Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt started relaying messages between the US and Iran soon after the war began .
But with the US having unclear and ever-changing objectives , and Israel favouring military escalation, diplomatic activity to end the war has faced enormous challenges, even as international powers such as China step up calls for a ceasefire.
While talks seemingly hit a dead-end last week, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed rumours that mediation had ended.
On Monday, reports emerged that an Islamabad-brokered ceasefire plan had been presented to Iran and the US, ahead of an extended Tuesday deadline by the US to rain “hell” on Iran if a deal hadn’t been made.
The framework reportedly presented a settlement that could be concluded in 15 to 20 days, sources told Reuters , with an immediate ceasefire followed by a comprehensive agreement, including the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz .
The final agreement would include commitments by Tehran not to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets.
While there has been no immediate response from the US or Iran, Iranian officials had previously told Reuters that the Strait of Hormuz would not be opened as part of a temporary ceasefire and that Iran was seeking a permanent ceasefire with guarantees it would not be attacked again. Regional diplomacy in action As soon as mixed signals from Washington and Tehran started rattling global markets, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan met in Riyadh on 19 March to find a diplomatic off-ramp.
At the time, finding an official to negotiate with in Iran had become increasingly difficult, with Ali Larijani, Iran's top security official and considered a viable counterpart , killed in an Israeli airstrike days earlier.
A breakthrough reportedly came in late March when Egyptian intelligence opened back-channel links with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to secure a five-day pause in hostilities, including the US’ targeting of energy facilities.
This then laid the groundwork for substantive talks in Pakistan as Egyptian, Turkish, and Saudi foreign ministers met in Islamabad on 29 March to advocate diplomacy, with Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar saying it was ready to host US-Iran negotiations.
Pakistan has emerged as a key mediator in the conflict due to its warm ties with US President Donald Trump as well as the top hierarchy in Iran. Together with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – three other key diplomatic actors – it faces a mounting fallout from the conflict.
For Islamabad, prolonged war could mean refugee flows, disrupted trade, and energy shocks to an already fragile economy. Turkey, meanwhile, fears its regional influence and energy routes are at risk, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt fear oil-price volatility and economic chaos.
“Energy prices are at stake for Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey; they are all three oil and gas importers with high populations and bustling economies. At the same time, all three countries have access to the White House,” Torek Farhadi, a senior geopolitical analyst based in Geneva, told The New Arab .
In the case of Pakistan, regular relations have been maintained with neighbouring Iran. For Egypt and Islamabad, which are recipients of key remittances from GCC economies, the “current economic slowdown in the Gulf puts undue pressure on their central bank reserves,” Farhadi noted.
“This crisis needs an exit, and while the US, Israel, and Iran are calling the shots, diplomatic off-ramps could save the day for everyone involved. Beyond that, the sooner this war ends, the better it is for the global economy. As such, these diplomatic efforts are highly appreciated.” Sticking points Initially, neither Washington nor Tehran showed much willingness to hold talks. Then, on 25 March, reports emerged of a 15-point US proposal which was delivered to Iran via Pakistan.
These included the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear facilities and a commitment to never develop nuclear weapons, limits on Iran’s missiles, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, ending support for regional allies, and a 30-day ceasefire.
Tehran, however, responded with its own five conditions , including guarantees against future attacks, compensation for war damages, and recognition of its right to control maritime activity in the Strait of Hormuz.
However, Iran and the US have not been able to bridge the huge gaps between them, even to come to a minimum understanding on a ceasefire, Zeeshan Shah , an analyst at FINRA in Washington, told The New Arab , noting how a recent offer of a 48-hour cessation of hostilities was rejected by Iran on Friday.
With decision-making in Iran right now being done in large part by the IRGC, Shah suggested that Pakistan’s mediation attempts may have been partly hampered as senior IRGC commanders who could have dealt with Pakistan have been assassinated.
Regarding the apparent exclusion of Israel from any active talks, Shah observed that Israel would be kept abreast of any efforts to end the war by the Americans and also by Egypt, which has taken a leading role in trying to end the war.
