Sudan Nashra: Sudanese bid to rejoin global financial system unlikely to succeed amid wartime realities, sources say | Burhan seeks political backing for state control of aid in brief Jeddah visit | Idris’s intra-Sudanese dialogue proposal lacks seriousness, party sources say | Sudan Shield Forces arrive in Blue Nile | Military launches ground attacks in North Kordofan

Subscribe to our Lens on Sudan newsletter here . A Sudanese delegation pressed for Khartoum’s re-entry into the international financial system on the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank spring meetings in Washington, DC last week, standing in for a finance minister barred from attending by United States sanctions. The 2021 coup by then-allies Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo reversed gains from earlier austerity reforms that had enabled Sudan, for the first time in decades, to access concessional financing. In the coup’s aftermath, debt relief was suspended and $1.8 billion in World Bank grants frozen. Now, amid war and economic collapse, the delegation sought to present an apolitical case, seeking to delink economic recovery from political conditions and to demonstrate that state financial institutions could still absorb and manage funding. World Bank support is currently channeled through United Nations agencies rather than state institutions. What the delegation pushed for, a former financial advisor said, was a return to budget-linked financing — allowing funds to pass through state coffers to replenish foreign currency reserves and support government spending amid its continued failure to make good on its reconstruction promises. That pitch, however, runs up against institutional erosion, operational challenges and military-dominated decision-making that undermine both implementation capacity and donor confidence, former officials told Mada Masr. There is also the question of leverage. With Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim under sanctions and absent from Washington, the delegation lacked its most politically influential figure — raising doubts about how much it can actually deliver. And while the government is trying to build what a ministerial source described as fiscal sovereignty and assert control over reconstruction financing, Burhan has turned to diplomacy to extend that sovereignty claim to humanitarian file. His stop in Jeddah this week for talks with Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, part of a short Gulf tour, was aimed at rallying Saudi support against what Khartoum sees as a pattern of external moves that bypass the state and risk legitimizing the Rapid Support Forces-led Tasis alliance and its parallel government. According to a former ministerial source, the immediate trigger for the outreach to Riyadh was the third International Sudan Conference held in Berlin on April 15. Khartoum viewed the meeting as part of a broader push to shift control over aid delivery to international actors — a core point of contention in all international attempts to broker a political settlement, where humanitarian access is tied to externally managed delivery frameworks. As a countermove, discussions in Jeddah touched on convening a conference on humanitarian and financial commitments, with Khartoum hoping Saudi Arabia would play a central organizing role, a source close to Burhan said. Burhan then traveled to Muscat, where, according to a diplomatic source, talks with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq focused on consolidating a shift in trade routes through Omani ports following the United Arab Emirates’ August 2025 ban on vessels bound for Sudanese ports. At home, Prime Minister Kamel Idris said his government is preparing to launch a “comprehensive political dialogue” by the end of May, which was met with broad skepticism. Party officials who spoke to Mada Masr described it as vague and detached from the realities on the ground, arguing that it glosses over the procedural and political foundations required for a credible process. A former official from former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s transitional government said the initiative aligns with Burhan’s broader efforts to recalibrate the transitional phase, potentially laying the groundwork for further steps that could consolidate his position in a post-transition order. On the battlefield, the military sent for more reinforcements for its operation to regain lost ground in the southeastern border region of Blue Nile, with troops from the military-aligned Sudan Shield Forces led by Abu Agla Keikel arriving in Damazin. A military source said preparations have been finalized for a major push toward the strategic city of Kurmuk. In Kordofan, the military launched ground offensives on RSF-held towns along the road linking North Kordofan to South Kordofan. Control over these towns would open a supply route to the Dalang frontline in South Kordofan, where the RSF continues to press its attacks on the city. *** Sudanese delegation in Washington urges donors to unfreeze grants, resume debt relief measures The Sudanese delegation at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank spring meetings in Washington, DC, April 15. Courtesy: The Finance and Economic Planning Ministry. On the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank spring meetings in Washington, DC last week, a technocratic Sudanese delegation — standing in for a finance minister under US sanctions — sought to press Khartoum’s case for re-entering the international financing system. According to three Finance Ministry sources, the pitch rested on separating economic recovery from the political impasse and ongoing war to restore the concessional financing and budget-linked support that had become available before the 2021 coup. With a “technical vision” in hand , the delegation proposed the grants directly finance reconstruction, support productive sectors and restore basic services. Yet that framing