As the United States marks 250 years since its founding as an anti-colonial republic, its global power and democratic system are facing a profound crisis, according to Khalil Jahshan, executive director of Arab Center Washington DC.
In an interview conducted byThe New Arab,'s managing editor, Jahshan said Washington’s costly entanglements in the Middle East, unconditional support for Israel and increasingly authoritarian politics at home had exposed the widening gulf between America’s founding ideals and its conduct. He described Donald Trump’s transformation of US institutions as a “quiet political coup d’état”, warning that the damage to the republic could take decades to reverse, even as growing public opposition to Israel and foreign wars struggles to translate into meaningful policy change.
Below is the transcript of the interview, edited for clarity
Karim Trabousl i: Hi, I'm Karim Traboulsi managing editor of The New Arab in London. This month the US is celebrating is 250th anniversary , the anniversary of its founding as a republic. Following its war of independence from Britain. Its founding principles were isolationist, anti-colonial and very much against entanglement in foreign wars. However, 250 years later, the United States and the Empire had built over the 20th century remain very deeply entangled in forever wars in the Middle East, most recently in Iran, with a botched war that ended with the strategic US defeat. The US is grappling today with many questions about the survivability of its empire and whether its foreign policy, as it currently stands, can be sustained. And for us in The New Arab, the Middle East is a crucial arena to examine those questions from that lens. To answer these questions and more, I'm joined by Doctor Khalil Jahshan, executive director of Arab Center DC . Thank you for joining us today.
Khalil Jahshan : Thank you. It's my pleasure.
KT : I want to just ask. My first question is: when the US, after its independence from Britain, the founding fathers pledged not to be entangled in great-power politics or foreign wars . And that promise was quickly abandoned thereafter steadily. And then, after World War Two, the US built a de facto empire and inherited the British Empire it had opposed. Today, it faces similar questions about the survival of this empire and the cost of sustaining it commensurate with America's mediocre circumstancesas Adam Smith had put it in relation to the British Empire at the time. Would you agree that the empire the US built over the 20th century is now in decline? Or do you think the rumours of its decline are greatly exaggerated?
KJ : As far as US policy toward the Middle East is concerned, I would definitely say there has been a decline, even though that bilateral relationship with countries in that region has not necessarily been successful in the past. Nonetheless, they have deteriorated. This is a historical question. And when you talk about a period of 250 years, essentially maybe 100, 120 of those directly dealing with the Middle East, you cannot deal with or answer this question in a static way, because the question does have built-in dynamics, if you will. Things have changed. No country stays consistent and persistent, if you will, in its policy, in its position for that long, and the US is not an exception. You know, some say some on the American scene say the US has definitely matured over the past 250 years. But again, with all due respect, maturity is in the eye of the beholder. You could mature for the better, you could mature for the worst. And in our case here, with regards to the Middle East, I would say it has changed. It has matured in a way. It's older today, but its policies have become even worse. So when you look at the founding documents of this republic and look at the values that this country established for itself in terms of its founding fathers, the Declaration of Independence, the inalienable rights of people, equality, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. You can hardly recognise these with regard to US policy today, whether in what we have witnessed over the past 20 years Iraq, Afghanistan today, in Palestine, in Gaza , the West Bank, the conflict with Iran, the situation in Libya, Syria, Yemen , it's kind of almost difficult, even with a magnifying glass, to see these American values.
KT : That prompts a different question, because in commentary that we've seen recently about US foreign policy on the 250th birthday, there are calls from certain avenues in Washington, especially the realist international relations figures, that the US should go back to its roots of isolationism and hemispheric domination and pursue a light-foot approach in the region. And they often frame it at least as a backwater, strategically insignificant. They often repeat this mantra, you know, China , as everything should be about China, and the Middle East should be abandoned. But the recent war in the Middle East, now, the question of Palestine is coming back to become an internal political issue in the US. Would you say that would prove them incorrect about, like, the importance of the Middle East, or how insignificant or significant it is for the US position in the world?
