Applying the Lessons of Ireland to Iran

For anyone entrusted with peacemaking, a visit to Northern Ireland, 28 years after the signing of the agreement ending the region’s “ Troubles ,” should be mandatory. The process that culminated in Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement (GFA) offers a master class in conflict resolution, which is particularly valuable at this moment when more conflicts are raging globally than at any other time since World War II. As former protagonists in the conflict readily share, the GFA may not be perfect, but they would readily take an imperfect peace over a return to the previous stalemate and bloodshed.

In April 2026, when Vice President J.D. Vance returned to Washington empty-handed from negotiations with Iranian officials in Islamabad, after a mere 21 hours on the ground, critics were quick to label the mission a failure. In truth, it was a necessary first step—though perhaps not recognized at the time by U.S. officials—in what undoubtedly will be a drawn-out process. This is something the United States is now acknowledging, as it struggles to secure a deal that leaves core issues to future talks. In the case of the GFA, getting to the finish line took 700 days, but that was only after several frustrating years of laying the necessary groundwork. With respect to ceasefires that allowed the GFA to move forward, as with the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz, they were merely the beginning of the journey, not the end, though they were critical to building confidence and trust between the warring communities.

A review of treaties and conflict-ending agreements in the post WWII period, of which the GFA is but one, presents a number of key lessons. For instance, penning an agreement to halt the worst excesses of any conflict is alone no guarantee of true peace. Political leaders may lend their signatures to agreements, but it is the people who make and sustain peace by reconciling with the past, having ownership of the future, and sharing in mutually beneficial outcomes. Absent the popular component, as recent history demonstrates, treaties usually prove as flimsy as the paper on which they are drafted.

In 2026, the Dayton Accords , which at the time of their negotiation ended the worst bloodshed in post-World War II Europe, celebrates its thirtieth anniversary. Coming on the heels of NATO bombing, and threats of more to come, the various sides had little choice but to end the fighting three decades ago. Much-needed reconciliation, however, between competing local narratives and aspirations, distorted by unyielding religious and ethnic identities, has yet to occur. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been locked in a time warp enforced first by NATO and now EU peacekeepers, with political and territorial divisions intact and little incentive for the former warring parties to alter the status quo. Thus, Dayton remains an “ugly peace” with the conflict frozen in time and space.

The Camp David Accords , signed by Egypt and Israel in 1978, remains similarly intact in 2026 with many of the same attributes as Dayton. At best, it has been a “cold peace,” supervised by UN peacekeepers still patrolling the Sinai Peninsula to this day and no reconciliation at the grassroots between Egyptian and Israeli populations. As with the Dayton Accords, it remains a treaty between political leaders without shared institutions, initiatives, or popular efforts to forge a common future absent ignorance and mistrust of the other.

The Oslo Accords, signed by Israeli and Palestinian leadership to much acclaim in 1994, was intended to complete the circle started at Camp David almost two decades before. Addressing a central issue of Arab antagonism towards Israel, the plight of the Palestinians, Oslo was supposed to herald a new chapter across the Middle East. But, as with Dayton afterwards and Camp David before, critical elements were absent from the start, most notably at the popular level. Oslo was, ultimately, a deal between political elites, and not necessarily equal ones. Three decades later, the results speak for themselves: separation, not reconciliation, and the complete absence of a shared future.

The Good Friday Agreement, which has now held for 28 years, was different from the very beginning. Since separation , the progenitor of The Troubles, had already proven inadequate to the aspirations of the two sides, both were forced to accept three key compromises. First, there would need to be mutual sacrifices and no side would be the winner or loser. As a senior paramilitary commander on one side in the conflict recently told the author, “peace is not surrender.” Second, they would need to leave behind exclusionist historical narratives that had only brought tragedy. “Compromise is not a dirty word,” according to the same paramilitary leader, despite very real political risks for all who made such concessions. Finally, a return to mutually self-defeating violence was not a viable option.

As stated in the preamble of the Accords:

The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honor them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.

Confidence- and trust-building efforts, including ceasefires, of course, were necessary to push the GFA over the goal line. But underpinning everything, unlike the historical examples cited above, was the intentional inclusion of people-centric initiatives in the process, in the recognition that citizens of the respective communities would, ultimately, have to live with the results. To that end, intentional efforts, supported by the international community , have provided citizen ownership and oversight of implementation from independent monitoring committees to popular referenda on the fine print. This is “the glue that binds” in the words of one negotiator.

For would-be peacemakers in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere today, the lessons of the GFA should be obvious. Patience, compromise, and above all popular participation are the essential ingredients.

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