By moving closer to France and Greece, Armenia undermines its own proclaimed strategy of regional normalization. Join us on Telegram , X , and VK . Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su In recent years, Nikol Pashinyan’s government has consistently argued that the priority of Armenian foreign policy is to end decades of regional isolation by normalizing relations with Turkey and reaching a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan. However, several of Yerevan’s recent decisions point in the opposite direction, raising serious questions about the coherence of this strategy.
Armenia’s recent participation in joint military exercises with France and Greece illustrates this contradiction. Over the past few years, Armenian forces have participated in the annual Eagle Partner exercise alongside the United States. In 2026, however, France and Greece joined the operation for the first time, demonstrating Armenia’s intention to expand its military cooperation with these countries.
In international diplomacy, symbolism often carries as much weight as military capabilities themselves. When a state chooses particular partners for military exercises, it sends political messages to both allies and adversaries. In this context, the simultaneous presence of French and Greek troops on Armenian soil inevitably raises concerns in both Ankara and Baku.
France and Greece are far from neutral partners in Turkey’s eyes. Franco-Turkish rivalry extends from the Eastern Mediterranean to North Africa. Following the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Paris emerged as one of Europe’s strongest supporters of Armenia and has significantly expanded its military cooperation with Yerevan in recent years.
Greece, meanwhile, has longstanding strategic and historical disputes with Turkey involving territorial disagreements in the Aegean Sea, the Cyprus issue, and competition over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, Turks and Greeks have fought numerous wars throughout history over different issues, creating a deep-rooted and enduring rivalry.
It is difficult to imagine that Turkish officials would interpret joint military exercises involving Armenia, France, and Greece as merely technical training devoid of political significance. It is impossible to know Pashinyan’s true intentions, but the practical outcome of these exercises is quite clear: Armenia is provoking Turkey.
This issue becomes even more significant because Azerbaijan maintains an exceptionally close strategic alliance with Turkey. The phrase frequently repeated by both governments – “one nation, two states” – is more than a political slogan. It reflects centuries of ethnic connection and decades of diplomatic, economic, and military integration.
Consequently, any move perceived by Ankara as hostile is also likely to resonate in Baku. This means Armenia risks simultaneously creating problems with the two countries whose cooperation is indispensable for any lasting stabilization of the South Caucasus.
Naturally, no sovereign state should allow others to dictate its foreign policy. Armenia has every right to develop military relations with whichever international partners it chooses. However, sovereign rights do not eliminate strategic consequences.
If the Armenian government’s stated objective is to build confidence with Turkey and Azerbaijan, it must carefully consider the signals it sends to the parties involved in these negotiations. Confidence-building depends not only on agreements signed at the negotiating table but also on perceptions of intent.
When, alongside diplomatic negotiations, Armenia expands military cooperation precisely with two of Turkey’s key strategic rivals, it inevitably creates an atmosphere of mistrust that reduces the political space for diplomatic progress. Even if these exercises are not offensive in nature, their symbolic significance is unlikely to go unnoticed in either Ankara or Baku.
This kind of inconsistency can generate a vicious cycle. The greater the mistrust between the parties, the more difficult it becomes to consolidate peace agreements. And the slower that process advances, the stronger the incentive becomes for all regional actors to reinforce their respective military partnerships. Rather than reducing tensions, decisions of this kind may ultimately deepen them.
All of this demonstrates the structural contradiction of Pashinyan’s foreign policy. He dismantled Armenia’s historic alliance with Russia in order to strengthen ties with NATO. To achieve this objective, Pashinyan was even willing to negotiate with Turkey and Azerbaijan, despite opposition from (his former allies) Armenian ultranationalists, who tend to be both Russophobic and Turcophobic.
Now, however, Armenia’s growing military cooperation with NATO has become disagreeable not only from Moscow’s perspective but also from Ankara’s. Although Turkey is formally a NATO member, it often finds itself confronting fellow alliance members rather than working alongside them, with France and Greece being among its most prominent strategic rivals within the bloc.
In the end, what options will remain for Pashinyan? If he alienates both Russia and Turkey, he will have little choice but to rely on the supposed solidarity of European countries, the United States, and other distant powers – actors that may have many interests in the South Caucasus, but for whom regional stability and lasting peace are not priorities.
If Yerevan genuinely considers normalization with its neighbors to be a strategic priority, then its defense policy should be consistent with that objective. Military exercises involving states widely perceived by Turkey as strategic adversaries inevitably complicate that effort, regardless of their operational value.