KJ : That's a very good question. It might not prove them incorrect, but it would prove that this type of U-turn that they are calling for is virtually impossible because of the spillover of foreign policy into domestic policy. That doesn't happen quite often, universally. It doesn't even happen very often here with regard to the US policy. But in this case, it has happened in an unprecedented and almost complete way, which robs, you know, foreign policy makers in this country of their manoeuvrability space, of their ability to make a U-turn. The US is almost like an aircraft carrier unable to make a U-turn quickly. It endangers itself, and it might sink. It needs time, and it needs space. And unfortunately, most of the time you don't have time and space in foreign policy today to make those types of changes. That requires some decisive leadership, which the US does not have. It needs some dedication again, as the people you quoted were saying. Dedication to the original, if you will, ideals of the United States. And that takes some leadership. It's not easy. History doesn't go backwards. It takes some serious leadership to resort to earlier commitments. And right now, with the type of leadership the US has, which tends to be more authoritarian and more neglectful, if you will, of historical commitments by the United States to its own ideals, which they have rendered into myths rather than ideals. It's very difficult to expect that, besides this, the leadership that we have in the US today has also paralysed governance, has paralysed institutions, has paralysed the three essential parts of the US government. The three components are not working well together. They are still there, but they are not working well. I would say, for example, the legislative branch is totally paralysed and subjected to total control, if you will [by the executive].
What we learned from the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, where it's totally independent, the same thing with the judiciary, which has become a footnote to the executive branch instead of an independent power within the system, kind of supervising, if you will, the behaviour of the executive branch . So, taking all that into consideration, I would find this demand, although I fully agree with it, that the US, if it has to survive as a system, has to basically readjust and revise some of its ideals on which it was based and respect them more than we have seen in the past. But that will prove much more difficult than those friends of ours think at this time.
KT : It's often the case that foreign policy is seen as whatever we do, whatever blunders we do abroad, it doesn't cost in United States because we're protected by two oceans and nothing can touch us. And that is a profound mistake, as we are seeing time and again that foreign policy does come back home to roost, and there is no escaping the cost of adventurism or miscalculation, or, as you said, neglecting commitments and obligations and long-term historic trends. In terms of the Middle East, it seems to me that the US still or never learns its lessons, specifically in the East. Maybe it learns lessons in Europe, maybe in Asia Pacific, maybe in South America to adjust policy. But it seems to me the Middle East, they repeat the same things and hope for different results. So we are seeing this now with the MOU, the Abraham Accords, with even the framework agreement in Lebanon where they're pursuing this, these recipes that are doomed to fail, that are recipes even for the US to withdraw and reduce its footprint in the Middle East. What would in your new opinion a durable solution that would allow the US to reduce its the cost of its footprint in the Middle East and leave it stable look like?
KJ : First, I fully agree with the premises of your question. It's been very difficult for the American political system to adjust to changes. I mean, yes, our system started as an isolationist, if you will, power anti-colonial and its general demeanour. In a sense, it was a rebellion against European control. But then it quickly assumed more power, and as it became a recognised world power, particularly economically, it kind of forgot its origins. And that made it oblivious to the commitments it made early on in its political lifespan, and made it difficult. In addition, through another development, which is what I referred to earlier, the spillover of foreign policy into domestic policy and vice versa. When that happens, you know, foreign policy is usually conceived and formulated in the interest of the aggregate, in the interest of the country, in the interest, or based on the national interest as perceived, if you will, by the foreign policy elite or leadership of the country. But when it spills over and gets mixed with domestic politics, it loses its sense of direction. It becomes a subject to the interest of the few. And that's basically what happened, for example, with a major aspect of US foreign policy, which is the Palestine question and the, you know, the relationship with Israel has become so intertwined with domestic politics to the point where it's impossible to even win the presidency or stay in the presidency or even any other office in the country, federal or even statewide or local, without, if you will, biased adherence to support for Israel at the expense of US national interests. You know, one could criticise Israel for that control. And that happens all the time, particularly in the Middle East.
