In its recent airstrikes in Kabul, Pakistan reportedly targeted a drug rehabilitation center, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of patients. The United Nations and the World Health Organization have called for an investigation into the attack , which, if verified, constitutes a war crime under international law.
While global focus is on the war in the Middle East, a war between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been intensifying. After Pakistan declared “open war” on Afghanistan last month, airstrikes against Taliban targets have increased as has Taliban retaliation along the contested Durand Line. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has lacked legal status internationally due to the exclusionary and dystopian rule of the regime, complicating the legal rights and security of the Afghan state and its citizens.
But does the Taliban’s lack of legitimacy justify Pakistani aggression? What Went Wrong Between Pakistan and the Taliban? The involvement of Pakistan in the creation of the Taliban during the mid-1990s and its subsequent support for the group throughout its two-decade insurgency against international engagement in Afghanistan is well-documented. Pakistan ultimately welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.
However, the Taliban’s success against the NATO mission and the collapse of the Afghan republic inspired Pakistani version of the Taliban—the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP—to intensify its insurgency within Pakistan , seeking to emulate the achievements of its Afghan counterpart. Pakistan expected the Taliban regime to reciprocate its decades-long support by acting against the TTP. However, the Taliban refused to acknowledge the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan and argued that Islamabad was externalizing its own security failure by attributing it to Kabul .
Since regaining power, the Taliban has faced accusations from various states and organizations, including the UN Security Council , for maintaining close ties with terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the TTP. Given their shared ideological affinities, longstanding relationships, and the vital role that groups like the TTP played in the Taliban’s rise to power, the Taliban regime’s willingness—and possibly its ability—to take action against these entities is significantly limited.
In 2022, Pakistan resorted to military aggression to pressure the Taliban regime to act against the TTP, leading to retaliatory Taliban artillery attacks on Pakistani military posts along the Durand Line. By 2026, hostilities escalated after Islamabad ramped up airstrikes in Afghan provinces. In response, the Taliban launched cross-border attacks on Pakistani security posts and accused Pakistan of violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty under international law. Afghanistan’s Sovereignty Under the Taliban Regime Sovereignty is a fundamental characteristic of the modern state and the basis of contemporary international order, upheld by international law, treaties, and judicial decisions. Key elements of state sovereignty include territorial supremacy, independence, non-intervention, equal rights, and internal jurisdiction. The UN Charter supports these principles by emphasizing “sovereign equality” among member states, prohibiting the threat or use of force against states, and protecting domestic jurisdiction.
Although defined as a state’s supreme authority over its territory and people, sovereignty is not static or absolute but rather subject to change and limitations. Initially, an absolute right of monarchs in the seventeenth century, it evolved into state sovereignty in the eighteenth century, and now reflects modern popular sovereignty. In the aftermath of twentieth-century atrocities committed by states, the concept of sovereignty increasingly highlights the authority of the people through constitutional rights and elected representation. Consequently, modern international law incorporates human rights considerations , among others, that limit state sovereignty. This limitation is particularly relevant to the Taliban regime.
The Taliban regime remains largely unrecognized internationally, with only Russia formally recognizing it . Despite claiming sovereignty through territorial control, the regime’s violations of international law, particularly concerning human rights, undermine its claims. In modern international law, sovereignty is viewed as a responsibility of the state to protect its people and uphold human rights. This includes demonstrating both the capability and the political will to fulfill that responsibility. As such, in recognition of a state’s sovereignty, considerations of human rights take precedence over the rights of the state itself.
Since regaining power, the Taliban has shown a significant failure to demonstrate the necessary capability and political will to protect fundamental rights. Instead, it has engaged in extrajudicial killings and severely limited women’s rights and agency . These actions, among others, significantly undermine the regime’s ability to assert sovereignty, resulting in its continued lack of recognition.
Without international legitimacy and recognition, the regime lacks the legal status to represent the Afghan state, which, under international law, still exists as a subject of international law. However, its legal personhood and its capacity to exercise rights are heavily contested and limited . This prevents the state from having juridical standing in global affairs. Its unrecognized status limits its ability to invoke sovereignty and enjoy sovereign immunity, which protects against external judgments. The Legality of Pakistan’s Military Intervention Pakistan asserts that its military actions are defensive and retaliatory against the TTP safe havens in Afghanistan. According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, the fundamental conditions for such acts of self-defense require either an armed attack or an imminent attack. While there has not been an armed attack by the Taliban to justify self-defense, the definition of “imminent attack” in international law is quite narrow. It necessitates that the threat be immediate, overwhelming, and leave no alternative options for action. Legal experts argue that engaging in preemptive war without an “imminent threat” constitutes illegal aggression under the UN framework. In the case of Pakistan, the justification for military action arises from the increasing insurgency of the TTP within its borders. However, Pakistan has not provided evidence to support its claim of self-defense to the UN Security Council.
