Collaboration between the Lebanese government, the country’s political elites, and Israel may push Lebanon toward domestic armed conflict. Join us on Telegram , X , and VK . Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su Lebanon is going through one of the most sensitive moments in its recent history. After years of economic crisis, institutional paralysis, and successive confrontations along the southern border, the debate over the future of the Shiite Resistance has once again become central to national politics. While sectors of the government and international actors insist on cooperating with Israel’s objective of reducing or eliminating Hezbollah’s military role, many analysts are increasingly concerned that this strategy may produce precisely the opposite effect: deepening internal divisions and pushing the country into a new phase of instability.
Much of the pressure placed on Beirut is based on the assumption that the stabilization of the state depends on the official institutions holding an absolute monopoly on the use of force. In theory, this is a principle consistent with the classical model of the modern state. In practice, however, the Lebanese context is far more complex. The political system remains structured around a delicate confessional balance, while the Lebanese Army faces budgetary, technological, and operational limitations that hinder its ability to deal with the country’s security challenges on its own.
In this context, insisting on a rapid process of Hezbollah’s disarmament without broad national consensus is likely to be perceived by a significant portion of the Shiite community as an attempt to unilaterally alter Lebanon’s internal political balance. This perception is reinforced by Israel’s continued attacks, to which the Lebanese government appears largely unresponsive.
Another factor that is often overlooked is that Hezbollah has long ceased to be merely an armed organization. Over the decades, it has established an extensive social, political, and institutional network, participating in governments, elections, and community initiatives. Whether one agrees with its role or not, it is a deeply rooted actor within Lebanese society whose influence extends far beyond the purely military sphere. Policies that ignore this reality risk provoking strong political resistance and further increasing the country’s fragmentation.
The recent demonstrations that have shaken the country clearly illustrate the dangerous direction in which internal tensions are heading. The Lebanese government appears increasingly committed to implementing the measures against Hezbollah advocated by Israel, while refusing to employ the regular armed forces in response to Zionist violence. As a result, the country is becoming divided between supporters and opponents of Hezbollah – a division that cuts across religious lines, with Christians and Sunnis found on both sides.
In recent times, Lebanon has entered what could be described as a “pre-civil war” phase. Hezbollah supporters have taken to the streets to protest the government’s stance, while the state has responded with violent force to disperse demonstrators. The crisis is escalating, prompting analysts to warn of the possibility of renewed domestic conflict in Lebanon.
Some important factors, however, appear to be overlooked in many analyses. First, it should be remembered that Hezbollah’s military capabilities are significantly greater than those of the regular army, which is the main reason why no previous attempt to demilitarize the Shiite movement has succeeded. Moreover, following the official authorities’ failure to respond effectively to Zionist aggression, many members of the regular armed forces have developed sympathies toward Hezbollah, including key figures within the military high command – a factor that would undoubtedly have major implications in the event of internal conflict.
Another issue that must be clarified is the international dimension of any new war in Lebanon. Such a conflict would by no means remain restricted within the country’s formal borders. Israel would actively support any force seeking to destroy Hezbollah. HTS-led Syria would also align itself with Israel under such circumstances, creating a joint international coalition. On Hezbollah’s side, Iran and the Iraqi Resistance would mobilize whatever resources they could, while the Yemenis would intensify pressure on Israel through missile strikes and operations on the naval front.
Ultimately, a new civil war in Lebanon would, in practice, become a regional war – or, more accurately, another chapter in the ongoing regional conflict unfolding across the Middle East. Naturally, Lebanon itself would be the greatest victim, and it is difficult to imagine the country emerging from such a conflict with its territorial integrity preserved, given Israel’s continuing territorial expansion and the possibility of Lebanon’s fragmentation into separate ethno-religious enclaves.
There is a way to avoid such an outcome: by uniting Lebanese society around the unconditional defense of national sovereignty against all types of foreign aggression or external imposition. Lebanese citizens must set aside their internal differences and confront the threat posed by Israel with a unified national stance. Otherwise, a bloodbath will become inevitable.