Frankly, Israel is not to blame. The US is to blame. The Israelis, in an admirable way, basically know what they're doing. They put their own interests ahead of everybody else's, including the United States. But the problem is with the United States that, somehow, with regard to Israel, there is this reverse sense of exceptionalism. I mean, there is this phenomenon in US policy we refer to as exceptionalism, but it usually means something else. But in this regard, this exceptionalism attributed to Israel, somehow, it is treated separately and differently as an exception to all allies of the United States, in spite of the fact that occasionally, as we do now, you see some friction between leaders or you see some slight disagreements with regard to tactical objectives and so on. But to me, it's still, I mean, US policy in the Middle East still caters to Israel and treats, for example, Arab allies as a footnote to that bilateral relationship with Tel Aviv. And therefore, this pattern of politics, domestic plus foreign policy combined, has basically detracted the United States from the pursuit of its own national interest in the region.
KT: In fact, some on social media, perhaps very crudely, were burning Israeli flags and calling for US independence from Israel on the anniversary. But on a less crude note, there are a lot of insurgent candidates now winning on an anti-apartheid platform, and the primaries at least. There are calls to detach the US from Israeli interests and put US interests first on both aisles, even ifstill in the fringes of both the right and the left. But perhaps there is a momentum I don't.Do you see that as a hopeful direction that the US could extricate itself from this, from this dependency or deference to Israel?
KJ : Sure. Yes and no. To be frank with you. Yes. In terms of the fact that there is a sea change happening with regards to public opinion in this country vis a vis the bilateral relationship between the United States and Israel. People are getting tired of this undue exceptionalism, if you will, in the treatment of Israel and allowing Israel to lord it over US policies and US interests in a vital region, and particularly when it leads to war, like in the case of the recent Iran war, that where the US, in a way, was dragged by Israel to enter into a losing war, if you will, that it had no interest entering at all, other than basically catering to the Israeli perspective and to Israeli interest.
And people seem to be smarter than policymakers these days. They have sensed that. And that's why we see this change, the grassroots level. And the change is becoming actually very significant, like it's no longer on the margins of American politics. When you look, for example, at the opposition today to US policy in the Middle East, particularly the war with Iran, let's say within the Democratic Party , it has already exceeded 80 to 90% within the party itself. That is critical. Opposed to the war, critical of the policy and extremely critical of the current government of Israel. That has never happened before, considering the fact that the Democratic Party has been the natural, if you will, base in this country for pro-Israel support. And that's where the bulk of the, let's say, the Jewish community is. That's where the bulk of the pro-Israel community used to be.
And now all of a sudden, it's changing and it's not limited just to Democrats and independents. It's to a lesser extent, happening also among independents, where you see fluctuating percentage between 40 to even 60% on some issues critical of of policy, less than the Democrats, but still significant, sometimes the majority on the Republican side, it's beginning to infiltrate the Republican Party , particularly youth. When you look at youth under 30 within the Republican Party, including MAGA, combined with policy substance, and, if you will, isolationist tendency within that sector of the party, the numbers are also increasing, exceeding 30 to 40%. That's almost the equivalent within young American Jews in this country -- the base of support for Israel, the natural base of support for Israel.
So these are significant changes. They are unprecedented welcome changes. We haven't seen them before to this extent. But the reason I said my reaction is mixed, because frankly, these changes in public opinion so far have not translated into change in policy. And until and unless leadership joins in, if you will, political parties get more involved in this and turn them into policy changes on the ground in the region where people in the region feel that change that could be just a passing phenomenon, could be just a passing phase that we could lose.
So, particularly as the reaction to that change is beginning to pick up on the Israeli and the pro-Israeli front, if you will. And so if people retreat, and it's easy for public opinion to disappear, we've seen it go up, we've seen it go down. It tends to be emotional. It tends to be cyclical. It tends to be seasonal based on certain events in the region, like the war in Gaza, the genocide in Gaza and so on. But American memories tend to be short-term. They tend to forget quickly, and unless it's changed, it changes the policy.
