Turkey has been pushing hard for an end to the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran since the campaign began late last month. In the weeks leading up to February 28, Turkey joined Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in lobbying the Trump administration to settle issues with Tehran through diplomacy, not war. Turkish leaders accurately predicted that “limited” U.S. or Israeli strikes on Iran would lead to widespread fallout.
Now, with this escalating conflict having spread across countries from the Indian Ocean to the European Union , Turkey is carefully navigating this global crisis, maintaining neutrality and geopolitical balance. In response to the launch of Operation Epic Fury, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned the U.S. and Israel’s strikes for “violat[ing] Iran's sovereignty and threaten[ing] the peace of the friendly and brotherly Iranian people.” He also offered his condolences following the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
At the same time, Ankara criticized Tehran for failing to comprehend the mood in Washington in the leadup to February 28, and denounced Iran’s missile and drone attacks on GCC states as “incredibly wrong.”
Turkey and Iran’s complicated relationship is best described as a “ cooperative rivalry .” Although Turkey sometimes works with other powers to counter Iran’s influence in certain theaters, Ankara does not view Tehran as an existential threat or even an enemy. Turkey and Iran have aligned in other cases such as opposing the 2017 Iraqi Kurdistan referendum, maintaining pro-Hamas positions, standing against Israeli bombings and expansionism in Syria, and supporting Doha during the 2017-2021 Emirati-led blockade against Qatar.
Ethnic separatism in Iran
Turkey fears that Iran, a country of 92 million people with which it shares a 312 -mile border, will slide into chaotic instability, sparking a new refugee crisis and stoking ethnic tensions. State fragmentation in Iran could empower militant Kurdish groups such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is affiliated with Turkey’s long-time enemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Such an outcome could have serious repercussions inside Turkey.
“Turkey’s underlying goal is that Iran maintains its territorial integrity, its unity as a country, so that the separatism fueled by the terrorist [organization] PKK doesn’t spread into Turkey,” explained Matthew Bryza, the former U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan, in an interview with RS.
Not long after the United States and Israel began waging this war on Iran, leaked reports suggested that Washington would possibly sponsor an armed Kurdish rebellion against the Islamic Republic. These reports infuriated Turkey’s government.
“[Turkish Foreign Minister] Hakan Fidan warned against instrumentalizing ethnic separatism to try to incite civil war [inside Iran], and he later announced he was pleased that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio assured him that the U.S. was not doing that. But I suspect that Ankara is keeping a really close eye on the possibility of the ethnic Kurdish population of Iran being used in such a way,” added Bryza.
After the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011, Turkey accepted millions of Syrian refugees, which led to major economic, societal, and security challenges in Turkey. Since Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in December 2024, a percentage of these refugees have returned to Syria. The last thing Turkey wants now is a similar crisis, this time from Iran. With a sizable portion of Iran’s population being ethnic Azerbaijani-Turks living in northwestern Iran, both Turkey and Azerbaijan’s governments would face enormous pressure to take them in under state-collapse or civil war scenarios in Iran.
Preventing a crisis in Iran-Turkey relations
NATO intercepted missiles flying in Turkey’s direction on March 4 , 9 , and 13 . Whether the intended targets were inside Turkey or another country is unclear. Following the second missile firing, Erdogan and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, discussed the situation. Turkey’s president “underscored that violation of the Turkish airspace, for whatever reason, cannot be excused,” according to a statement released by Turkey’s government.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has denied that Iran had anything to do with these recent missile and drone launches at Turkey. Whether true or not, this denial has helped Ankara maintain its neutrality in this escalating conflict. Tehran’s desire to avoid a high-stakes confrontation with NATO’s second largest military power is also understandable.
Economic stakes
Turkey’s economy, like many others worldwide, feels the strain of this war as rising energy costs threaten to fuel inflation. Turkey’s reliance on imported energy, particularly natural gas from Iran, underscores the country’s vulnerability to supply disruptions and price increases. Adding to Turkey’s sense of threat is the fact that the country’s long-term energy agreements with Russia and Iran are nearing expiration this year.
“A Gulf reduction in oil supply and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would put a country like Turkey, which is dependent on external sources for oil, in a difficult position,” said Mustafa Caner, an assistant professor at Sakarya University Middle East Institute, in an interview with RS. “Furthermore, in the context of an ongoing war, delays to Turkey's regional economic projects, particularly in Syria, are inevitable.”
This war has hurt Turkey’s tourism sector too, especially in eastern and southeastern regions. Although popular tourist destinations such as Istanbul, Bodrum, and Antalya have so far remained relatively unaffected , travel to Turkey from Iran and other neighboring countries has essentially reached a standstill , creating uncertainty for the Turkish tourism sector.
A diplomatic player
While Turkey might benefit from the Islamic Republic being a weaker regional power, Ankara does not want any scenario involving state-collapse or uncontrollable turmoil in Iran. But the longer this war rages on, the higher the likelihood of such an outcome becomes. Ankara is therefore using diplomatic channels to promote a de-escalation of hostilities between Washington and Tehran.
“Turkey is engaging in mediation efforts—holding talks with Iran, the United States, the EU, and Gulf countries—to bring the war to an end as soon as possible,” Pınar Dost, a nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program and Türkiye Today columnist, told RS.
Of all the regional players, Turkey arguably possesses the greatest mediation capacity as a country that is not a direct party to the conflict. Given Erdogan’s good relations with Trump as well as the Iranian leadership, Caner says Turkey is “ready to employ its full diplomatic capacity” to help end the conflict.
Israel’s increasing tendency toward military adventurism has further reinforced Turkey’s desire to see this war come to a close. After October 7, the “Axis of Resistance” suffered a series of setbacks, and Turkey filled some vacuums created by the relative decline in Iran’s clout. This expansion has created a series of potential flashpoints in Turkish-Israeli relations, as reflected in a growing discourse in Israel about a purported need for Tel Aviv to set its sights on Ankara.
Under certain circumstances, this Israeli-Turkish rivalry could complicate Ankara’s ability to play a productive role as a diplomatic bridge between actors in this war, as Dost explained.
“Turkey can certainly act as a mediator between the United States and Iran, but this would not be possible in a scenario where the U.S. stops fighting while Israel continues,” she told RS.
Nonetheless, depending on the Trump administration’s moves, there is real potential for Ankara to help wind down this conflict through more of the shuttle diplomacy that has kept Fidan busy since late last month. On top of Turkey’s diplomatic achievements in Ukraine and Gaza, the U.S.-Israel-Iran war could be the next international crisis where Ankara puts its skilled diplomacy to good use.