As Iran’s largest trading partner , China wields far greater influence over Tehran than any other nation worldwide.
This is a reality that the Trump White House has sought to use to its advantage, as did the previous US administration, with Washington hoping that Beijing would leverage this clout to nudge Iran toward making foreign policy changes that would advance US national interests.
In anticipation of this, President Donald Trump’s high-stakes visit to Beijing last week, where he met with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, carried the weight of expectation.
Yet despite the summit’s fanfare, it produced no substantive breakthroughs on the Iran file, highlighting the limits of American leverage .
From Beijing’s perspective, the US-Israeli war on Iran, Tehran’s retaliatory strikes against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other neighbouring states, and the dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have all generated instability that China finds unwelcome.
At the same time, Chinese policymakers recognise that this conflict represents a major misstep for Washington, and they appear in no rush to rescue the Trump administration from the disastrous mess it created with the launch of Operation Epic Fury nearly three months ago.
For China, the war offers a calculated opportunity to showcase to the world, particularly Washington’s allies and partners, the recklessness of US foreign policy and the limits of the American security umbrella. In doing so, Beijing advances its own interests, challenging US hegemony while maintaining a non-interventionist approach to foreign policy.
“President Trump apparently completely disregarded US geostrategic rivalry when he decided to go to war against Iran, since the war has, predictably, led to a massive depletion of US armaments, significantly weakened the US economy, and further eroded US standing with its allies,” Gordon Gray, the former US ambassador to Tunisia, told The New Arab .
“China, for its part, seems to be following the advice attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte: ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is in the process of destroying himself,’” he added.
Ali Wyne, the senior research and advocacy advisor for US-China relations at the International Crisis Group (ICG), made a similar point.
When addressing the fact that this recent summit in Beijing did not produce breakthroughs to help wind down the US-Israel-Iran war, he explained that “while China worries about risks to its energy security and its relationships with the Gulf countries, it does not want to be seen as going out of its way to end a crisis of America's making”.
Pointing to how this conflict has undermined Washington’s goal of rebalancing US foreign policy towards Asia, Wyne noted that the fallout from this war on Iran is “likely to persuade a growing number of countries, including US allies and partners, that they must diversify away from fossil fuels from the Middle East and accelerate their clean energy transitions by increasing their imports of green inputs from China”.
Although the US summit readout emphasised agreement on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, China’s summary made no mention of Iran.
Instead, Beijing articulated its stance through a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, offering the following assessment : “There is no point in continuing this conflict, which should not have happened in the first place.”
The statement called for an early resolution to the conflict, a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issue, and the reopening of shipping lanes, albeit without specifying the conditions Beijing would consider acceptable. By contrast, the US readout notes that President Xi expressed his “opposition to militarisation of the Strait and any effort to charge a toll for its use”.
Within this context, despite the lack of any breakthroughs or agreements, the summit did produce one important outcome on the US-Israel-Iran war, explained Ferial Saeed, a non-resident Fellow at the Stimson Center and a former senior American diplomat.
She told TNA that “China clearly signalled that it would not partner with the United States against Iran or pressure Tehran on Washington’s behalf”.
As Saeed put it, “The discrepancy underscores China’s emphasis on de-escalation rather than coordination with Washington on Iran, even if their positions partially converge”.
Not only did the summit yield no concrete outcomes regarding Iran, but it also exposed two notable inconsistencies in the Trump administration’s approach to the negotiations, highlighting gaps between its stated objectives and its diplomatic strategies , explained Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme.
These contradictions underscore the challenges Washington faces in presenting a coherent and unified policy, particularly at a time when regional tensions demand both clarity and careful calibration.
“First, it showed that Trump saw the war in Iran as part of a bargain. He thought he could use a favour on Iran in exchange for another for China on Taiwan or trade. Second, Trump returned with less influence over Iran after being rebuffed in Beijing,” Aboudouh told TNA .
“For instance, China has refused ‘militarisation’ of Hormuz, a term that is used deliberately to refer to both the US and Iran’s military deployments.”
After Trump’s return to the United States, China declined to support the second US- and Bahrain-sponsored draft resolution, despite the fact that it conspicuously avoided any reference to Article VII.
The move underscored Beijing’s cautious approach and its reluctance to align with Washington on a measure that could escalate tensions in the region.
“This behaviour uncovers the big political, cultural, and psychological differences between [the US and China] on conflict resolution, negotiations, and sovereignty,” noted Aboudouh. China's likely response to renewed military operations According to Trump, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE persuaded him to “hold off” on a “planned military attack” on Iran. It remains unclear whether he has chosen to take an off-ramp in order to end this war or is just simply buying time while remaining intent on restarting military operations later on.
