Damascus, Syria - US President Donald Trump declared the memorandum of understanding that would end months of war between the US and Iran “all signed” last week.
Those in Syria have been onlookers to the war, often literally, with Iranian missiles targeting Israel frequently visible in the night sky over the preceding months.
Yet, with Syria caught in the middle of the regional conflagration, it has certainly felt the shockwaves. Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa elected to “maintain neutrality in the Iran war through diplomatic outreach to Arab states and distancing itself from the former Iranian axis while avoiding direct combat,” Nanar Hawach, senior researcher for the International Crisis Group, told The New Arab .
Al-Sharaa refused to allow the country to be drawn into the war, stating in March that, “unless Syria is targeted by any party, Syria will remain outside any conflict”.
Damascus has a long history of entanglement in regional conflicts, including several wars against Israel and Hafez Al-Assad’s 1976 intervention in the Lebanese civil war that turned into a multi-decade occupation that only ended in 2005.
Equally, the country’s war saw Syria become a battleground for many rival powers, including Iran, Russia , and the US.
Al-Sharaa made clear that he does not want Syria to become “another arena of war,” and instead, his priority is focused on rebuilding the country after years of brutal war. The Lebanon question Al-Sharaa has not escaped pressure to commit Syria to the fight. Trump has repeatedly suggested that Syria could intervene against Hezbollah.
Hezbollah was a key supporter of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, intervening, alongside a number of other Iranian-aligned groups, in the Syrian civil war in 2013 to help prop up the regime, which was at that time struggling to hold back the advance of the Syrian opposition.
Fears spiked in Lebanon over the spectre of a Syrian invasion in March, after Al-Sharaa ordered large numbers of troops to deploy on the Lebanese and Iraqi borders .
Damascus alleges that Hezbollah has been behind a string of bombings and attacks across Syria since the fall of the regime and has deployed these forces to secure the border from any possible Hezbollah incursions.
Most recently, Trump said last Tuesday during a press conference at the G7 summit in France that he “suggested to Israel to let Syria take care of Hezbollah”.
“I think they would do a better job of doing it,” he added.
On Saturday, Al-Sharaa referred to reports circulating suggesting a Syrian intervention was on the cards, as “rumours,” that were “completely untrue”. There are a number of reasons why Al-Sharaa is reluctant to involve himself in the war on Lebanon.
Any intervention would have “major external and internal consequences for Syria,” Issam Al-Reis, a military researcher with ETANA, a Syrian research group, tells TNA . He believes there could be diplomatic backlash externally, right at the time when Syria is trying to repair its international relations with much of the world. Equally, recent polling by Syria in Transition’s Syria Poll suggests that public opinion is clearly opposed to an intervention in Lebanon, with 63% of respondents against, whilst only 17% answered in favour.
Al-Reis suggests that the Syrian military , which is currently going through a phase of amalgamating different armed factions, “is not yet a professional army, well equipped for any foreign intervention”.
“Fighting Hezbollah in their own territory is certainly not an easy battle,” he adds. “It is a complicated intervention in many aspects that the Syrian military is likely reluctant to engage with.”
Syria’s security services are already combating an Islamic State (IS) insurgency , attacks linked to Assadist remnants on the Syrian coast, occasional clashes in the Druze-majority region of Suweida in southern Syria, alongside its ongoing integration with the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast.
It is a fact further complicated by Israel’s own continued occupation of the southern Syrian regions of the Golan Heights and Quneitra. Israel has adopted a highly antagonistic attitude towards the new Syrian government.
In July 2025, Israel bombed the Ministry of Defence in Damascus during days of violence against the Druze in Suweida. Economic impact The Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz “provides a good opportunity for Syria to position itself as a transit hub for oil exports from Iraq and the Gulf,” Benjamin Feve, a Senior Consultant with Karam Shaar Advisory, explains to TNA .
Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz , Iraq redirected oil exports overland through Syria, which has seen roughly 600,000 tonnes of oil transit the country per day. Syria is reportedly charging $5 per barrel in transit fees, which has netted the public purse an estimated $2-3 million daily.
“Syria is now better positioned to sell itself as a trade corridor and possible transit hub,” Feve adds.
It is an idea that has champions in the United States. Last week, the New Lines Institute, a US-based think tank, unveiled, with the support of Syria’s US Chargé D’affaires, Mohammad Qanatari, a new policy initiative called “The Four Seas Initiative,” that envisions Syria positioning itself as a key regional transit hub linking the Arabian Gulf, Caspian Mediterranean, and Black Seas through a network of strategic energy and transport corridors.
Such an idea could “attract additional investment into Syria,” explains Feve, as countries hope to build out Syria’s potential as an alternative transit hub. Equally, it could have “political benefits” as these external stakeholders “would have a bigger interest in keeping Syria stable”.
However, not all the outcomes may be positive. Ultimately, Syria’s energy sector remains in ruins and so the country is still a net oil importer. According to Feve, the war has raised fuel prices globally, which has had a knock-on effect on import costs and fuelled inflation domestically.
There is also a risk that “Gulf states recovering from their own infrastructure damage will direct investment toward Syria more selectively than before,” says Hawach.
“Gulf states may prioritise their own reconstruction,” says Feve, although he cautions that it is too early to judge the impact. “We will see moving forward, but what Syria has been promised is a really tiny amount [in relation to overall Gulf investment abroad].”
Syria has witnessed a phenomenon of most promised investments not materialising, “but this was a problem before the war,” says Feve, and is mostly explained by constraints within Syria in managing these promised programs.
Yet, the Iran war has had a transformative effect on the region, empowering Iran and diminishing somewhat both the US and Israel’s ability to manoeuvre.
For Syria, situated in the heart of the region, it will certainly feel the ripples of this latest regional conflict for a long time to come. Cian Ward is a journalist based in Damascus, covering conflict, migration, and humanitarian issues Follow him on X: @CP__Ward Edited by Charlie Hoyle