Pakistan claims that the Taliban regime is supporting an intensifying religious insurgency led by the TTP and the ethno-linguistic Baloch insurgency. Under international law, the provision of weapons or logistical support by a second country to an insurgency or rebel group violates the principle of non-intervention. However, this does not automatically justify a claim of self-defense against that country unless the support reaches the level of an armed attack. The International Court of Justice defines the transition from support for an insurgency to an “armed attack” as an act of “ significant scale and effect .” For support to be classified as an armed attack, the assisting country must direct, command, and control the insurgency’s operations, acting as the primary actor in areas such as material support, logistics, intelligence, training, and coordination.
The moral paradox for Pakistan lies in its accusations against the Taliban regime’s actions or “inactions” that resemble those Pakistan itself engaged in while supporting the Afghan Taliban insurgency during the two decades of the war on terror. The international community has provided substantial evidence of Pakistan harboring and supporting the Taliban insurgency. This situation marks a reversal, as Pakistan now condemns the Taliban for behavior it was previously criticized for. If Pakistan’s past support did not justify the coalition forces and the Afghan government invoking self-defense, it raises questions about Pakistan’s current claims of self-defense against the Taliban regime, presenting a significant moral quandary. When states apply double standards by treating similar scenarios differently based on their interests or involvement, they undermine the consistency and fairness that are essential to the international legal system.
From a strategic standpoint, Pakistan’s military intervention could yield counterproductive results. The Taliban, by portraying themselves as defenders of national sovereignty, could take advantage of Pakistan’s aggression to bolster their domestic support. The “rally round the flag” effect strengthens the Taliban, particularly among some Pashtuns with ethno-linguistic affinities for the Taliban, thereby enabling the regime to solidify its authority.
Furthermore, the Taliban can also use the external threat to sustain the motivation of its fighters. Taliban combatants are not a conventional professional army but are instead motivated by religious zeal, which underpins their loyalty. Following the Taliban’s return to power, some fighters reportedly joined other militant groups , such as ISKP or TTP, to maintain their religious fervor. In this context, resistance to Pakistani aggression provides renewed impetus for “jihad” among Taliban fighters. This motivation, combined with several other factors, including the historical territorial dispute over the Durand Line, opposition to Pakistan’s decades-long interventionist policy in Afghanistan, a desire to retaliate against Pakistani aggression, and shared identity and ideological affinities among some population segments on both sides of the Durand Line, may further rally support for the Afghan Taliban as well as strengthening TTP insurgency in Pakistan. Looking Ahead The Taliban regime’s lack of domestic legitimacy and international recognition has created a legal vacuum for the Afghan state in the international system, rendering it vulnerable to foreign aggression. This international isolation stems from the regime’s repressive policies and human rights violations. Therefore, the restoration of the Afghan state’s full sovereign rights begins at home with the establishment of an inclusive political system and the protection of fundamental human rights. Initiating these would facilitate international recognition and restore Afghanistan’s full legal personhood within the international system. Absent these reforms, Afghanistan remains a legal void in the international society.
Nevertheless, the absence of legal recognition for the Afghan state does not entitle Pakistan to violate its sovereignty. After all, the principle of sovereign equality remains binding regardless of a state’s political status.
Furthermore, irrespective of the legal status of Pakistani military actions, mass civilian casualties constitute war crimes. The reported Pakistani attack on an addiction rehabilitation hospital, resulting in hundreds of casualties, warrants thorough investigation, documentation, and reporting. In the absence of Taliban representation at the international level, relevant agencies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan should document and preserve evidence of the attack for potential war crimes investigation.
In a time marked by unilateralism, the erosion of multilateral norms, and a decline in adherence to core UN principles by influential states, these challenges pose substantial challenges to international law. Nevertheless, international law has clear mechanisms for reporting violence and rights violations, requiring relevant actors to document these abuses for potential legal proceedings.
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