In any event, if the Pakistani-brokered ceasefire collapses and the fighting resumes with the war entering a new phase, there seems to be every reason to expect Beijing to maintain its posture.
China is likely to confine its pressure on the United States to rhetorical means, while providing diplomatic protection to Iran, according to Aboudouh. At the same time, if the military operations start up again, he believes Beijing will continue seeking to position itself as a responsible global power, speaking on behalf of the international community and advancing what it frames as the collective interest.
This approach allows China to balance its regional partnerships with its broader ambitions on the world stage, projecting influence without direct confrontation.
“Beijing will continue to thread the needle diplomatically by seeking to maintain good relations with both Gulf Arab states and Iran, so it is unlikely to come down squarely in favour of one side or the other. Both are important markets for China, so it wants to avoid antagonising both sides,” Gray told TNA .
Marco Carnelos, the former Italian ambassador to Iraq, also holds that Beijing would probably respond to the conflict as it did during the war’s earlier phases. In practice, this would entail “denouncing the violation of international law and providing covered support to Iran, possibly weapons and supplies and, for sure, intelligence.” Echoing Gray’s point, Carnelos explained to TNA that “Beijing will benefit from the known principle ‘do not stop an enemy which is making serial mistakes’”.
Negar Mortazavi, a Washington-based Iranian journalist, host of The Iran Podcast , and senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, addressed the fact that “Iran’s relationship with China is nothing compared to US unconditional support for Israel throughout the genocide and participating hand-in-hand [in the] war against Iran”.
Yet, she believes that China’s indirect support for the Islamic Republic amid the conflict would probably not only continue but “possibly grow as Tehran is trying to intensify and broaden its diplomacy with Beijing”. Broader geopolitical implications The influence of the US-China rivalry on this year’s conflict dynamics in the Middle East is a crucial question that will grow in significance as events unfold and the wider ramifications become clearer.
One of the primary objectives of the war is to accelerate Israel’s integration into the region through the Abraham Accords, framing Iran as the principal adversary for all Gulf Arab monarchies while positioning Israel as a reliable ally capable of ensuring their security, noted Aboudouh.
By casting the conflict in these terms, the strategy seeks to strengthen regional partnerships, legitimise Israel’s role as a defensive partner, and consolidate a broader anti-Iranian coalition.
“By weakening Iran and establishing Israel as a first among equals in the Middle East, Washington can finally achieve its stated strategic objective of reducing its strategic focus on the Middle East and North Africa in favour of other regions, such as the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific, to contain China’s hegemonic posture. However, this strategy is futile at best,” Aboudouh told TNA .
Gulf Cooperation Council members are likely to reassess their heavy reliance on the United States as a security guarantor. It seems that Saudi Arabia is gravitating toward the emerging “Quad” - comprising the Kingdom, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, which seeks to counterbalance Israel’s unhinged and borderless aggression in the region.
At the same time, Iran’s dependence on China and Russia is expected to deepen in the coming years, while many Gulf and Middle Eastern states are likely to expand their strategic hedging with Beijing and other powers, leveraging these relationships to extract stronger security commitments from Washington.
This dynamic reflects a shifting regional order in which states increasingly pursue diversified partnerships to safeguard their interests.
When asked whether all these changes suggest a security outlook that might permit the US to withdraw from the region, even in the most speculative terms, and whether China stands to gain or lose from such a posture, Aboudouh observed, “Obviously, it's too early to tell, but the early signs of a long-term Chinese win and a US loss have already emerged from this war”. Key takeaways The unfolding dynamics in the Middle East underscore how the US-China rivalry is increasingly shaping the region. At a time when Washington grapples with its blunders and missteps, Beijing is leveraging opportunities to expand its diplomatic and economic footprint, carefully balancing relations with multiple regional actors without direct confrontation.
The recent US-China summit highlighted a fundamental reality in which China prioritises its prudence over alignment with Washington, protecting its energy interests, cultivating regional partnerships, and positioning itself as a responsible global actor.
This competition takes place amid shifts toward a multipolar order in which American dominance is no longer guaranteed, and China’s role as a global power continues to rise. As regional alliances evolve, Washington risks even greater loss of leverage, whereas Beijing stands to consolidate its influence, reinforcing the broader trajectory of a changing international order. Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero Edited by Charlie Hoyle