When Iraqi officials confirmed in early May that Baghdad was finalising the purchase of 20 Turkish air defence systems following months of regional escalation , the announcement reflected more than another procurement deal.
It signalled a broader transformation in how Iraq is beginning to think about air defence after years of fragmentation, underinvestment, and dependence on foreign partners.
The urgency behind the decision was shaped by the recent Iran war, during which Iraqi airspace became an operational corridor for missiles, drones and military aircraft belonging to multiple actors.
Iranian projectiles crossed Iraqi territory, while US, Israeli and Saudi strikes targeted Iran-linked militia infrastructure inside the country. Oil installations, diplomatic compounds and strategic sites were repeatedly exposed to aerial threats, highlighting the country’s limited ability to monitor or intercept attacks independently.
Baghdad’s answer is increasingly taking the form of a layered air defence architecture combining South Korean medium-range missile systems with Turkish short-range and counter-drone platforms.
Iraq is already set to receive eight South Korean Cheongung-II , or KM-SAM II, batteries under a $2.8 billion deal signed in 2024 with South Korea’s LIG Nex1, while Turkish systems - reportedly centred on ASELSAN’s KORKUT family - are expected to protect against low-altitude drones and loitering munitions.
The shift matters because it reflects Iraq’s attempt to rebuild a national air defence concept largely absent since 2003. From point defence to layered defence Iraq’s current air defence posture remains limited and uneven despite years of reconstruction efforts. The Iraqi Air Defence Command relies primarily on US-supplied AN/TWQ-1 Avenger short-range systems, Russian Pantsir-S1 batteries, and upgraded Soviet Igla-S systems for man-portable air defence (MANPAD), all platforms capable of protecting specific facilities or bases, but clearly insufficient for broader territorial coverage.
For years, this fragmented model reflected both political realities and operational priorities. Following the rise of the Islamic State group in 2014, Baghdad concentrated on rebuilding ground forces and counterinsurgency capabilities rather than investing heavily in integrated air defence.
Earlier attempts to acquire more advanced systems, including US Hawk missiles or Russian S-300 and S-400 SAM batteries, never materialised.
Iraq’s new procurement strategy reflects lessons increasingly visible across modern conflicts, from Ukraine to the Gulf. “It’s an essential combination for most air defences these days,” Paul Iddon, a journalist specialising in the Middle East, told The New Arab , referring to the pairing of KM-SAM systems with Turkish counter-drone platforms.
“The medium-range Korean KM-SAMs are suitable for countering high-altitude threats such as enemy fighter jets, cruise missiles and even ballistic missiles. However, they could be vulnerable to smaller and cheaper FPV drones launched near a base.”
This vulnerability has become central to contemporary warfare. “It makes no sense firing cutting-edge $1-4 million interceptor missiles – such as the US-made Patriot PAC-3 – against drones that cost anywhere from a few hundred to several tens of thousands of dollars,” Iddon noted.
This cost-exchange dilemma helps explain Iraq’s growing interest in Turkish systems such as the KORKUT, a 35 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun which combines radar-guided guns, programmable airburst ammunition and counter-UAV capabilities better suited to engaging low-altitude drone threats.
Baghdad will likely use the Turkish systems to protect the Korean batteries themselves from close-range attacks, effectively creating an additional defensive layer around its most strategic assets.
Recent conflicts have demonstrated that sophisticated missile systems can themselves become targets for low-cost drone swarms and close-range attacks. During both the Ukraine war and the recent Iran conflict, relatively inexpensive drones repeatedly threatened or damaged far more valuable military assets.
In this endeavour, “the Korkuts are suitable for combating small FPV-type drones and can play an essential role in protecting strategic assets like the KM-SAMs from close-range, low-altitude attacks,” Iddon explained. Why Iraq is turning to Korea and Turkey The systems themselves are only part of the story. Iraq’s procurement choices also reflect broader political and strategic calculations. For Baghdad, South Korea and Turkey offer something increasingly valuable in today’s defence market: advanced systems combined with fewer political complications and more flexible sustainment arrangements.
South Korea, in particular, has emerged as an increasingly attractive supplier for Iraqi policymakers seeking alternatives to both Russian and American systems. Russian equipment has become harder to obtain and maintain following sanctions linked to the war in Ukraine, while US systems often come with political restrictions, end-use concerns and dependency on American approval processes.
This dynamic has already affected Iraq’s broader military procurement strategy. Baghdad previously faced complications involving US M1 Abrams main battle tanks used by Iran-linked Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), while Russian maintenance and spare-parts issues have increasingly constrained Iraqi reliance on Moscow.
Iraq’s new strategy is therefore as much about sustainability and political flexibility as technical performance. “Iraq needs systems it can operate, maintain and replenish reliably, not just systems that look advanced on paper,” Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE, told TNA .
“Its past procurement has been constrained by weak sustainment and political dependency on suppliers.”