KT : I haven't read the book by Maggie Haberman yet and Jonathan Swan, regime change , but I feel like that could be part of the pro-Israel response, that if they are losing public opinion and if electoral politics are this favoring the Israeli narrative, is it possible that the those forces and their allies could sacrifice US democracy and the US Republic itself, and even the free media, as we've seen with the big monopolies emerging on the media and their heavy handed interference in like television shows and censorship, is it a possibility that this regime change from within?
KJ : It could at this day and age, if you asked me that question, let's say eight years ago, I would say no, this country, the way it's built in, if you will, and the way its DNA is composed is not conducive to coup d'etat, if you will, or to change that radically. But in this day and age, with Trumpist policies prevailing, I have to change my answer. My answer would be yes. Unequivocal yes. I think what we are witnessing today in the United States, I agree with the analysis that says it's very few people who use the word, but I would venture to use it. It's virtually a coup d'etat. This is the American version, unlike the Third World, which is always accused of having repeated coup d'etat that tends to be supported or initiated by the military or what have you, this one is different.
This one is a salient, quiet political coup d'etat that's undermining the basic premises of the American political system. How Trump and his supporters managed to do that. It still remains to be seen. Haberman and company, you know, the book is very smart. It has good analysis. They are well-connected. And I think they are probing and asking, raising the right questions. But the answers remain incomplete. I think it's going to take us a few years to fully realise what happened and how. And this administration assumes it ends, and it's not followed by a similar administration in the next presidential election. If that happens, it's going to take between 2 to 3 decades to clean up.
KT : Wow. That is a very that's a shocking assessment. For my final question: For us as analysts, as journalists, as the general audience, what do you think we should be watching out for as the survivability or the fate, really, of the US Republic and Empire seems to be very much in question and is tied to the Middle East in many ways. Not to say that the Middle East is at the centre of the universe, but it remains a critical, strategic and financial hub that determines the fate of empires. What should we be watching out for? What should be focusing on in the next few months and even years?
KJ : Well, in the short term, I would say the midterm elections . Again, going back to what I said earlier, looking for more solid, if you will, or tangible signs that the sentiment that changed sentiment in public opinion is being translated into reality in the political arena. We would like to see more evidence in this regard. If that happens, I think that would be good news for the survival of the American political system.
But frankly, right now the problem is not just with the Trump party, which used to be known as the GOP or the Republican Party. The problem is not with them alone. The problem is also with the Democratic Party. That seems to be confusing to those of us who study them. At least, it's reminiscent of what happened to the Labor Party in Israel, which is now kind of like a weak semblance of its former self. And that's basically what is happening to the Democratic Party. I'm not sure it can pick up the pieces. It can lead, it can substitute. There isn't even a consensus about potential leaders in these, you know, upcoming elections. So I would be looking for that type of evidence to see a sense of direction politically on the part of the public and again, pushing public opinion, pushing public sentiment more toward policy.
What we hear are good ideas, ideas in the right direction, but they need to be firmed up on political grounds, in a political base, if you will. And that hasn't happened yet. The other thing I would be looking for again is almost like a political revival in this country if I see the seeds of one, but there has to be some common sense political trends that need to emerge in the near future in this country that can reexamine these basic issues, whether they are the the exceptionalism in American politics, the American form of nationalism, this myth of manifest destiny , this pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. What do they mean today in 2026? They definitely do not mean the same thing they did in 1776, but the quality of leadership needed to dive into these issues and answer these questions is still dormant. And if there is a tendency to move in that direction, I think that would also be healthy for the United States and its survival as a system.
KT : That's a perfect note to end our conversation on. Thank you so much for joining us, Doctor Jahshan. Hopefully, we'll talk to you again soon. Thank you.
KJ : Any time. Thank you.