When Volodymyr Zelensky landed in Damascus on 5 April, the visit was framed as part of Kyiv’s broader diplomatic outreach across the Middle East. Yet behind the optics of post-war reconstruction and economic cooperation, a more consequential dimension is emerging: security.
Zelensky’s meeting with Syrian interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa - his first visit since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad in 2024 - comes as Ukraine is actively positioning itself as a provider of military know-how across the region.
From the Gulf to Turkey and now Syria, Kyiv is exporting lessons learned from years of high-intensity warfare with Russia, particularly in countering drones and adapting to asymmetric threats.
In Syria, where air defences remain limited and the security landscape fragmented, this offer carries particular weight. But it also raises a broader question: is Ukraine becoming a new security actor in a theatre long dominated by Russia and increasingly shaped by Turkey ? Ukraine's offer: Expertise, not hardware Rather than traditional arms transfers, Ukraine is bringing something more flexible - and arguably more relevant to Syria’s current needs: battlefield experience.
After more than four years of war against Russia, Kyiv has developed extensive expertise in countering drones , adapting air defences, and integrating low-cost technologies into layered defence systems.
This model is now being actively promoted across the Middle East, including through recent security agreements with Gulf states and the deployment of Ukrainian technical teams to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Syria represents a different kind of partner. Unlike Gulf states, Damascus lacks advanced air defence systems and remains exposed to a range of threats, from Iranian drones and missiles to ongoing Israeli strikes . In this context, Ukrainian support is less about high-end platforms and more about training, doctrine, and technical assistance.
Recent reports suggest that Kyiv is also exploring more transactional arrangements, combining wheat supplies, drone technology, and military expertise - potentially in exchange for access to phosphate resources still partly controlled by Russian-linked companies.
This reflects a broader Ukrainian strategy: leveraging its wartime capabilities not only for diplomatic visibility , but also for economic and strategic gain.
For Damascus, the appeal is both immediate and structural. As Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and a senior analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, notes to The New Arab , Ukraine is not a pivotal actor for Syria, “but there are areas where these two countries could cooperate meaningfully,” particularly in food security and defence recovery.
More critically, Syria’s armed forces are in urgent need of rebuilding. Following years of war, much of the country’s advanced military hardware has been destroyed. Since the fall of Assad in 2024, Israel has conducted hundreds of strikes against Syrian military assets, with conservative estimates pointing to nearly 600 documented incidents.
The campaign has effectively dismantled large parts of Syria’s remaining air defence network, degraded its air force and naval assets, and struck deep into command-and-control nodes, weapons depots, and military-industrial infrastructure. As Lund explains, “jets, tanks, helicopters, air defence systems… anything they could find” was targeted, leaving Damascus with "limited capabilities to restore territorial control”.
In this context, Ukraine’s role is less about replacing Russia and more about filling specific gaps. Kyiv can act as a technical enabler, offering expertise in areas such as equipment repair, counter-drone tactics, and operational adaptation - all without the political weight attached to deeper reliance on Moscow.
At the same time, this outreach is not happening in a vacuum. It is unfolding within a crowded and highly contested environment - where Turkey remains the most influential external actor on the ground, and Russia continues to hold critical military assets along the Syrian coast. Turkey: Coordination, competition, or containment? If Ukraine’s entry into the Syrian file adds a new layer to the country’s external landscape, it does so in a space where Turkey remains the most immediate and influential actor.
Zelensky’s visit to Damascus came just one day after talks in Ankara with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 4 April and was reportedly conducted aboard a Turkish government aircraft - a detail that underscores the degree of coordination behind the trip and Ankara’s role in facilitating Ukraine’s regional outreach.
The presence of Hakan Fidan during Zelensky’s visit was therefore more than symbolic. It reflected Ankara’s determination to remain embedded in any evolving diplomatic or security track involving Damascus - and to shape, rather than react to, new partnerships.
Turkey’s footprint in Syria is both military and political. With thousands of troops deployed across northern Syria, deep involvement in restructuring Syrian security forces, and a growing role in key installations such as the Tiyas (T4) airbase , Ankara has positioned itself as an indispensable actor in the country’s post-Assad order.
Against this backdrop, Ukraine’s growing engagement appears, at least for now, to align with Turkish interests. The move is “a positive and welcome step” that could benefit both sides and even act as a “natural counterbalance” to Syria’s ties with Russia, Ali Bakir, assistant professor of international affairs, security, and defence at Qatar University, tells TNA .
