Perhaps fearful of abandonment, or of being treated as a mere “bargaining chip” in negotiations with Beijing, Taiwan has worked diligently to ingratiate itself with President Donald Trump’s inner circle. Just last month, Taipei hired Checkmate Government Relations, a firm whose founder, Ches McDowell , enjoys close ties to Donald Trump Jr. and access to the president himself. The six-month contract is worth roughly $300,000. The move follows Taiwan’s 2025 decision to retain Ballard Partners , another well-connected Washington firm led by prominent Trump fundraiser Brian Ballard.
Yet Taiwan’s influence operation is hardly confined to one party. Taipei has long maintained relationships with Democratic-aligned firms as well, including Gephardt Government Affairs, which has represented Taiwanese interests since 2013. Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle has also frequently worked on Taiwan-related advocacy efforts.
The coordinator for most of these efforts is the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington. TECRO manages a sophisticated influence network involving lobbying firms, public relations consultants, congressional outreach, and partnerships with prominent think tanks .
There, Taiwan-related funding has also reached institutions across the ideological spectrum, including the centrist Center for Strategic and International Studies, the liberal Brookings Institution, and the conservative Hudson Institute.
The goal is not difficult to discern: maintain broad elite consensus behind closer U.S.-Taiwan relations, continued arms sales, and an increasingly expansive American commitment to Taiwan’s security.
Of course, there is nothing unusual about a foreign government attempting to persuade American policymakers. Moreover, compared to the sums spent by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or pro-Israel organizations, Taiwan’s expenditures are relatively modest , particularly in relation to the multi-billion dollar defense deals they help produce.
In many ways, this reflects Taiwan’s success. Support for Taipei has become so deeply embedded within the Washington foreign-policy establishment that it requires less lobbying than more obviously controversial causes — a remarkable fact given the enormous costs the U.S. might incur in a prospective war with China over Taiwan.
For those hoping to understand how Taipei became so influential in Washington, it is important to note that Taiwan’s contemporary lobbying efforts are not new. Rather, they are the latest manifestation of a much older phenomenon, once known as the “China Lobby.”
During the early Cold War, supporters of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government cultivated one of the most influential foreign-policy pressure groups in modern American history. Organizations such as the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, the American China Policy Association, and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China mobilized public opinion in favor of continued support for the Republic of China.
The movement enjoyed powerful allies. Senators such as William F. Knowland of California, often called the “Senator from Formosa” (another name for Taiwan), Joseph McCarthy, Pat McCarran, and H. Alexander Smith championed the Nationalist cause in Congress. Media magnate Henry Luce used the pages of Time and Life to advocate for Chiang’s government. Together, these networks helped sustain American backing for Taipei long after the Nationalists’ retreat to Taiwan in 1949.
The diplomatic revolution initiated by President Richard Nixon and completed under President Jimmy Carter altered the landscape. Washington normalized relations with Beijing in 1979 and formally recognized the People’s Republic of China. Yet the Taiwan Relations Act, passed the same year, preserved substantial unofficial ties and committed the United States to providing Taiwan with defensive arms.
Rather than disappearing, the China Lobby adapted. As Taiwan democratized and rebranded itself as a vibrant liberal democracy confronting an increasingly powerful People’s Republic of China, the old China Lobby gradually evolved into the modern Taiwan Lobby. The methods changed, but the objective remained largely the same: securing American political, military, and diplomatic support for the island’s interests.
Over the past decade, the Taiwan Lobby has helped generate congressional momentum behind a series of increasingly ambitious initiatives that threaten to destabilize an already increasingly tenuous status quo. These include the Taiwan Travel Act ; the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act ; the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act ( TERA ), which was incorporated into the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act; and a variety of other proposals aimed at accelerating arms transfers, expanding military cooperation, deepening Washington’s strategic commitment, strengthening Taiwan’s international participation, and deepening economic integration.
Perhaps the most outrageous legislative effort was the debate in 2022 over the Taiwan Policy Act and Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act , which saw bipartisan support for a (thankfully defeated) de facto authorization for the use of military force in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.
Many of these measures enjoy broad bipartisan support independent of any lobbying effort. Still, Taiwan’s representatives and contracted firms have worked diligently to cultivate congressional champions, organize visits, support caucus activity, and maintain pressure for continued action. As Ben Freeman of the Quincy Institute has shown in his research, the result has been one of the most successful foreign influence campaigns in Washington – not because it operates in secret, but because it has become so thoroughly normalized.
With respect to Taiwan’s most recent efforts, the hiring of Checkmate Government Relations appears less the manifestation of a new policy initiative than the addition of another proverbial horse to an already well-stocked stable.
Taipei’s objectives remain largely unchanged: securing timely arms deliveries, strengthening defense cooperation, and ensuring that American support for Taiwan remains firm amid escalating tensions with Beijing.
What has changed is the political environment. Trump’s highly transactional approach to foreign policy, his willingness to treat arms sales and security commitments as negotiating leverage, and his public frustration with Taiwan’s defense spending have introduced a degree of uncertainty absent from previous administrations.
In that context, retaining a firm with close ties to Trump’s inner circle reflects a rational effort to secure access and influence at a critical moment. That the contract was signed shortly before Trump’s Beijing trip — and amid questions surrounding a delayed arms package and Washington’s dissatisfaction with Taipei’s defense budget — suggests a willingness to adapt to new political realities. It remains to be seen whether this shift will bear fruit.