Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed Sudan’s army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan in Ankara on Tuesday, in a visit that comes as Turkish‑made drones and other military hardware have become central to Sudanese army (SAF) operations in the country.
The two leaders discussed bilateral relations and regional developments, with Erdogan later adding that work was underway to deepen already close cooperation in trade, agriculture, energy and defence, according to Turkish media reports.
The Turkish president framed Ankara’s role in the Sudan war, which has ravaged the country since April 2023, as driven by a "desire to halt the bloodshed and preserve Sudan’s territorial integrity".
Sudanese state media likewise emphasised that the meeting at the Presidential Complex in Ankara aimed to explore "mechanisms for further development" of ties between the two countries.
But while Ankara presents itself as backing Sudan’s sovereignty and peace efforts, Turkish‑made Bayraktar TB2s and other systems have become central to SAF operations, contributing to mass civilian harm and undercutting Western sanctions and mediation efforts.
Although no new defence pact has been announced so far following the visit, Turkey’s military footprint has become entrenched in the SAF's war campaign against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through successive arms deals, training, and technical support.
Documents published by the Washington Post in March 2025 showed how Turkish defence company Baykar – the manufacturer of the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı combat drones – covertly funnelled about 120 million dollars’ worth of weapons shipments to the SAF, including at least eight TB2s, ground stations and hundreds of guided munitions.
Analysts say those systems proved decisive in allowing the army to push the RSF out of key parts of the capital Khartoum and other strategic hubs in 2025, reshaping the balance of power on several fronts.
Since then, researchers have drawn direct links between major SAF advances and the combat use of Turkish‑supplied drones and munitions, including during the lifting of the siege on Dilling in South Kordofan in May this year – a battle that forced thousands of civilians to flee.
The SAF’s expanded reliance on drones is partly a response to the RSF’s own growing use of unmanned aircraft, which are believed to be supplied and supported by the United Arab Emirates and other backers.
Arms transfers by both Ankara and Abu Dhabi continue despite active arms embargoes on Sudan by the UN, the EU and the US, raising concerns over how Turkey – a NATO member – is bypassing international restrictions through opaque financing channels and third‑country transhipment hubs.
Investigations and UN expert reporting have pointed to flights moving military cargo from Istanbul to Port Sudan, as well as the appearance of Turkish‑made small arms in both Sudan and South Sudan, despite formal embargoes.
Meanwhile, the civilian toll of Sudan’s drone warfare has been immense.
UN figures released on 11 May indicate that drones were responsible for more than 80 per cent of recorded civilian deaths in Sudan’s war during the first four months of 2026 alone, killing at least 880 people.
In a report last month, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk condemned the escalating use of armed drones by all parties and warned that "escalating drone warfare could push the conflict into an even deadlier phase." Parallel power structures on the RSF side Erdogan’s talks with Burhan also come as RSF leader Gen. Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo moves to formalise his own rival governing structures in areas under RSF control.
On 31 May, Hemedti issued a decree establishing a Security and Defence Council for the so‑called Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasees) government, to be headed by the president of his parallel Presidential Council and including regional governors, key ministers and top security chiefs.
According to the decree, the new council will be responsible for setting "strategic plans and policies" on national security and defence, drafting a general policy for Sudan’s role in international peace and security, and overseeing counter‑terrorism and efforts to combat organised and cross‑border crime.
Crucially, it is also tasked with approving plans to build a new national army and security apparatus whose core would be the RSF and allied armed movements, giving Hemedti’s camp its own institutional vehicle to claim state‑like authority over military affairs.