On the evening of 11 February, Tbilisi’s TV tower was illuminated in the colours of the Iranian flag to mark the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
While such gestures are a common diplomatic practice worldwide to commemorate national days and anniversaries, this one led the Israeli Embassy in Georgia to publicly scold its host state.
In a lengthy Facebook statement , the embassy questioned what message Tbilisi was sending “to the region, the world, and to the citizens of Iran”. Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze dismissed the criticism, stating that the message was straightforward: “When a request comes to light the tower, the tower is always lit.”
This was not an isolated incident, but rather part of a broader pattern of Israel’s public diplomacy aimed at steering Georgia’s foreign policy regarding Iran.
A similar episode occurred last July, when Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksandre Khvtisiashvili, attended a solidarity event at the Iranian Embassy commemorating victims of the June war on Iran, which killed more than 1,000 people. The Israeli Embassy reacted furiously, slamming Khvtisiashvili’s participation as “morally wrong”.
Most recently, amid the US-Israeli war launched in February, the Georgian Dream government extended condolences to both Iran and Israel on 2 March. Without directly referencing the condolences, the Israeli Embassy issued a critical message emphasising that the friendship between “the Georgian people and the Jewish people” should be reflected "especially in times of trouble”.
A few days later, within hours after Irakli Kobakhidze congratulated Mojtaba Khamenei on his election as Iran’s leader , the Israeli Embassy posted critical remarks about Khamenei on Facebook, in what appeared to be another public signal of disapproval toward Tbilisi’s outreach to Tehran. Georgia's dual-track engagement Since regaining independence 35 years ago, Georgia has made Euro-Atlantic integration a central part of its identity and foreign policy aspirations. In recent years, however, Tbilisi has sought to balance these aspirations with geographic and economic realities by expanding trade, tourism, and diplomatic engagement with non-Western actors, including Iran, while continuing to pursue closer integration with Europe.
In 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze made two visits to Iran - first to attend the funeral of late President Ebrahim Raisi and later for the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian - signalling a clear intention to deepen ties amid a shifting regional environment.
Yet these signs of warming ties between Tbilisi and Tehran should not be viewed as either a major geopolitical breakthrough or the emergence of a genuine strategic partnership. Rather, Georgia’s geopolitical hedging - encompassing outreach to Russia, China , and Iran - reflects an effort to maintain relatively balanced relations with non-Western actors while still preserving its long-term Western aspirations.
Notably, Georgia attaches greater importance to its relations with Israel than with Iran. Following the 7 October attacks in 2023, Tbilisi adopted arguably the most pro-Israel stance among the South Caucasus states, condemning the “horrific terrorist attack on the State of Israel” and expressing solidarity exclusively with Tel Aviv.
In the months that followed, Georgia abstained from several UN General Assembly resolutions related to Gaza, unlike neighbouring Azerbaijan and Armenia. Amid the genocide in Gaza, Tbilisi also hosted Itamar Ben-Gvir on 24 August 2025, despite his extremist reputation internationally. The visit was soon afterwards reciprocated by Georgia’s interior minister, who travelled to Israel.
The asymmetry is also visible in diplomatic access and public messaging. When the Israeli ambassador addressed the Georgian Parliament and accused Iran of having a role in Hamas’s attack, the Iranian ambassador was denied the same opportunity to respond to the accusations.
Similarly, during the US-Israeli war with Iran this year, while Georgia’s Deputy FM attended a solidarity event at the Iranian Embassy, PM Kobakhidze personally visited the Israeli Embassy to offer condolences to the ambassador. Georgia's narrowing strategic space Most importantly, Tbilisi is being careful not to alienate the US at a time when Washington is heavily investing in the normalisation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, while simultaneously increasing pressure on Georgia.
In 2024, the outgoing Joe Biden administration suspended the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership and paused security assistance, measures that have remained in place under Donald Trump. Amid the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process and the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity project, Georgia fears losing its strategic importance as a transit corridor linking Europe with Azerbaijan and Central Asia through its railways and Black Sea ports.
At the same time, pro-Israel circles in Washington have increasingly sought to draw attention to Iran’s role in Georgia. The proposed MEGOBARI Act - sponsored by Joe Wilson, a vocal critic of Georgia’s relations with Iran - passed the House of Representatives while stalling in the Senate.
The legislation calls for sanctions against Georgian officials deemed to be undermining US interests in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, hawkish think tanks such as the Hudson Institute, in a lengthy report on Georgia–Iran relations, have urged Washington to impose travel bans and sanctions on officials associated with the Georgian Dream government.
In this context, Tbilisi understands that maintaining strong ties with Washington increasingly requires sensitivity to Israel’s security and political interests as well. The ambitious Trump Tower project - a planned 70-story multifunctional skyscraper in Tbilisi - can be interpreted as an attempt to gain favour with Donald Trump and his political circle.
Georgia’s engagement with Tehran remains cautious and largely limited to trade, tourism, and basic diplomacy. In 2024, total bilateral trade reached $322 million, the lowest in the South Caucasus.
Yet Israel’s repeated public rebukes over even symbolic forms of engagement with Iran reveal an emerging pattern: the limited tolerance Israel shows for diplomatic flexibility by smaller states such as Georgia within the broader context of its confrontation with Tehran.
Fully aware of Georgia’s geopolitical constraints and dependencies, Israel is increasingly seeking to shape Tbilisi’s approach to Iran according to Israeli security priorities rather than Georgia’s own bilateral interests. Any move crossing Israel’s perceived red lines is met with public criticism and diplomatic pushback.
The issue for Tbilisi is no longer simply balancing between competing partners but the gradual narrowing of the space in which such balancing remains viable.
As US-Israeli tensions with Iran continue, Georgia’s room for calibrated engagement risks being increasingly defined by external priorities rather than its own preferences. Rovshan Mammadli is a Baku-based journalist and independent analyst. Holding a BA in Israel and Middle East Studies and an MA in International Policy Studies, he focuses on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Middle East politics, and peace and security in the South Caucasus Follow him on X: @MammadliRovshan Edited by Charlie Hoyle