As Algeria prepares to hold parliamentary elections on July 2, there is virtually no chance that these elections will bring a positive political shift. Indeed, they occur as the regime has solidified its authoritarian grip, enacting laws that expand presidential authority, and restrict political freedoms.
Analysts contend that the tightly orchestrated electoral processes in Algeria serve primarily to maintain the existing political order, block meaningful systemic change, and project an pretense of legitimacy to foreign partners.
Seven years after the 2019 Hirak movement ended former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s political order, Algeria’s military and political elite have since successfully and effectively reasserted their grip on power.
Algerians have not forgotten when the military top brass intervened to halt the first free post-independence parliamentary elections in 1991 just as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was on the verge of winning. By forcing then President Chadli Bendjedid out of office, the authorities abruptly dismantled the country's democratic transition.
In the aftermath of the coup and the devastating civil war which resulted in over 200,000 casualties, subsequent elections have been reduced to a single objective: the safeguard of the regime. The July 2 elections are no exception. Despite the veneer of a multi-party politics, these elections are unlikely to disrupt Algeria’s power dynamics. True political control continues to rest with the military-security apparatus. Furthermore, the electoral process is widely perceived as being pre-engineered to benefit the ruling alliance comprising the National Liberation Front (FLN), the National Democratic Rally (RND), and pro-establishment independents.
Nearly 7,000 candidates are competing for 407 seats. Yet, the challenge for the authorities remains voters’ turnout . How to convince Algerians to get to the polls when confidence in state institutions remains so thin?
Many Algerians feel that parliament has no real power. They see it as a “rubber stamp” mechanism for the decisions of the executive branch, which completely controls the National Assembly. Moreover, Members of Parliament feel no accountability to their constituents. They view parliament as a fast track to wealth and status as the perks of being an MP are as lucrative as they are many. Supress, rinse, repeat According to ongoing reports from journalists, opposition parties, and activists, Algerian authorities are stifling the political and media environment . International NGOs have widely condemned the government for utilizing arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, and travel bans to muzzle and punish peaceful dissidents.
Mr. Fethi Ghares, coordinator of the Democratic and Social Movement (MDS), was arrested last September and handed a two-year prison sentence and a 300,000 Algerian dinars ($2,250) fine for remarks deemed insulting to President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.
The forthcoming electoral cycle coincides with an apparent entrenchment of authoritarian governance. Recent constitutional revisions , officially marketed as “technical adjustments,” have significantly broadened presidential authority while weakening the opposition’s capacity to contest the system. Analysts argue these reforms have cemented executive overreach within key political institutions.
Despite the government maintaining strict control over the political apparatus, some of Algeria's opposition parties are returning to the electoral process, reversing their 2021 boycott. The Socialist Forces Front (FFS), the secularist Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), and the Trotskyist Workers’ Party (PT), are participating in the upcoming elections solely to avoid legal dissolution.
Under the new March 2026 electoral law, political parties may be banned if they refuse to participate in the election. This is political blackmail. Moreover, a large number of hopefuls – largely veterans of the Hirak movement – the 2019 popular uprising that toppled former autocrat Abdelaziz Bouteflika, have been barred from running, while many of the protest movement's activists face ongoing marginalization.
When questioned by The New Arab about participating in an electoral process they have always denounced, two leading Hirak figures cited a desire to challenge the regime from within. This naive rationale recalls the failed attempts of past reformists, most notably former Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche.
It should be mentioned that this election unfolds against a backdrop of deep-rooted economic challenges, including high youth unemployment , a heavy reliance on hydrocarbons, and bureaucratic red tape that stifles investment. Meanwhile, the average Algerian battles rising living costs.
While hydrocarbons make up Algeria’s 93% of product exports, the US-Israeli war against Iran has given the country’s economy an additional boost.
As Europe sought alternatives to LNG from Persian Gulf countries , Algeria capitalized on the shifting geopolitical landscape to double its exports. This generated much-needed revenue, enabling the Algerian authorities to continue buying social peace.
However, international democracy watchdogs argue that the Algerian political system, while maintaining an electoral facade, remains an authoritarian state dominated by an entrenched political-military elite that suppresses authentic political competition.
The July 2 political theater will merely maintain the political status quo, keeping the ruling elite in power without delivering meaningful democratic change. Deep-rooted systemic issues such as heavy reliance on hydrocarbons, restricted political freedoms , and systemic corruption are expected to persist long after the polls close.
Yet while current political engineering by the authorities could yield short-term stability, underestimating Algerian agency would be a mistake. The Hirak protests, where millions who flooded the streets every Friday may be a thing of the past for now, their original grievances have not disappeared.
Since the outcome of the July election is a foregone conclusion, the lingering question is how this electoral cycle will shape Algeria's trajectory for the next half-decade. Ultimately, the process may well prove to be much ado about nothing. Dr. Abdelkader Cheref is a US-based Algerian scholar, freelance journalist, and former Fulbright grantee. He holds a PhD from the UK's University of Exeter and serves as an Assistant Professor of Africana and Multicultural Studies at Southern Illinois University. His research and writing focus heavily on African and MENA politics, democratization processes, postcolonial studies, Islam/Islamism, migration, and political violence. Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com Opinions expressed in this video article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff, or the author's employer.