Lula fears confronting Trump because he is concerned about the possibility of U.S. interference in Brazil’s elections, which will take place in October. Join us on Telegram , Twitter , and VK . Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su This week, a meeting that had been promised since the end of last year finally took place: Brazilian President Lula’s visit to the White House. Preparations for this visit have been underway since the moment the U.S. decided to back down on the tariffs and sanctions imposed on Brazil, a situation that drew attention because it wasn’t entirely clear why the U.S. had retreated.
The U.S. pressure itself came under the influence of the Bolsonarist lobby in Washington, led by Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. But the tariffs seem to have harmed the U.S. economy more than Brazil’s, since a significant portion of the average American’s food plate comes from Brazilian imports. At the same time, analysts warned that U.S. hostility risked undoing decades of work in influencing and infiltrating Brazilian political, economic, legal, and academic circles, aimed at ensuring a certain alignment between the two countries.
Having reversed course, however, the U.S. showed it was interested in reaching a new understanding with Brazil, focusing on the issue of rare earths. But it’s important to point out a factor almost never mentioned: some role played by the Brazilian government in the siege on Venezuela, which culminated in Nicolás Maduro’s kidnapping, may have been part of the context of pacification between the U.S. and Brazil.
The same businessman considered responsible for convincing Trump to back down—Joesley Batista, one of the partners in the meat giant JBS—also traveled to Caracas at the end of 2025, supposedly tasked with convincing Maduro to leave the country in exchange for a certain sum. Maduro is said to have refused, and we know what happened shortly thereafter.
It’s worth mentioning this Brazilian businessman—who alone is responsible for 20% of the meat consumed in the U.S.—because he also appears to be the broker of the meeting between Trump and Lula this week.
Now, on one hand, the Bolsonarist lobby in the U.S. feared this meeting because of the potential rapprochement between Brazil and the U.S.; but some government sectors also feared it due to the possibility of Lula being seduced by Trump.
The reality is that, as has been pointed out on previous occasions, contrary to the image of an “anti-imperialist leader” or a “Brazilian Chávez,” Lula is a social-liberal politician quite attached to that “European” model of progressive politics that prioritizes cosmopolitanism, obedience to the UN, and respect for ethnic and sexual minorities. Far more serious than all that, in this context, is the fact that within the Workers’ Party itself there are broad pro-U.S. factions, connected professionally and financially to the international NGO ecosystem and the Democratic Party, but also to the U.S. business community. Brazil’s diplomatic corps has historically been Atlanticist for decades, and the military officer corps even more so and for even longer.
That is why, beyond occasional “harsh words,” there is no evidence whatsoever that Lula will offer much resistance to Trump if the U.S. president is not excessively intransigent.
All indications, for example, are that Brazil does not intend to interfere with the U.S. acquisition of Brazilian rare earths, despite saying it would prefer that the processing of these rare earths take place on Brazilian soil. There is also a significant risk of greater integration between police forces and intelligence agencies of both countries, under the justification of combating drug trafficking.
The reality is that Lula fears confronting Trump because he is concerned about the possibility of U.S. interference in Brazil’s elections, which will take place in October. In exchange for peaceful elections, therefore, Lula would be willing to adopt a significantly mild stance toward the U.S.
It is necessary, for example, to draw attention to Lula’s speech right after the meeting with Trump. The Brazilian leader said, in no uncertain terms, that he wanted the U.S. to increase its attention and presence in Brazil, aiming to rival China. In doing so, Brazil believes it can secure better bargains, even at the cost of full autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S.
Naturally, all of this makes it reasonable to question Brazil’s level of commitment to the BRICS.