The presence of powerful armed groups in Iraq has been a persistent challenge to the state, undermining its authority and drawing the ire of the US.
Numerous previous governments have tried to rein them in and bring all arms under Baghdad’s control, but have largely failed . That appears to be changing, however, as some of these groups now see their interests better served by disarmament and legitimisation through the state.
The most notable example is Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), which is led by Qais al-Khazali and has been one of Iraq’s most formidable armed groups over the past two decades.
No longer sitting on the margins as one voice among many, it is now perhaps the most powerful political entity in Iraq, despite being tarred with international sanctions.
It has achieved this status by becoming deeply involved in the Iraqi state and increasingly disinclined to use its arms as part of regional conflict.
On 2 June, AAH took the momentous step of announcing that it would withdraw from the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and place all of its weapons under state control.
“This includes the withdrawal of all individuals and weapons, along with all logistical and institutional matters related to the full disengagement from the [PMF], in a manner that aligns with the requirements of the armed forces and state institutions, and serves the supreme national interest,” it said in a statement.
It has also formed a working coalition with several other forces from across the political spectrum. Not only do these relationships endow it with greater international acceptability, but they also enable AAH and its partners to defy other establishment figures.
Analysing this shift reveals a major lesson: that Iraq’s armed groups will change their strategy based on self-interest, rather than outside pressure from Baghdad or Washington.
To put their weapons under the control of the state and integrate into its political and institutional structures, they must see themselves in the state. That requires a strategic flexibility that AAH is currently demonstrating and many of its armed group counterparts have yet to appreciate.
For AAH, the stakes are high. Formed in 2004 as a split from the Sadrist Movement , it continued to fight the US even after the Mahdi Army signed a ceasefire. It was subsequently involved in operations in Lebanon in support of Hezbollah in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war and the Syrian war.
In 2014, it participated in elections for the first time through its affiliated political party, al-Sadiqoun, and won just one seat. In 2018 and 2021, it ran on the PMF’s Fatah list, with its members winning 15 and 16 seats respectively.
This allowed it to translate to progressively more important ministerial positions, taking the culture ministry and a stake in the social and labour ministry in 2018, before moving up to the higher education ministry under Sudani, as well as positions in the prime minister’s office and other governmental bodies.
AAH won its first governorship in 2023 when it took power in Babil, which counterintuitively reflects its national power rather than its local influence.
In the past election in November , it won 27 seats running on its own. The result means that it has the most seats of any single Shia party in the Council of Representatives. Other lists, like that of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani and Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law, involve several smaller formations to boost their numbers in addition to the main party.
As other parties looked to the executive and cabinet posts as a path to power, AAH homed in on the first deputy speaker in the legislature as their key demand. This was fulfilled when Adnan Faihan was elected on 29 December.
They have also picked up the chairmanship of the powerful parliamentary finance committee, which is proving influential as parties and governorates jostle for resources in the budget.
This focus on parliament, rather than the cabinet, might seem self-limiting, but it reflects a considered strategy. The Trump administration has warned against the inclusion of any pro-Iran and armed groups in the government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, a line that AAH’s inclusion would cross. Instead of defying Washington’s demand to prove a point, Khazali has sought influence in other ways, which could pay off down that line.
Beyond accruing power at an institutional level, AAH has built up a strategy of coalition politics that ensures it has the greatest possible influence. Before the formation of Sudani’s government, it worked all-in with the rest of the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) to oppose the Sadrists and continued to be a key player in that grouping after the 2022 government formation.
However, AAH’s coalition emphasis has changed since the November 2025 election, expanding and rearranging its alliances to put itself at the centre. This new and informal bloc crosses ethno-sectarian lines and also includes Ammar al-Hakim and Sudani from the Shia camp, former speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Taqadum from the Sunnis, and Bafel Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) from the Kurdish bloc.
The leadership of this five-member group reflects the emergence of a new generation of politicians drawn from diverse ethno-sectarian backgrounds who are in their 40s and 50s and have begun to provide a contrast to older politicians like State of Law leader Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani.
“There is a changing of the guard…there is a new generation, a younger generation of leaders,” Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Deputy Prime Minister Quabd Talabani said at the Atlantic Council on 15 May.
“[They] are talking about things in a different way to the old guard. They are respectful to the old guard, but there is a new cell that is emerging,” added Talabani, who is also a senior member of the PUK.
While each member of the five-member group continues to have its own politics and relationships, they are learning that they can work in concert for mutual benefit.
While Halbousi himself has not returned to the speakership, Taqadum was able to win the position for Haibet al-Halbousi, a member of the same tribe and a political loyalist of Mohammed. In so doing, it saw off a challenge from their Sunni rivals in the Azm Alliance. The PUK was also able to retain the presidency over a strong challenge from the KDP.
It also allows the group to block the ambitions of its rivals. They were able to prevent Maliki and State of Law from taking the ministries of interior and higher education, Azm from planning and culture, and the KDP from retaking housing and construction. It also threw its weight around by preventing the re-election of the KDP’s first-choice candidate for second deputy speaker, forcing it to select an alternative.
While these domestic triumphs are significant, perhaps the greatest benefit of this new coalition for AAH is reforming its international image.
In 2020, the US State Department named AAH as a foreign terrorist organisation and Khazali as a specially designated global terrorist. While this may be a badge of honour in some circles that AAH ran in previously, it will prove a major hindrance if it is trying to become more integrated with the Iraqi state.
The international reputations of figures like Hakim, Halbousi, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani are useful in softening Khazali’s image and gradually working to bring him into the fold of acceptable Iraqi politicians.
“Qais al-Khazali is not the same Qais al-Khazal of four years ago,” Talabani said during his remarks at the Atlantic Council.
These domestic and international advancements for AAH are the result of its strategic flexibility to make new friends and opportunistic action to take advantage of the weakness of its rivals. As a result, it has reached a prominent place in Iraq’s politics.
That AAH feels secure enough in this to voluntarily disarm and bring its weapons under the control of the state - and win acclaim for doing so proactively - is a testament to the success of its strategy.
It still harbours ambitions of becoming part of Zaidi’s government, perhaps taking the still-vacant social affairs and labour ministry, but that may be a bridge too far amid Washington’s warnings that armed groups are not welcome in the new cabinet.
With four years to consolidate its position, they have started to whisper that the next step may be to launch a bid for prime minister following the next round of elections in 2029. That ambition will face domestic and geopolitical challenges. The question is whether they can interrupt AAH’s rising trajectory or prove to be a mere speedbump on the way to the premiership.
Its efforts to slowly and methodically build power inside the state, in part by leaving its violent past behind and forming a pragmatic and cross-sectarian group of allies, may prove potent enough to overcome the old guard of Iraqi politics and opposition from Washington. Mohanad Adnan is a political analyst and communications strategist with more than a decade of experience advising politicians, civic activists, and international organisations Follow him on X: @mohanadaadnan Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and analyst based in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. He focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy Follow him on Twitter and Instagram: @wrodgers2 Edited by Charlie Hoyle