When the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28, Tehran responded by firing missiles and drones at many countries, targeting members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with particular intensity. Kuwait, second only to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has been hardest hit among the Gulf states by Iranian attacks amid this conflict.
By March 23, Iran had launched 1,061 drones and missiles at Kuwait. Tehran has hit U.S. military installations and a range of civilian sites, including Kuwait’s main airport , energy facilities , and a desalination facility . Debris from intercepted missiles has also damaged power lines in Kuwait.
Iran continued attacks on Kuwait even after the Pakistani-mediated ceasefire went into effect on April 7–8, though no further strikes have been reported since April 10 .
These attacks have puzzled regional analysts. Kuwait had, after all, maintained relatively stable relations with Iran for the past decade. So why did Iranian force land so disproportionately on Kuwait? The answer mostly comes down to two factors: geography and U.S. military bases. With 13,000 American forces stationed in Kuwait, located near crucial parts of the Persian Gulf, these facilities would likely be critical to any U.S. air, sea, or land operation against Iran. Tehran has thus sought to pressure Kuwait into ejecting the U.S. military from its soil, or at least restricting Washington’s access to its bases, airspace, and territory, since this war erupted. Like its five fellow GCC members, Kuwait denies that the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury from its soil or via its airspace on February 28. But after weeks of Iranian strikes, Kuwait started permitting the U.S. to use its facilities for missile attacks on March 24 and 31 , according to France24. The decision could further incentivize Iran to attack sites in Kuwait should the full-scale war resume. “Originally, [Iran] declared [Kuwait] a fair target because it hosts U.S. forces involved in the war effort, even if those forces were not specifically used to attack Iran,” said Sean Yom, an assistant professor of Political Science at Temple University. “The missile launches, for Iran’s war planners, bolstered their justification that Kuwait — and indeed, the entire Gulf littoral — represented a kinetic ‘front line’ open to retaliatory drone and missile attacks because any aerial attack against the Iranian homeland could physically originate from these U.S. allies.”
Critical infrastructure and sectarian fault lines
Earlier this month, Iran struck a desalination plant in Kuwait, signaling a troubling shift toward targeting critical infrastructure, which has mirrored U.S. and Israeli attacks on civilian sites in Iran. For Kuwait, where nearly 90 % of drinking water comes from a handful of coastal desalination plants, further attacks on such facilities pose a serious threat. If full-scale hostilities resume and Tehran launches more strikes on Kuwait’s desalination plants, the country could face a catastrophic water security crisis. Sectarian dynamics in Kuwait offer Tehran a potential lever to foment turmoil, heightening tensions and making Kuwait a more vulnerable target for malign behavior than some other GCC states. About 30 % of Kuwait’s population is Shi’a, and Iran has cultivated ties with segments of this community. Although the vast majority of Kuwaiti Shi’a remain loyal to the ruling Al Sabah family, some individuals and groups from within this community have historically aligned ideologically or politically with Tehran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Kuwaiti officials worry that more radical pro-Iran elements within the country could act to advance Tehran’s agenda of stirring unrest in the Gulf, similar to what the then-nascent Islamic Republic did to Kuwait amid the Iran-Iraq War (1980-8 , when the emirate was backing Saddam Hussein. On March 25, Kuwaiti authorities announced they had foiled a Hezbollah-linked plot targeting state leaders that involved Kuwaiti citizens as well as Iranian and Lebanese nationals. Earlier in March, the Interior Ministry said it had disrupted another plot against critical infrastructure, arresting 10 Kuwaiti citizens with ties to Hezbollah, and, 10 days prior, dismantled a group of Kuwaiti and Lebanese nationals linked to the Iran-backed Lebanese organization.
Lessons of history and the limits of US guarantees
Kuwait’s experience under Iraqi occupation in 1990–91 informs its perspective on war. As Neil Quilliam of Chatham House told RS, the crisis of the early 1990s taught Kuwait three lessons that shape its behavior: First, is that “formal neutrality offers no protection against a determined aggressor.” Second, “U.S. security guarantees when activated are transformative.” Third, “small states must never find themselves diplomatically alone,” which helps explain why Kuwait is known for regionalizing and internationalizing its grievances through the GCC and the United Nations Security Council. “What 1990 did not prepare Kuwait for is the current inversion of that experience, where the U.S. has not come to rescue it, but is instead using its territory to strike a neighbor, leading to Iranian retaliation that Kuwaiti soldiers and civilians are expected to absorb,” Quilliam said. “The gap between historical memory and present reality is the deepest challenge Kuwait's leadership now faces.” This conflict is a profound test of Kuwait’s survival strategy. Since the 1990–91 Gulf War, Kuwait’s royal family has relied on U.S. protection to shield the emirate from external threats, while managing domestic tensions among liberal reformists, Islamists, and tribal conservatives to maintain stability, according to Yom, who explained how the ongoing conflict calls this entire approach into question. “The closure of the Hormuz Strait and unprecedented Iranian aggression show that Kuwait’s stability and security are no longer guaranteed by the U.S., so long as American foreign policy remains on its current trajectory,” he added. Despite Washington’s aggression toward Iran exposing Kuwait to Iranian attacks, Kuwait will likely continue relying on the U.S. security umbrella given that no other power possesses both the capability and willingness to assume that role. Kuwait is expected to strengthen its air defenses, which have successfully intercepted many missiles and drones since February 28. Yet, as Quilliam notes, such measures mitigate, as opposed to deter, attacks while no regional collective defense arrangement exists within the GCC. In the coming years, Kuwait may draw closer to Washington not because U.S. guarantees are reliable, but because no viable alternatives exist in this current era. Ironically, Iran’s attempts to pull the emirate away from U.S. influence may have had the opposite effect. Still, mindful of the risks of overdependence on Washington, Kuwait is likely to pursue regional security partnerships to reduce reliance on Washington, especially as U.S. policy toward Iran increasingly prioritizes Israel’s government over the security interests of GCC members. In sum, while Kuwait will always be grateful to the U.S. for its 1991 liberation, the country must adapt to new regional realities and rethink its security strategy amid what the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi calls the “beginning of the end of the American security order in the Gulf.”