US President Donald Trump's recent threat to “blow up” Oman if the country didn't “behave” was striking not only for its tone, but also for its target.
Threatening a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member widely regarded as one of the world’s most effective diplomatic intermediaries marked a rare departure from Washington's traditionally close relationship with Muscat.
For decades, Oman has helped advance American national interests with the Sultanate pairing its close partnership with the United States with a distinctive role as an effective and credible diplomatic bridge, quietly facilitating dialogue and helping ease sensitive disputes.
“The strait is going to be open to everybody,” the president said during a Cabinet meeting late last month. “It's international waters. Nobody's going to control it. We're going to watch over it. We'll watch over it, but nobody's going to control it. That's part of the negotiation that we have. They would like to control it; nobody's going to control it. It's international waters. And Oman will behave just like everybody else, or we'll have to blow 'em up. They understand that. They'll be fine.”
Within 24 hours, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reinforced the Trump administration's position, warning that Washington would “aggressively target any actors involved, directly or indirectly, in facilitating tolls for the Strait”.
Trump and Bessent’s threats came amid a growing dispute over the Strait of Hormuz’s future. The White House has firmly opposed Iran and Oman’s reported discussions about a tolling system or joint management arrangement for the Strait of Hormuz, warning that any such framework would challenge the principle of free navigation and extend Tehran's influence over one of the world's most strategically important maritime chokepoints.
The White House’s shifting posture toward the Sultanate is best understood not as the product of a bilateral dispute between the United States and Oman, but as a reflection of broader geopolitical tensions reshaping the Middle East in the post-28 February period.
Trump’s comments were rooted in a convergence of pressures surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, US-Iran hostilities, concerns over global energy security, and Washington's wider effort to align GCC members more closely with American and Israeli objectives, according to an Omani analyst who spoke to The New Arab on the condition of anonymity.
“Oman has not acted as a hostile state toward the United States, nor has it claimed a right to charge vessels for innocent or transit passage. Muscat’s public position has been that it follows international law. Therefore, the threat appears disproportionate and politically performative rather than grounded in Oman’s actual conduct,” he told The New Arab. Years of a growing pressure campaign Oman's relationship with Iran has periodically generated friction with both Trump administrations. Yet despite these recurring tensions, ties between Washington and Muscat remained largely stable, at least until Trump's recent threat to “blow up” Oman and subsequent warnings from his administration about potential sanctions.
Understanding the forces shaping this shift requires looking at political pressures from within the US capital. Muscat's role as the “ unsung hero ” of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which included its hosting of secret negotiations in Oman between Obama administration officials and Iranian representatives, led to certain neoconservative and pro-Israel circles in Washington taking issue with the Sultanate.
To many within those networks, Oman's position as a diplomatic bridge between the United States and the Islamic Republic has been suspicious. Over time, a range of think tank analysts, lobbyists, and political pundits sought to encourage both Trump administrations to see Muscat not as a trusted partner, but as a problematic regional actor.
For years, pro-Israel and Likud-aligned organisations have promoted narratives critical of Oman within Washington policy circles. These campaigns have frequently relied on exaggerated, misleading, or outright false claims regarding Muscat's ties to Iran and members of the so-called "Axis of Resistance," portraying such relationships as justification for a more punitive American approach toward the Sultanate.
In March 2025, a surge of coordinated anti-Omani commentary appeared across multiple outlets, leading many observers to interpret it as a concerted pressure campaign, bearing notable similarities to the anti-Qatar media offensive that preceded the Emirati-led blockade of Doha in 2017.
Oman's central role in facilitating US-Iran diplomacy , coupled with its increasingly vocal condemnation of Israel’s genocidal conduct in Gaza since 7 October 2023, helps explain why efforts to recast the Sultanate's image have intensified in some Washington circles.
The broader objective appears to be reframing Oman from a trusted intermediary and valued regional partner into a troublemaker state and, ultimately, a target for political, economic, and now even military pressure. Impact on Oman-US relations True to character, Oman did not react impulsively or dramatically to Trump’s threat issued on 27 May. However, it is difficult to imagine Trump’s remark not negatively impacting the centuries-old bilateral relationship between America and Oman.
“To their credit, Omani leaders did not react to the vulgar and utterly violent pronouncement, preferring to voice their objections in private. Consequently, short-term repercussions will probably be limited to distancing Muscat from Washington, something that will hurt the United States given the Sultanate’s critical behind-the-scenes assistance to negotiate with Iran,” explained Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, in a TNA interview.
“Regrettably, the threat - far worse than an insulting declaration - will have significant long-term consequences as the trust that existed probably evaporated into thin air,” he added.
“Muscat won't perform outrage, that's not how it operates. But the damage is structural,” Hamed S. Al Ghaithi, senior research associate at Country Risk Solutions, told TNA . “A military threat formalised by a sanctions threat has institutional weight Muscat cannot ignore.”
Trump’s threat to “blow up” Oman may easily fuel diplomatic friction between officials in Muscat and Washington while leading to greater public resentment on the part of Omani citizens, noted Dr Abdullah Baabood, visiting professor at Waseda University in Tokyo.
“Oman is widely regarded as one of the United States’ most reliable and constructive partners in the Gulf, and public threats of military action inevitably generate concern among both policymakers and the wider public,” he observed in a discussion with TNA. Concurring with Dr Kéchichian’s comments, Dr Baabood identified the erosion of trust as the most significant long-term consequence.
“The US-Oman relationship has historically been built on mutual confidence, strategic cooperation, military access arrangements, and diplomatic coordination. If Muscat concludes that its role as a mediator is no longer appreciated or protected by Washington, it may become more cautious in facilitating future diplomatic initiatives,” the Omani scholar told TNA .