runs up against the realities donors see on the ground, two former officials say. Institutional erosion, a collapsed revenue base, operational challenges and military-dominated decision-making undermine both implementation capacity and donor confidence — as does the gap between a technocratic delegation making the case abroad and the political actors who ultimately hold leverage at home. Years of war and economic mismanagement have hollowed out Sudan’s productive and export sectors and deepened the foreign currency shortage. Domestic banks are unable to sustain trade finance, while reconstruction in military-controlled areas has stalled amid a depleted wartime treasury — strains compounded by global volatility in the wake of the US-Israeli war on Iran. The state’s debt burden, meanwhile, has climbed to US$66.8 billion, mostly in accumulated interest. This marks a stark reversal from Sudan’s post-2019 trajectory. Following Omar al-Bashir’s ouster, austerity measures and arrears clearance enabled access to debt relief initiatives and reopened channels for concessional finance and grants after decades of isolation. The momentum was derailed by the 2021 coup led by then-allies Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo against the civilian component of the transitional government. Debt relief was suspended, $1.8 billion in World Bank grants were put on hold and substantive US assistance was withdrawn. While those suspensions halted funding routed through state institutions, World Bank support has not ceased entirely. Instead, it has been redirected through United Nations agencies and other partners, financing programs in health, education, food security and other sectors, but outside government channels. Reversing that arrangement is central to Khartoum’s current push. The delegation in Washington, led by Central Bank of Sudan Governor Amina Mirghany and State Minister of Finance Mohamed Abdel Dayem, wanted external financing to flow through the state again, replenishing foreign reserves while paying salaries and contractors in local currency, according to a former financial advisor to the 2019-2021 transitional government led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. With the war now in its fourth year and government pledges on reconstruction and a return to “normalcy” yielding little on the ground, Mirghany and Abdel Dayem used the meeting to try to persuade donors to “delink humanitarian and development tracks from political conditions,” one of the sources in the Finance Ministry told Mada Masr. The delegation also sought to revive Sudan’s track under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, arguing that the unresolved debt burden continues to bar access to the concessional finance needed to stimulate productive sectors and avert total economic collapse, according to the source. In an effort to make that case more palatable, the delegation presented what a second ministerial source informed of the meetings described as a “technical vision” — an attempt to demonstrate that the Finance Ministry and central bank can still function despite security and political challenges. Central to that pitch was a proposal to direct frozen World Bank grants into “rapid response” projects, according to the source. These would focus on repairing infrastructure, supporting agriculture to mitigate food insecurity, and restoring essential services in the most vulnerable regions, they added. The delegation pointed to ongoing reforms aimed at rebuilding confidence in public financial management, according to a third ministerial source. The source described a government push toward “comprehensive digital transformation,” including the expansion of central bank e-payment systems and the rollout of a single treasury account framework linking government entities to a centralized digital accounting platform. New electronic systems for procurement and contracting have also been introduced, the source said. Yet these measures fall short of addressing the core constraints deciding donor engagement. The former financial advisor noted that while Sudan’s economic institutions retain a degree of technical credibility, the resumption of large-scale grants and debt relief ultimately hinges on political stability and constitutional legitimacy — namely, forming a government that enjoys broad domestic consensus and international recognition. Beyond politics, structural constraints continue to weigh down any potential re-engagement. Years of war have eroded institutional capacity and depleted experienced cadres — factors that complicate the monitoring and evaluation processes required by the World Bank, according to the former advisor. Another core technical barrier, the advisor noted, is a critical “data gap.” International financial institutions currently lack accurate, up-to-date statistical reporting on macroeconomic indicators across all Sudanese states. In the absence of comprehensive field surveys, designing targeted reconstruction programs — or assessing the impact of financing — becomes significantly more difficult. Security and access constraints present another layer of difficulty. According to the former advisor, World Bank missions are unable to access production and agricultural areas. As a result, current projects are implemented through UN agencies and international partners rather than state institutions. While this allows programs to continue, it raises administrative costs and limits direct engagement with state institutions, constraining the government’s ability to build fiscal sovereignty or lead the reconstruction process independently, and diverting funds that could otherwise be paid to its own employees. Even where financing is theoretically available, the government can’t meet its terms. Some World Bank infrastructure projects on the table require parallel government financing before reimbursement, according to the former advisor — a model that requires a functioning revenue base. In Sudan’s case, that base has largely collapsed, given the contraction of economic activity, the industrial shutdown and the damage to exports, they added. In that context, the advisor said, the government’s push to demonstrate the viability of its digital reforms and financial transparency is an attempt to substitute for the guarantees to donors it is currently unable to meet. For donors, however, the issue is not just how the case is made, but who can act on it. Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim’s placement on the US Specially Designated Nationals list in September 2025 prevented his participation in Washington, with the government presenting a technocratic face instead. A former central bank source said Ibrahim’s absence from the meetings was a key limitation on their effectiveness. The US sanctions have effectively removed the government’s most politically powerful economic actor from direct engagement with international institutions. Ibrahim, both a senior political figure and an armed movement leader, commands influence within the governing coalition with the ability to push through decisions even in the face of internal resistance. The officials sent in his place — Mirghany and Abdel Dayem — are technocrats, operating within a far narrower mandate and without the same capacity to enforce alignment. The source noted that Ibrahim had previously approached international forums with an explicitly political argument — framing debt relief as a “political right” in the wake of the 2019 revolution. The current delegation, by comparison, has relied on a strictly technical register, emphasizing data and administrative reforms in an effort to present a state apparatus detached from wartime ideologies or political alliances, the source said. As a result, the source said, expectations for the meetings remain modest. Rather than signaling a restoration of trust, they are more likely to produce what the source described as “conditional technical trust” — cooperation around specific programs. Under such an arrangement, the World Bank would continue to rely on UN agencies and other intermediaries for implementation, in part to mitigate sanction risks and prevent resources from being redirected toward military ends, according to the source. *** Burhan touches down in Jeddah, seeks political backing in state’s bid for control of aid Sudanese Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman hold a meeting at the Royal Palace in Jeddah, April 20. Courtesy: The Transitional Sovereignty Council. Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair and Sudanese Armed Forces chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan set out on a short Gulf tour this week, seeking Saudi political backing while using a stop in Muscat to anchor new trade and logistical routes. Burhan arrived in Jeddah on Monday for a brief visit, where he met with Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, accompanied by Foreign Minister Mohie Eddin Salem and intelligence chief Ahmed Ibrahim Mufaddal. According to a former Foreign Ministry source, the visit was aimed at enlisting Saudi support in countering what Khartoum views as a series of external moves that erode state control over humanitarian aid and edge toward implicit recognition of the RSF-led Tasis coalition and the parallel government it leads. Such moves, according to the source, risk consolidating RSF influence in Darfur and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile. A source close to Burhan said discussions in Jeddah touched on convening a conference on humanitarian and financial commitments, with Khartoum hoping Saudi Arabia would play a central organizing role. The immediate trigger for Khartoum’s outreach, according to the former Foreign Ministry source, was the third International Sudan Conference held in Berlin on April 15. While typically focused on humanitarian pledges and access, the meeting once again drew criticism from Sudanese authorities for excluding government representatives. In Khartoum’s view, discussions at the conference implied that the Sudanese government might relinquish control over the delivery of aid to international actors, according to the source. For Sudanese officials, this direction was foreshadowed in February by the formation of a new “coalition to prevent atrocities and promote justice in Sudan,” comprising members of the UN Human Rights Council’s core group on Sudan — the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway — which in Khartoum’s reading expands external influence over the humanitarian issue, the source said. A former Sudanese diplomat in the European Union told Mada Masr that the series of international conferences on Sudan, most recently in Berlin, are effectively an attempt to create a parallel civilian track that excludes the direct warring parties. These forums bring together civilian actors, diplomats and aid organizations seen as less confrontational and more amenable to consensus, according to the source. From that perspective, the Berlin meeting’s scope was narrowed from the outset to managing humanitarian access, opening corridors, protecting aid workers and expanding the operational role of international organizations. But for Khartoum, these discussions cut to the core of the months-long dispute over sovereignty that has often been a key sticking point in international attempts to broker a political settlement, where humanitarian access is tied to externally managed delivery frameworks. Sudanese authorities insist assistance should be routed through state institutions to preserve control, the former diplomat said. The same tensions extend to the Sudan Atrocity Prevention Coalition formed in February. According to the former diplomat, Khartoum views the formation of international pressure groups as effectively building a network of political influence capable of impacting aid and funding decisions as well as diplomatic legitimacy. The larger the network, the greater its ability to link