“Netanyahu’s statements that the current Iranian government might survive the conflict are a reflection that Israel would have to end the hostilities at some point. To put it simply, once the US agrees to end the war, it will basically give the excuse for Israel to end the war as well.” China's role Last week, China stepped into the role of peacekeeper as it issued a five-point plan together with Pakistan with the aim of bringing about a ceasefire.
Issued on 31 March, the plan was drafted after Pakistan’s foreign minister travelled to Beijing and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the initiation of peace talks, the safety of non-military targets, the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and the safeguarding of the primacy of the UN Charter.
As Iran’s largest trade partner and a buyer of 80% of its oil, China is in a good position to push for a ceasefire and end the Strait of Hormuz blockade, despite having been muted in its response to the conflict so far. Beijing also has the capacity to bring balance, as it is on good terms with all sides, including Israel.
Iran seeks a “comprehensive end to the war,” Li Chao , Deputy Editor-in-Chief of China Media Group (CMG Middle East), told The New Arab , but there is so far “no public evidence showing that Iran has formally asked China alone to provide such a security guarantee”. Chao noted that China has “repeatedly emphasised that the sovereignty and security of the Gulf states must likewise be respected, and that energy infrastructure, desalination facilities, power stations, peaceful nuclear facilities, and other non-military targets should not continue to be attacked”.
In other words, “Beijing is not endorsing an Iranian ‘victory in war’; it is trying to define the issue instead of ending the war as quickly as possible and preventing the region from sliding into systemic disorder”.
Chao said that the five-point proposal jointly put forward by China and Pakistan is quite straightforward at its core, with Beijing’s point of entry not “helping one side win,” but pulling the region back from the edge of losing control, he said.
China plans to “use countries such as Pakistan to help build bridges, create a negotiating window through shuttle diplomacy and multilateral communication, and then broaden the demand for a ceasefire into a wider international consensus”, Chao said.
“Beijing does not intend to turn itself into a lone, single-channel mediator. Rather, it is trying to combine the China-Pakistan initiative, Gulf states’ security concerns, and European interest in maritime security and de-escalation into a broader pro-negotiation framework.”
While China’s approach has clear limits, Beijing has not publicly offered a Chinese-led mechanism to enforce an end to the war, which would include monitoring arrangements, penalties for violations, on-the-ground verification, or explicit security guarantees.
However, there was no formal response from Washington to China’s efforts. A new regional alliance? The quadrilateral diplomatic mechanism formed by Ankara, Cairo, Islamabad, and Riyadh has been seen as potentially representing a permanent grouping in some quarters.
With diplomatic activity by the four nations representing the best hope for a ceasefire in the conflict, there have also been suggestions that it could also come to define a new regional order after the war, as regional powers build a new military-strategic partnership .
Even before the US-Israeli war on Iran began, former Qatari PM Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani had in January urged the formation of a defence alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, describing it as an “urgent need” given shifting Western policy alliances.
He stressed that the alliance should not be perceived as hostile to Iran.
In line with a GCC position of security diversification as a core pillar of their defence strategies, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan announced a Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025.
The pact significantly upgraded their bilateral ties, positioning Pakistan as a key regional security partner and strengthening intra-regional cooperation.
Negotiations for Turkey to join the defence pact were reportedly at an advanced stage earlier this year, although ultimately Ankara did not join the alliance.
While not declaring a formal alliance, coordinated actions by Egypt and Saudi Arabia this year have suggested the quiet forging of a shared approach to regional security , most notably to oppose state fragmentation in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia.
Even before the war on Iran, Gulf states had begun to assess their relations with both the US and Iran. This diversification of defence partnerships is likely to continue, as regional powers assess what kind of regime is left in Iran once the conflict ends. Sabena Siddiqui is a foreign affairs journalist, lawyer, and geopolitical analyst specialising in modern China, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle East, and South Asia Follow her on X: @sabena_siddiqi Edited by Charlie Hoyle