The Iran war put Israel’s air defences to the test. The multilayered billion-dollar system, among the most advanced worldwide, can combat a multitude of threats, from ballistic missiles in space flight to small rockets launched from nearby Gaza and Lebanon.
Nevertheless, its interceptors are finite , and some of the hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles fired, especially those fitted with cluster munition warheads, caused casualties in Israel.
According to the Israeli military, Iran launched approximately 650 ballistic missiles at Israel from 28 February until the early hours of 8 April.
Half of these carried cluster warheads, designed to disperse smaller bomblets over a wide area. In total, these 650 missiles killed 20 Israeli civilians and foreign nationals in the country and injured approximately 7,000. They also killed four Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.
For ballistic threats, the top tier of this network consists of the Arrow 3. Already proven in combat since 2023, the Arrow 3 intercepts ballistic missiles as they travel above the Earth’s atmosphere.
Below that, the David’s Sling covers the middle tier of this layered national defence. Firing Stunner missiles, the David’s Sling is roughly equivalent to the American Patriot missile, which it was designed to replace in Israeli service . It can intercept tactical ballistic missiles at lower altitudes, unlike the Arrow 3’s specialised exoatmospheric capability.
These systems have intercepted ballistic missiles before they even reached Israeli airspace, as evidenced by the Iranian missile debris landing in neighbouring Syria .
The well-known Iron Dome system is more suited for intercepting shorter-range rockets of the kind fired by Hamas in Gaza than ballistic missiles, ditto for the new Iron Beam laser interceptor that’s supplementing it. Effective in the short term, strained over time “Israeli authorities have provided only fragmentary data about interception rates; therefore, a high-confidence assessment remains difficult,” Federico Borsari, a defence expert at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, told The New Arab .
“Public statements from the IDF indicate a ~92% interception rate of missiles, with 9 single-warhead hits and 30 cases of cluster warheads as of March 27,” he added.
“Overall, I think the Israeli air defence umbrella has performed quite well, confirming the importance of layered capabilities to tackle a variety of potentially simultaneous threats,” he said.
Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE, also believes Israel’s air defence performed “very effectively overall”. Paired with its long-range offensive strikes against Iran, Israel managed to “limit the volume and frequency” of the incoming Iranian attacks.
“This combination is what makes the system especially strong in short, decisive conflicts,” Khoueiry told TNA . “The main challenges emerge in longer wars of attrition, where sustained interception demands begin to strain interceptor stockpiles and resources.”
In the later stages of the Iran war, there were growing signs of a “higher impact rate” of Iranian attacks on Israel. Khoueiry believes this was most likely driven by a “mix of evolving Iranian launch tactics” and the use of cluster payloads. Furthermore, sustained attacks over a long period would inevitably strain Israel’s interceptor stockpiles.
“This ultimately means advanced systems can be gradually stressed over time, not necessarily through a single overwhelming attack, but through persistent, adaptive pressure that forces difficult trade-offs in interceptor use,” he said. Cluster missile threat “Iranian tactics of using missiles with cluster warheads have created some problems since the early release of submunitions has defied interception efforts, with many bomblets hitting across Israel," CEPA’s Borsari said. “This has resulted in a few victims and material damage. So, 100% protection does not exist.”
RANE’s Khoueiry echoed that assessment. “Cluster and fragmentation-type missiles are more challenging for Israel’s defences because they turn a single incoming threat into many smaller objects, especially when released at high altitude,” he said.
“This makes tracking and intercepting them more complex, as systems like Arrow or David’s Sling are mainly designed to stop one main warhead, not dozens of fragments.”
Even when the primary missile is intercepted by these high-end defences, its shrapnel or submunitions can still fall and cause damage or even casualties on the ground.
“High-altitude release makes this worse, as it gives the fragments more time and space to spread out, reducing the chances of fully neutralising the threat,” Khoueiry said.
Borsari also noted that even some unitary warheads managed to penetrate Israel’s air defences. He attributes this to better mission planning by Iran, noting that it benefited from Russian intelligence support during the war. He also believes interceptor shortages on the Israeli side may have been to blame for some of these missiles getting through.
“Some of these impacts have damaged or destroyed industrial sites, including a drone production facility, confirming that access to better and up-to-date intelligence has contributed to improving the effectiveness of Iranian strikes compared to the past,” he said. Finite interceptors In late March, reports emerged that Israel had begun conserving its Arrow interceptors, relying more on David’s Sling and even Iron Dome systems to combat these threats. Arrow 3 interceptor missiles can cost at least $2-3 million each.
The Stunner missile fired by the David’s Sling cost approximately $1 million, making it more cost-effective than the American Patriot PAC-3. Again, however, it lacks the Arrow 3’s exoatmospheric intercept capabilities.
By early April, the Israeli press reported that the Defence Ministry had approved plans for “a substantial increase in the production rate and quantity of Arrow interceptors.” That came shortly after the military assessed that Iran still had 1,000 ballistic missiles that can reach Israel.
“The shift away from heavy reliance on Arrow 3 is likely a resource management decision under stockpile strain,” RANE’s Khoueiry said.
“Israel is likely simultaneously preserving scarce, high-end interceptors, adapting to cost and volume dynamics, and responding to the sustained barrages of Iranian missiles to compensate. The Stunner offers a comparatively cost-effective option to compensate too.” Simultaneous launches Missiles coming from Iran in the east are not the only projectiles Israel’s air defences have to contend with. Hezbollah in Lebanon in the north still has rockets and missiles capable of threatening Israel despite being degraded by repeated Israeli bombings and a cross-border invasion . Late in the war, the Houthis also fired a few ballistic missiles at Israel, none of which got through.
However, there were increasing signs that Iran and these militias were coordinating joint, simultaneous attacks. Khoueiry believes this was a tactic meant to stretch Israel’s defences as well as create “psychological and operational pressure.”
Still, synchronised attacks from multiple directions don’t necessarily make it more difficult for air defences to combat.
“Each actor typically uses different types of missiles or rockets from distinct geographic directions, and Israel’s multilayered system is designed to cover multiple sectors at once,” Khoueiry said.
“So far, these attacks have been occasional rather than sustained high-volume salvos, which limits their ability to truly saturate the system.”
The real challenge, Khoueiry notes, would be if actors coordinated frequent, large-scale launches at the same time, which could begin to strain interceptor allocation and response capacity. Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs Follow him on X: @pauliddon Edited by Charlie Hoyle