humanitarian access to political outcomes, something the government categorically rejects, the former diplomat said. According to the former ministerial source, both the coalition and aid discussions held in the government’s absence risk lending legitimacy to Tasis, which, in addition to holding Darfur, includes the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdel Azizi al-Hilu, which controls large swathes of Blue Nile and Kordofan. The source said Khartoum has begun trying to counterbalance these dynamics on multiple fronts. Ahead of the Jeddah visit, Sudan’s acting chargé d’affaires in Ireland, Omar Ahmed Mohamed, agreed with Irish Parliament Speaker Verona Murphy on April 18 to establish a parliamentary Friends of Sudan group. The initiative, according to the source, is intended to build a counterweight within European political circles by promoting the government’s narrative and challenging what officials see as the growing influence of rival actors. Ultimately, the aim is to cultivate a lobbying network capable of shaping decisions on sanctions, aid, recognition and the broader terms of international engagement, according to the source. In parallel, the source said, a military track seeking to regain lost ground in Blue Nile and Kordofan is underway, particularly along the Blue Nile’s Kurmuk axis, a critical border area the military has been losing to the RSF. As these regions face some of the most acute humanitarian crises, they sit at the center of the dispute over aid delivery. Regaining control is seen as key to reinforcing the government’s claim that aid can be delivered through state channels rather than external mechanisms. Burhan, the former ministerial source said, made clear in his meeting with bin Salman that operations will continue as the military attempts to strengthen its position on the ground. *** Burhan in Muscat to anchor new trade routes Sudanese military chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is received by the Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq, in Muscat, April 21. Courtesy: The Transitional Sovereignty Council. Following his brief stop in Jeddah, Burhan traveled to Muscat on Tuesday — his first visit to Oman since assuming leadership of the TSC in 2019. He was received by Sultan Haitham bin Tariq at Baraka Palace, where the two leaders discussed ways to “enhance existing cooperation frameworks and open new horizons for bilateral action in the coming period,” according to a TSC statement. A Sudanese diplomatic source told Mada Masr that talks focused on Sudanese-Omani cooperation in light of the reconfiguration of Sudan’s trade routes in recent months. Following Emirati bans in August 2025 on vessels bound for Sudanese ports, Oman’s Arabian Sea ports emerged as an alternative corridor for rerouting supply lines. According to the source, what began as a temporary workaround has since reshaped parts of Sudan’s trade map, especially for imports from China and India, which are now transiting through Oman. The rupture between Khartoum and Abu Dhabi has unfolded in parallel with the war over Emirati backing for the RSF. In May 2025, the government severed diplomatic ties with the UAE and designated it a hostile state, following RSF drone attacks on Port Sudan that it blamed on the Gulf country. By August , the fallout had expanded into the economic sphere, with Emirati bans on Sudanese aviation and shipping, followed by a suspension of all trade with Khartoum. According to the diplomatic source, Burhan’s visit to Muscat appears to be aimed at consolidating the logistical shift into a more stable arrangement — whether through port facilitation or transit and re-export arrangements that ease the cost and complexity of imports. More broadly, the source said, Khartoum is trying to diversify trade lines to reduce reliance on traditional routes that have become increasingly susceptible to regional upheavals. For Oman, the shift presents an opening to position itself as a regional logistics hub for Sudan and other disrupted markets, according to the source. *** Idris says intra-Sudanese dialogue to launch in May, party sources: lacks basic markers of seriousness Prime Minister Kamel Idris and Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minnawi meet in Khartoum to discuss the Juba Peace Agreement and governance in Darfur, April 21. Courtesy: Sudan News Agency (SUNA). Prime Minister Kamel Idris said his government is working to launch a “comprehensive political dialogue” by the end of May, presenting it as a prelude to “free and fair elections” under international, regional and domestic monitoring, in an interview with Al Jazeera. He said steps are being taken to create a suitable environment for talks among different parties, including facilitating the return of opposition figures from abroad. In the same breath, Idris stressed that there is “a near consensus among the Sudanese people not to coexist with the RSF.” He did not specify a venue for the dialogue, saying the talks could be held “in Khartoum or any other city in the country.” The proposal has been met with skepticism across the political spectrum. Party officials who spoke to Mada Masr described it as vague and detached from the realities on the ground, arguing that it glosses over the procedural and political foundations required for a credible process. Omar al- Digeir , the head of the Sudanese Congress Party , described Idris’s remarks as inconsistent. Speaking of elections amid an ongoing war, he argued, bypasses the basic prerequisites for democratic transition and makes light of the humanitarian catastrophe. Any viable path forward, he said, must begin with a ceasefire and urgent relief measures, followed by a comprehensive political process that establishes a new basis of legitimacy. He added that the initiative lacks basic indicators of seriousness: there have been no meaningful consultations with political forces, no clear mechanism to manage the process and no defined framework. Presented