In the tragic event that a sovereign state chooses to attack another, the party under attack will often shoot back. Russia experienced this after attacking Ukraine. The United States, Israel, and the Gulf Arab monarchies did as well after the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran. Now, the U.S. may bring this fate down upon itself once again — this time in the Gulf of Mexico, far far closer to home. At least that’s what reporting by Axios on Cuba’s alleged drone capacity suggests. According to the article, Cuba has acquired some 300 military drones from Russia and Iran since 2023 and has explored the possibility of using them to attack Guantanamo Bay and possibly even Key West in Florida. The reporting cites only “classified intelligence” and anonymous U.S. officials. Buried at the bottom is the caveat that Cuba’s drone warfare plans are meant only as a contingency “in case hostilities erupt.” Still, the Axios report instantly triggered a hysterical reaction among usual suspect Miami hawks. All three Miami Cuban Republican members of Congress tweeted within hours of the story dropping, all with very similar messages. Rep. Carlos Giménez tweeted that “Cuba poses a dangerous national security threat to the United States.” Rep. Mario Diaz Balart tweeted, that “It’s clear that the Cuban regime is a national security threat.” Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar tweeted that “It is a direct threat to our national security.”
There are good reasons to be skeptical of the reporting’s accuracy. Cuba’s economic problems, recently exacerbated dramatically by the Trump administration’s oil blockade , do not leave much room in the budget for a military buildup. Additionally, one imagines Iran and Russia are both using most of the drones they can produce themselves. Any drones Cuba has acquired “since 2023” have likely already been in Cuba for some time. Indeed, a fair question to ask Axios – or rather the U.S. officials who leaked the reported classified intelligence – would be “why now?” Yet it’s worth taking the reporting seriously. Suppose that Cuba does possess the drone warfare capacity to strike at U.S. bases, vessels, and even the U.S. itself. If true, this would be another very good reason to not start a regime change war in Cuba. Cuba remains a sovereign state. From its perspective, it is well within its rights to seek the ability to impose some costs on the United States in the frighteningly plausible event of a U.S. attack on the island. The U.S. has militarily intervened in Cuba many times , including numerous campaigns before the 1959 Cuban revolution. In the intervening decades, Washington has sought to strangle the island both economically and politically. This history is well known in Cuba, even if often overlooked in the United States. The second Trump administration has also been saber rattling against Cuba. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, another Miami Cuban politician, recently posed for a picture with the commander of U.S. Southern Command in front of a prominently placed map of Cuba. It wasn’t very subtle. Other reports indicate the administration is increasingly looking at plans for military action against Cuba. Wednesday's U.S. criminal indictment of 94-year-old Raul Castro mirrors the lawfare against Nicolas Maduro that preceded the American attack on Venezuela. In such circumstances, it really isn’t too surprising that Cuba should seek to make contingency plans for how to retaliate against a U.S. attack.
None of this means Cuba is about to launch a pre-emptive drone strike on the United States. Such a move would be suicidal. The Axios report puts Cuba’s drone warfare capacity at 300 drones, and much of the rest of the Cuban military is effectively composed of museum pieces. There is no way Cuba can hope to win a war with the United States; Cuba can only hope to make the prospect of a U.S. attack on Cuba unpleasant enough to give policymakers in Washington pause before ordering one. Hence the Cuban president’s warning that a U.S. attack on Cuba would trigger “a bloodbath.” It would indeed be healthy for the United States to consider the likely cost of invading Cuba. Such a blatant act of U.S. aggression would certainly harm U.S. standing in much of Latin America. The Trump administration's investment in the Latin American right is already one of diminishing returns, as governments in Argentina , Chile , and Bolivia all increasingly face rising disapproval and, in Bolivia’s case, active revolt . Being seen as complicit in a U.S. attack on Cuba would not help the popularity of U.S.-aligned governments at all, while anti-American sentiment on the Latin American left would become emboldened.
Another attack on a Latin American nation this year would also accelerate the trend underway in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia to hedge against U.S. influence, including by seeking out closer economic and diplomatic relations with both China and the European Union . A remilitarization of the continent is also already under way in response to the U.S.’ demonstrated willingness to use force in Latin America, with both Brazil and Colombia looking to increase their defense capabilities. Indeed, if the Axios drone reports are true, this is exactly what has been occurring in Cuba. It is worth recalling that the possibility of Cuban drones striking U.S. targets was not a concern during the brief window of diplomatic normalization between the U.S. and Cuba. There was no talk of drones striking Florida when President Barack Obama and Raul Castro shook hands in Havana back in 2016. This is the most elementary of geopolitical lessons: it is better to get along with your neighbors than not to. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy towards Latin America recognized this — as well as the fact that sometimes getting along requires respecting neighboring states’ sovereignty, even when inconvenient. Famously, FDR went against powerful U.S. oil interests in order to respect Mexico’s choice to nationalize foreign-held oil resources in 1938. This U.S. restraint and respect for its neighbor would win Mexico’s friendship during the Second World War. Sadly, the Good Neighbor Policy was long gone by the time of the Cuban Revolution. Years of U.S. efforts to accomplish regime change in Cuba have only pushed it to become more hostile. After the 1959 revolution, Castro initially pursued positive relations with the United States. This was despite the strongly anti-American views of other revolutionary leaders like Che Guevara, who had witnessed the 1954 U.S.-backed coup in Guatemala. It was primarily Fidel Castro’s moves to nationalize U.S.-owned property that soured the Eisenhower administration on Castro; the U.S. responded with a trade embargo in 1960. It was a very different reaction than the diplomatic approach Roosevelt had taken with Mexico 22 years earlier. Yet rather than convincing Castro to abandon reforms that were hostile to U.S. business interests, the U.S. pressure on Cuba merely prompted Castro to seek new allies as a hedge against U.S. pressure. Soon, weapons from the Eastern Bloc were arriving in Cuba, which in turn generated U.S. security concerns — much like the latest panic over Russian and Iranian drones. This led to the U.S. choice to pursue regime change in Cuba, culminating with the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 . This threat to Cuba in turn inspired the Soviets to place nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. The ensuing Cuban Missile Crisis nearly led to nuclear war.
Of course, drones are a far cry from nuclear missiles. Cuba today does not pose any meaningful threat to the United States, and Cuba’s preparations for a possible attack do not make U.S. aggression against Cuba any more justified. In fact, they are a wake-up call for the U.S. to abandon its maximalist fantasies of regime change. If Cuba can truly threaten to strike the United States, then that is all the more reason to be more, not less, cautious before embarking on any military action against Cuba.