seriously in question,” Dr Caner told TNA .
“These factors constrain Israel while simultaneously reinforcing Turkey's own strategic confidence,” he added.
The Israelis, who will require US support, must also address the high political costs of further adventurism once the current war with Iran is resolved, or at least reaches a frozen stalemate .
As Dr Caner observed, Israel’s willingness to focus on countering Turkey in the post-Iran period will largely depend on how the conflict with the Islamic Republic unfolds.
In his assessment, Israel is highly unlikely to direct its aggression toward Turkey if the United States emerges weakened from the war with Iran, a scenario that would compel Israel to “pull back for a period.” Conversely, if Washington sustains only “minimal damage” in its confrontation with Tehran, Tel Aviv will seek to pivot its attention toward Turkey.
However, Dr Caner contends that American backing for an Israeli campaign against Turkey is unlikely for two principal reasons.
“First, why would it risk its relationship with a NATO ally? And second, after the enormous cost of the Iran war, America will want to stay away from further adventurism for some time,” the Ankara-based analyst told TNA .
The rise of a Turkey-Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan quad as a counterweight to Israel’s destabilising actions in the region represents another critical dynamic that Tel Aviv cannot ignore.
“The strengthening of regional initiatives is always bad news for Israel, because Israel prefers regional states to remain isolated - isolated states make easier targets. The Turkey-Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan grouping works against Israel’s preferences on two fronts simultaneously: it acts as a containing force during the war, and it will contribute to institutionalising stability in the post-war order,” explained Dr Caner. Future flashpoints and the limits of hegemony The tensions between Israel and Turkey illustrate the fragile equilibrium shaping the Levant. Regional and international dynamics have created a window of opportunity for Israel to pursue regional hegemony, yet Ankara now stands as the primary counterweight to such ambitions.
While Israel may enjoy a temporary strategic advantage, the broader regional balance remains delicate, constrained by Turkey’s conventional military strength, NATO membership, and diplomatic alliances.
Any Israeli attempt to confront Turkey directly is fraught with risks, including potential military clashes in Syria or the Mediterranean, as well as the loss of American support if the costs of confrontation outweigh perceived benefits from Washington’s perspective.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s measured deterrence , which takes the form of leveraging its military capability, alliances, and regional influence, underscores Ankara’s determination to protect its strategic interests without provoking full-scale conflict.
Looking ahead, the region faces multiple potential outcomes. Israel and Turkey may find avenues for pragmatic cooperation. Crises could flare intermittently. Also possible is a prolonged strategic rivalry, which may define the post-Iran conflict period in the Middle East.
Beyond immediate military calculations, Israel and Turkey’s actions will significantly influence the post-war geopolitical architecture of the Levant. Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero Edited by Charlie Hoyle