“At the same time, the relationship is sufficiently institutionalised that it is unlikely to collapse over a single episode. Security cooperation, economic ties, and shared interests in maritime stability remain important for both sides. Nevertheless, rebuilding confidence may require diplomatic efforts to reassure Omani leaders that the partnership remains valued,” he added. Oman's fellow GCC members An important dimension of this episode that must not be ignored relates to how the other Gulf Arab states view Trump’s threat to Oman. With all six GCC states having spent decades operating under the US security umbrella , this unprecedented threat of military action against a GCC member by an American president can’t be dismissed as no big deal by any Gulf Arab policymaker.
“Saudi Arabia's trajectory is instructive here. Days after the first-ever Israeli airstrike on a Gulf country [which was Qatar in September 2025], Saudi Arabia concluded a mutual defence treaty with Pakistan, a military powerhouse with nuclear weapons, and is believed to have not informed its American partners until the deal was inked. That is not an accident. It is a hedge,” Al Ghaithi told TNA .
“Gulf states are quietly building redundancy into their security architecture precisely because confidence in Washington as a consistent partner has been eroding for years and has accelerated sharply in the current period,” he added.
Officials in the UAE, which has been the most hawkishly anti-Iranian GCC state amid this war as well as the Arab state most heavily attacked by the Islamic Republic since 28 February, “may privately feel some alignment with the administration's frustration at Omani engagement with Tehran, said Al Ghaithi.
“But even Abu Dhabi will register the underlying logic: if Washington will threaten a longtime partner over a disputed legal question about a waterway that passes through that partner's territorial waters, what does the US security guarantee actually guarantee?”
Dr Baabood made a similar point, arguing that even those in the Gulf who have been at odds with aspects of Muscat’s diplomatic foreign policy will not take well to a US president publicly threatening a founding member of the GCC.
“For many Gulf governments, the lesson may be that close security ties with Washington do not necessarily shield a country from political pressure, public criticism or even attacks. This could further strengthen ongoing efforts to diversify strategic partnerships, deepen regional cooperation, and pursue greater strategic autonomy,” noted Dr Baabood.
The Middle East is now entering a new era in which discerning between bombastic hyperbole and actual threats is more challenging than ever before, explained Dr Aziz Alghashian, senior non-resident fellow at Gulf International Forum, who observed that the Trump administration’s foreign policy since 2025 leaves GCC members unable to simply dismiss as “hot air” the American president’s threat to “blow up” Oman.
"These remarks by Trump only exacerbate security anxieties for the GCC states as it signals to Iran and Israel that their main security partner in the US is not only not willing to protect them, but [threatens to] actually attack them. This demonstrates a lack of resolve that can only embolden Iran and Israel,” he told TNA . Impact on Omani policies The core tenets of Oman's foreign policy are very unlikely to be altered by Trump’s threat. There is no reason to believe Muscat will abandon its longstanding preference for dialogue, mediation, and diplomatic engagement over confrontation, or compromise the independent nature of Omani foreign policy that has long defined the Sultanate's approach to regional affairs.
Nor is pressure from Washington or Tel Aviv likely to end Oman's opposition to the Abraham Accords or its commitment to maintaining constructive and pragmatic relations across the Gulf, including with Iran.
Indeed, Oman's value as a regional actor has long stemmed from its ability to engage all sides while remaining independent of competing geopolitical blocs. That balancing act is a cornerstone of the Sultanate's national identity.
“Oman is unlikely to abandon neutrality or mediation, because these are not temporary tactics; they are pillars of Omani statecraft. However, this episode may push Muscat to reassess how it manages exposure to great-power pressure. Oman may become even more careful in how it communicates its positions on Iran, Israel, maritime security, and regional mediation. Rather than changing its identity, Oman may seek to protect that identity more strategically,” said the Omani analyst who spoke to TNA anonymously.
Dr Kéchichian believes that Oman might back off from its offers to help Washington with mediation efforts throughout the immediate future.
“Given the violence of the Donald Trump threat, Oman will not volunteer to act as a regional mediator for the time being, though that would likely be a temporary preference. Nevertheless, Omani leaders will most likely continue to talk with Iran, hopefully to find a workable solution to reopen traffic through the Straits of Hormuz, especially since doing so will assist Muscat’s fellow GCC partners,” he told TNA .
More importantly, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said will “seek to foster even closer ties between the Sultanate and all nations,” commented Dr Kéchichian. “Proud of its established ties with one and all, Oman will behave like the adult it is, and will wait for this nefarious episode to wither at the proverbial vine.”
Ultimately, while Oman can be counted on to stick to its principles, policymakers in Muscat might be in the process of adjusting some of their approaches to specific aspects of the Sultanate’s diplomacy.
By placing “greater emphasis on multilateral frameworks rather than highly visible bilateral mediation efforts,” Oman will possibly be “more cautious about public involvement in sensitive negotiations” while also encouraged to “strengthen coordination with GCC partners and other international actors to ensure that its diplomatic role is better understood and supported,” according to Dr Baabood.
Ultimately, in a volatile and war-torn region, there is a growing need for credible mediators, particularly amid a period in history defined by geopolitical bifurcation.
Yet, as Dr Alghashian pointed out, with Gulf Arab mediators - namely Qatar and Oman - recently coming under attack, calculations about the “security of mediation” must be reconsidered.
The Trump administration’s recent threats of military action and sanctions against Oman only add to the doubts surrounding the assumption that mediators are safe in today’s Middle East. Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero Edited by Charlie Hoyle