Khoueiry also noted that Baghdad appears increasingly focused on diversification rather than dependence on any single partner. “Political flexibility matters because Iraq is trying to avoid overdependence on any one actor while avoiding political constraints,” he explained.
This logic helps explain why Iraq is simultaneously expanding defence ties with both Seoul and Ankara. The KM-SAM provides a sophisticated medium-range interception layer comparable in role to systems such as Patriot or S-400, while Turkish counter-drone systems offer cheaper and more sustainable protection against the kinds of threats Iraq is now most likely to face.
The KM-SAM itself reflects a broader regional shift already underway in the Gulf. Originally developed by South Korea as a medium-range system designed to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic threats, the Cheongung-II has increasingly emerged as one of the most attractive alternatives to more politically restrictive or expensive Western systems.
The United Arab Emirates became the first foreign customer of the platform in 2022 through a deal worth roughly $3.5 billion, while Saudi Arabia followed with its own acquisition agreement in 2024. During the recent Iran war, Emirati-operated KM-SAM batteries reportedly achieved interception rates estimated at around 96% as part of the UAE’s layered air defence network, marking the system’s first major wartime validation abroad.
While those results depended on the integration of multiple systems rather than on the KM-SAM alone, the conflict nevertheless reinforced the platform’s regional appeal. For Gulf states, the system offered proof that a non-US supplier could provide a credible intermediate layer between strategic ballistic missile defence and point defence systems, particularly against cruise missiles, lower-flying threats and mixed salvos capable of straining Patriot batteries.
The appeal of Turkish systems has also grown significantly following the recent Iran war, which demonstrated the importance of low-cost, layered and attritional forms of air defence. “States cannot rely only on expensive high-end interceptors to defeat cheap drones and loitering munitions,” according to Khoueiry. “They need a mix of medium-range systems, short-range air defence, counter-drone tools, electronic warfare, radars and cheaper interceptors.”
He added that Turkish and South Korean systems are increasingly attractive because they offer “credible capability, faster delivery, easier sustainment, and more flexibility than some US, Russian or Chinese alternatives”.
The appeal is also financial and political. South Korean systems are generally faster to deliver, less encumbered by political restrictions, and significantly cheaper than many Western alternatives, with each KM-SAM interceptor reportedly costing roughly one-third of a Patriot PAC-3 missile.
Seoul has also demonstrated greater flexibility regarding sustainment, industrial cooperation and delivery timelines - factors increasingly valued by regional states after years of procurement delays and geopolitical constraints.
Turkey’s growing defence-industrial ecosystem has further reinforced this appeal. Ankara’s broader “Steel Dome” concept increasingly combines radar systems, electronic warfare, short-range interceptors and counter-drone platforms into integrated architectures aimed at addressing modern drone warfare and saturation attacks.
For Iraq, proximity also matters. Turkish systems are geographically and logistically easier to sustain, while Ankara has become a major regional supplier of drones, electronic warfare platforms and short-range air defence technologies. The real challenge: integration Yet acquiring advanced systems is only the beginning. Iraq’s greatest challenge may ultimately lie not in procurement itself, but in integration.
Before 1991, Iraq operated one of the region’s most extensive air defence networks through the French-built Karicommand-and-control system. Much of that infrastructure was destroyed during the Gulf War and subsequently dismantled after 2003.
Rebuilding an effective layered architecture now requires far more than importing missiles and guns. Iraq must integrate radar coverage, command-and-control systems, communications networks, engagement procedures, operator training and maintenance structures into a coherent national framework.
Khoueiry warns that this process will likely be difficult even if technically feasible over time. “The main challenge is not acquiring the systems, but integrating different radars, interceptors, command systems and maintenance structures into a coherent air-defence network,” he said.
Still, some analysts believe interoperability problems may be less severe than Iraq previously faced with Russian systems. According to Iddon, Korean and Turkish systems benefit from broad NATO compatibility standards. “It certainly won’t be like when Turkey acquired those S-400s from Russia,” he noted. “Korean and Turkish military hardware are designed to comply with NATO compatibility standards.”
Even so, Iraq’s institutional fragmentation could complicate implementation. Multiple chains of command, uneven training standards, maintenance limitations and the continued autonomy of some Iran-linked armed groups all raise questions about how effectively Baghdad can centralise air defence operations during a crisis.
The challenge is therefore strategic as much as technical. The recent Iran war demonstrated that modern air warfare is increasingly defined not only by advanced fighter aircraft or ballistic missiles alone, but by drones, saturation attacks and the economics of interception. Iraq’s new procurement strategy reflects an attempt to adapt to this reality while rebuilding a more sovereign and resilient defence posture after decades of fragmentation.
Whether Baghdad can successfully integrate Korean missile systems and Turkish counter-drone platforms into a functioning layered network remains uncertain.
But the direction is becoming increasingly clear: Iraq is moving away from fragmented point defence toward a broader architecture designed for the age of attritional drone warfare. Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi Edited by Charlie Hoyle