Military cooperation between Egypt and Turkey has rapidly ascended to heights not seen in decades, if not altogether unprecedented ones.
The increased cooperation between these two heavyweight Middle Eastern powers has caused some consternation within Israel.
In June, Egypt hosted a joint air force exercise with Turkey. Combat aircraft from both countries trained together “at a number of air bases in Egypt” . It was the first time both countries held such an exercise in more than a decade.
A second joint exercise kicked off almost immediately, this time with Turkey hosting Egypt’s air force. Citing Egypt’s military, Al-Ahram noted that the exercise reflects the “growing military cooperation between the armed forces of Egypt and Turkey” and forms part of ongoing efforts to “strengthen defence ties between the two countries”.
The exercises followed joint naval drills in late 2025 between the two countries, the first in 13 years . That exercise featured Turkish F-16 fighter jets, frigates, and even a submarine.
American-made F-16s participated in all of these exercises. The jets form the backbone of both countries’ fighter fleets. Turkey has the third-largest F-16 fleet worldwide, while Egypt has the fourth.
Cairo has a more diverse air force, including French-built Dassault Rafale and Russian MiG-29M/M2 fighter jets acquired in the 2010s. Turkey, which has long had an all-American fighter fleet of mostly F-16s, supplemented by aged F-4 Phantom IIs, has taken steps to diversify its air force with a landmark order of Eurofighter Typhoons from Britain. It’s also developing a domestic stealth fighter called the TF Kaan.
The exercises are significant as they mark a major thaw in relations between the two countries. Prior to 2013, they had close military relations.
Between 1993 and 1995, Turkey even manufactured 46 F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had close ties with Egypt’s short-lived Muslim Brotherhood under President Mohamed Morsi. Morsi’s government wanted to buy ten of Turkey’s homegrown Anka military drones, but none were delivered before it was ousted in the bloody July 2013 army coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who became president afterwards.
Erdogan denounced the coup, and for years, Turkey-Egypt relations were severely strained . The Turkish leader would often use the four-finger Rabaa salute to signal his support for the deposed Brotherhood government.
Today, while Sisi is still in power, ties have thawed over the past few years, as evidenced by these renewed military exercises. In 2025, Turkey’s Havelsan and Egypt’s Arab Organisation for Industrialisation signed a memorandum of understanding for producing drones in Egypt .
Kristin Ronzi, a Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, assesses that these joint Egyptian-Turkish military exercises are “evidence of strengthening bilateral ties amid warming relations” between Ankara and Cairo.
“In recent years, Turkey has sought rapprochement with regional countries, including Egypt, to expand its regional influence, and Egypt and Turkey have largely moved past post-2013 tensions to focus on pragmatic areas of security, economic, and diplomatic cooperation,” Ronzi told The New Arab .
“Even so, there are divergences in Egyptian and Turkish policies, such as Turkish efforts to formalise maritime claims in the disputed Eastern Mediterranean Sea and foreign policy differences over the Horn of Africa, which risk constraining further cooperation,” she said. Diversification Egypt has long sought to diversify the sources of its armed forces' military equipment to reduce reliance on a single supplier. It risked incurring US sanctions with a 2018 order for Russian Su-35 Flanker fighter jets, which it subsequently cancelled.
More recently, Egypt hosted its first-ever joint air force exercise with China on its territory in 2025, which featured China’s premier fourth-generation Chengdu J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter. Cairo is interested in potentially acquiring that fighter. Buying equipment from Turkey could further enhance Egypt’s longstanding military diversification policy.
“Egypt is currently diversifying its military ties and weapons suppliers while Turkey works to boost its own indigenous defence capabilities,” Ronzi told The New Arab . “While Egyptian-Chinese military cooperation is likely to ruffle feathers in Washington, Egyptian-Turkish cooperation is less likely to be contentious, due in part to Turkey’s role as a NATO member.”
Nicolas Heras, Interim Executive Director at the Middle East Policy Council and Senior Director at the New Lines Institute, outlined how Egypt seeks to become a regional military power through “balanced security partnerships” that can deter the “military ambitions” of its neighbours.
“The Egyptians may become involved in a war with Ethiopia or even Israel over the next decade and do not want to be completely dependent on US weapons systems and therefore US policy prerogative, which could restrain Egypt's leaders in future wars,” Heras told The New Arab .
“Cairo would not abandon Washington for Beijing, but it does see the utility of a serious partnership with China as a means to access cheaper but highly effective military technology and to balance against potential US military withdrawal from the region.”
Ronzi noted that Turkish arms sales typically have “fewer end-use requirements” than those of Western countries, which gives Cairo “more operational flexibility” and often at a “lower price point”.
“Furthermore, joint production agreements, such as the Havelsan deal, will boost Egypt’s domestic arms manufacturing capabilities,” Ronzi said. “Even so, Turkish weapons systems are generally not as advanced as some Western conventional systems; consequently, Egypt is still likely to rely on US and other Western hardware even as Cairo continues to diversify its suppliers.”
Overall, the RANE analyst sees growing Egyptian-Turkish cooperation, along with a “broader alliance” comprising Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, which is likely to facilitate expanded regional defence cooperation .
Nevertheless, there remain “significant policy differences” between Cairo and Ankara, including Turkey’s efforts to formalise maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and “foreign policy divergences” over the Horn of Africa , factors which risk “limiting the scope” of this partnership. Irritated Israel The cooperation has perhaps unsurprisingly attracted the attention of Israel, which sits between the two regional powers.
While Israeli officials have warned that Turkey’s military poses a threat , other statements indicate that Israel also views Egypt’s military as a potential rising danger if left unchecked.
In February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly warned that “the Egyptian army is getting stronger, and we need to monitor it”. Israel views growing military cooperation between the two largest armies in the region with concern, particularly their cooperation in joint drone manufacturing. Ronzi anticipates that Egyptian-Turkish military cooperation will “further fuel” pre-existing concerns in Israel amidst elevated tensions with Ankara and Israeli scrutiny of Egypt’s military.
“Nevertheless, this cooperation is unlikely to directly threaten Israel, particularly since Egypt and Israel maintain pragmatic relations for security and energy,” she told TNA . “Although Egypt has reiterated its ‘red line’ position regarding Gaza, it remains highly unlikely to take a more assertive stance against Israel,” Ronzi added.
“Furthermore, both Egypt and Turkey will be cautious about taking actions toward Israel that could strain their respective ties with the United States.”
Renewed security ties between Egypt and Turkey are a means for the former “to develop another source of lower cost, but highly effective, military hardware for future assertive Egyptian military action in its region,” Heras of New Lines Institute says.
“Egyptian leaders are unlikely to provoke another war with Israel but must prepare for a potential future when relations with Israel break down into hostilities in the Sinai due to the increasingly aggressive regional actions taken by Israeli decision makers.” Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon Edited by Charlie Hoyle