in its current form, he said, the proposal reflects a top-down approach that undermines the very consensus it claims to seek — particularly as the current government is a party to the war. Digeir noted that the absence of a defined agenda — including core issues such as a ceasefire, a return to civilian rule, restructuring the military and launching a transitional justice process — raises questions about the dialogue’s objectives, as it appears intended to legitimize the status quo. Similar concerns were raised by Misbah Ahmed, a media officer for the National Umma Party and a leader in the opposition Sumud coalition. Speaking to Mada Masr, he downplayed the seriousness of Idris’s proposal, saying it had been put forward without meaningful consultation and reflected the absence of an institutional vision or a consensus-based approach. He stressed that any credible dialogue would require a preparatory committee representing all stakeholders, with defined authority to steer the process. Skepticism also extends within the ruling coalition. Darfur Governor and Democratic Bloc leader Minni Arko Minnawi discussed the initiative in a meeting with Idris on Tuesday, according to a source close to Minnawi. The source said differences remain between the two sides, particularly over prerequisites for any dialogue, including clarifying the nature of participants to avoid partial solutions. Amid doubts that the initiative would amount to anything meaningful, a former official in Hamdok’s government sees it as consistent with Burhan’s recent moves. According to the former official, the initiative is part of a larger political recalibration of the transitional phase. After reshuffling the military command and distancing the establishment from visible Islamist influence through dismissals and reappointments, Burhan is seeking to draw political forces into a process that could provide cover for further steps — including forming a legislative council, dissolving the TSC and potentially positioning himself for a run for the presidency, according to the former official. *** Military recaptures a Damazin defense position, Sudan Shield Forces arrive in Blue Nile The military announces the recapture of Magaja, north of Blue Nile’s Kurmuk, April 20. Courtesy: The Sudanese Armed Forces. In its operation to regain lost ground in the southeastern border region of Blue Nile and advance toward the strategic city of Kurmuk, the military said on Monday it recaptured the area of Magaja in the Bau locality , north of the city. The military had lost the area to the RSF and its allied SPLM-N-al-Hilu on March 26, a day after Kurmuk fell. According to the military’s statement, units from the state capital of Damazin’s Fourth Infantry Division led the operation, claiming significant losses among RSF fighters and damage to their equipment and vehicles. A military source told Mada Masr that troops moved along two axes, breaking through RSF defenses and pushing their forces southward and southwest of Bau. The clashes, the source added, resulted in the destruction of several RSF vehicles, the seizure of weapons and ammunition and the capture of fighters from both the RSF and the SPLM-N forces led by Joseph Tuka. Magaja is considered a key defensive line for Damazin, and its recapture could allow the military to advance from Dandro toward Kurmuk with reduced risk of ambush or encirclement. A second military source said the armed forces have finalized preparations for a larger push toward Kurmuk, with additional drone and artillery crews deployed on Saturday, alongside reinforcements from the Sudan Shield Forces and mobilized civilians. The Fourth Infantry Division command confirmed on Monday the arrival of units from the Sudan Shield Forces, led by Abu Agla Keikel, to join operations in the region. Addressing his troops, Keikel vowed to “end RSF presence before the rainy season, so farmers can safely return to their fields.” Blue Nile is a key agricultural region where much of the population lives in rural areas and depends on seasonal farming. The onset of the rains in June marks the start of the planting season, but the ongoing military escalation risks disrupting cultivation by displacing farmers, limiting access to land and damaging productive infrastructure. Blue Nile’s Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Qisma Abdel Karim previously told Mada Masr that such disruptions, combined with rising displacement, raise the risk of pushing the region into a food crisis approaching famine conditions. *** Military launches offensives along North Kordofan-South Kordofan road, RSF repels attack The military launched a surprise attack on Saturday targeting RSF defensive positions and checkpoints along the main road linking North Kordofan’s capital, Obeid, to South Kordofan’s Debeibat , a military field source told Mada Masr. According to the source, the military hit the areas with drone strikes and artillery fire before beginning the ground offensive in the early morning hours. Clashes then broke out in North Kordofan’s Kazgil, Hammadi and Shawaya and South Kordofan’s Debeibat. The source said the offensives destroyed several combat vehicles and pushed RSF fighters to the outskirts of Debeibat before they withdrew to defensive positions in Rayyash and Aloub, south and southwest of Obeid, respectively. However, an RSF source told Mada Masr its forces quickly regrouped and mounted a counterattack, regaining control of the area within hours while inflicting losses on the military in equipment. Subscribe to our Lens on Sudan newsletter here . The post Sudan Nashra: Sudanese bid to rejoin global financial system unlikely to succeed amid wartime realities, sources say | Burhan seeks political backing for state control of aid in brief Jeddah visit | Idris’s intra-Sudanese dialogue proposal lacks seriousness, party sources say | Sudan Shield Forces arrive in Blue Nile | Military launches ground attacks in North Kordofan first appeared on Mada Masr .