Bakir sees Ukraine not as a rival, but as a complementary partner. Its battlefield experience - particularly in drones and air defence - could “add practical value” and potentially open the door to deeper defence cooperation and knowledge transfer, signalling what he describes as a “new era” in Syria–Ukraine relations.
This view is broadly echoed, though with a more geopolitical framing, by Barın Kayaoğlu, assistant professor of America Studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBU). From Ankara’s perspective, Ukraine’s engagement reinforces Turkey’s role as a regional intermediary. “It shows that [Turkey] is the critical middleman in its neighbourhood,” he argues, linking the development to Ankara’s broader efforts to position itself across multiple theatres - from Libya to the Black Sea.
At the same time, Kayaoğlu highlights the practical dimension of Ukraine’s offer. Beyond defence, Ukrainian expertise could extend into sectors such as electronics, agriculture, and industrial reconstruction - making Kyiv a potentially valuable partner in Syria’s long-term recovery.
Still, limits remain. While Bakir downplays the immediate impact on Turkey’s coordination with Russia, describing it as likely “limited,” Kayaoğlu suggests a broader shift: the era of structured cooperation frameworks such as the Astana process is fading, reducing Ankara’s need to rely on Moscow as a counterbalance.
Taken together, these views point to a nuanced picture. Ukraine may fit into Turkey’s Syria strategy - but as part of a layered system in which Ankara retains ultimate control over the pace and scope of external engagement. Russia: Symbolic move or strategic irritation? If Ukraine’s entry into Syria is constrained by Turkey’s entrenched presence on the ground, it carries a different kind of weight for Russia - one that is less immediate, but potentially more symbolic and strategic.
For more than a decade, Moscow has been the central external actor in Syria’s security architecture. Its military bases at Khmeimim and Tartus remain critical nodes for projecting power into the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Despite the fall of Bashar Al-Assad in 2024, Russia has retained a foothold in the country, and Damascus continues to rely heavily on Russian-made systems.
Yet this position is no longer uncontested. Ukraine’s outreach introduces an unusual dynamic: a country actively at war with Russia stepping into one of Moscow’s most established theatres of influence. While Kyiv’s role remains limited, its presence carries a clear political signal - one that aligns with what Lund describes as a broader “post-Assad reset” in Syria’s external relations , after years of near-total alignment with Moscow.
At a practical level, Ukraine is unlikely to displace Russia as Syria’s primary security partner. The scale of Russian involvement - from infrastructure to arms supply - remains unmatched. But the significance of Ukraine’s engagement lies elsewhere.
Russia’s regional posture is already showing signs of strain. Its naval presence in the Mediterranean has dropped to its lowest level since the start of the Ukraine war, while discussions over the future use of Russian bases in Syria - including their potential conversion into training facilities - suggest a more uncertain long-term footing.
By offering Syria alternative channels for technical support and limited defence cooperation, Kyiv may contribute to a gradual diversification of partnerships - giving Damascus additional leverage in its dealings with Moscow. This is particularly relevant at a time when Russia’s resources are stretched, and its regional posture is under pressure.
In this sense, Ukraine’s role is less about direct competition and more about strategic friction: introducing new variables into a relationship that has long been asymmetrical.
Zelensky’s visit to Damascus underscores a broader transformation in Syria’s external environment. Rather than replacing existing powers, new actors are beginning to layer themselves onto an already complex landscape, offering targeted capabilities and selective partnerships.
For Damascus, this creates opportunities. Engaging Ukraine allows Syria to diversify its security options without fully breaking with Russia, while also navigating Turkey’s dominant presence on the ground. The result is a strategy built not on alignment, but on balance.
For external actors, however, the picture is more fluid. Turkey appears willing to accommodate Ukraine’s role - but within limits that preserve its own influence. Russia, meanwhile, may not face an immediate threat, but is unlikely to ignore a development that introduces new degrees of uncertainty into its long-standing position.
In this sense, Ukraine’s entry into Syria is less about shifting the balance of power overnight and more about reshaping the rules of engagement.
The question is no longer whether Syria will remain a contested space - but how many layers of competition it can sustain, as conflicts elsewhere begin to echo across its fragmented security landscape. Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi Edited by Charlie Hoyle