In Cuba a deadlock is more likely than a deal

“I do believe I’ll be having the honor of taking Cuba,” President Trump told journalists in the Oval Office last month. “ “I think I can do anything I want with it, if you want to know the truth. They’re a very weakened nation.” And so they are. In the escalating confrontation with the United States, Cuba does not have many cards, as Trump likes to say. In the months since the United States took control of Venezuela’s oil exports, cut off the flow to Cuba, and threatened sanctions against any nation that dared send fuel to the island, only Russia has been willing to defy Washington’s oil embargo. As a result, Cuba’s economy is gradually grinding to a halt. It seems that the stage is set for Trump to succeed where his twelve predecessors failed, finally “taking” Cuba back from the bearded young revolutionaries who took away North America’s Caribbean playground some seven decades ago. And yet, a close look at Washington’s options reveals that taking Cuba would not be as easy as it appears. Washington and Havana have begun negotiations to see if there is enough common ground between the Trump administration’s demands and the compromises the Cuban government is willing to make. But Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said publicly that Cuba “has to get new people in charge,” and the New York Times reports that Washington is demanding that Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel depart. Cuban officials have drawn a red line in response, refusing to negotiate either the shape of the political system or who their leaders are. If the two sides focus on economic issues, which appear to be high on the U.S. agenda, just as they have been in Venezuela, a deal may be possible. That would be a good outcome for both sides, but it would fall short of Cuban-American demands for regime change. Realistically, however, a deadlock is more likely than a deal. That would seem to condemn Cuba to a continuing oil blockade, deeper misery, and the looming threat of U.S. military attack. “We may stop by Cuba after we're finished with this,” Trump said , referring to the war in Iran. But both the air war option and the “boots on the ground” option pose real problems for the United States. First, Cuba poses no immediate threat to the United States, so Washington has no predicate for attacking it. That may not concern the Stephen Millers in the White House for whom power is all that matters . But it will further damage U.S. alliances in both Latin America and Europe. Moreover, a military campaign against Cuba offers no guarantee of producing the political change the Trump administration wants. One of the lessons of the war in Iran is that you cannot impose regime change without boots on the ground. Even killing the top tier of leaders is no guarantee; the second tier may be even more recalcitrant. Moreover, Cuba, unlike either Iran or Venezuela, has no organized opposition of any consequence, so it would be a vain hope to expect Cubans to simply rise up against their government. So air strikes on Cuba would not accomplish much, other than making life even more miserable for the general population. The U.S. military could invade and occupy the island with relative ease. The Cuban armed forces, once powerful enough to fight South Africa to a stand-still in Angola, are still operating with Soviet-era equipment and limited fuel. They could not mount much of a conventional defense. But they don’t plan to do so. Ever since President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of state, Al Haig, threatened to attack the island, Cuban military doctrine has been a “ war of the whole people ,” premised on waging protracted asymmetric guerrilla warfare against an occupier. And if the United States occupied Cuba, it would immediately become responsible for the welfare of 10 million people who currently do not have enough to eat, do not have access to adequate medicine, and do not have enough fuel to keep the lights on. As Secretary of State Colin Powell put it when he warned President George W. Bush against invading Iraq, “If you break it, you own it.” What scenario remains if the Cubans are unwilling to agree to regime change at the bargaining table, an air war alone is unable to impose regime change by force, and an invasion is deemed too costly and risky? The White House may well decide to simply ratchet up the economic pressure in hopes that the government is bound to break sooner or later. But despite the deterioration of public services, Cuba is far from being a failed state. The government remains very much in control of society and able to suppress episodic unrest. By imposing strict austerity to control consumption, accelerating the transition to solar energy (with help from China), and importing limited amounts of petroleum for the private sector and from Russia, Cuban authorities are trying to muddle through. If they succeed, Trump will have failed to achieve regime change and missed an opportunity to leverage an opening in the Cuban economy. If the Cuban state does eventually fail and social order breaks down into chaos and violence, Trump will be faced with another mass migration crisis — a combination of the 1994 “balsero” crisis when Cubans got on rickety rafts to cross the Florida Strait, and the 1980 Mariel boatlift when Cuban Americans went south to rescue their relatives and friends. So despite the fact that Trump thinks he holds all the cards in dealing with Cuba, it still is not a very strong hand. As he tries to negotiate a deal, he would be well advised to take Reagan’s negotiating advice that “half a loaf is better than none.” As weak as Cuba is at the moment, there is no clear path by which Washington can achieve regime change. There is, however, an opportunity to re-engage with Cuba economically to the benefit of both countries, and that is a deal too good to pass up.