The memorandum of understanding (MoU) to end the US-Israeli war on Iran has cast a spotlight on potential implications for Gaza amid ongoing indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel to implement a September 2025 ceasefire that has never truly taken root.
While welcoming the US-Iran deal in a 15 June statement, it is clear that Hamas was not consulted and is not a party to the agreement.
Since a US-brokered ceasefire in Gaza was agreed last year, Israeli forces have killed at least 1,000 Palestinians and continued to annex more territory in the coastal territory.
Few of the Gaza ceasefire’s agreements have been implemented, with Israeli airstrikes and assassinations of high-profile Hamas officials continuing ever since.
The US-Iran deal comes at a time when the Palestinian question appears increasingly marginalised within shifting regional arrangements that have redefined the priorities of key regional and international actors.
A Hamas source, who preferred to remain unnamed, told The New Arab that there was an implicit awareness within the movement that Gaza was not part of the understanding, nor were core issues such as the ceasefire, humanitarian access, or future governance included in its framework.
"Hamas views the development primarily through its broader regional implications rather than as a direct intervention in the Gaza file," he said.
While any de-escalation between Washington and Tehran could contribute to a calmer regional environment, the Hamas source said, "Gaza remains governed by separate calculations: the Israeli position on the ground and the mediation efforts led by Egypt and Qatar".
Palestinian political analysts say the US-Iran deal reflects how the Palestinian file is no longer being treated as a central negotiating axis amid a regional restructuring . Gaza on the margins: Shifting regional priorities "The US was focused on preventing escalation with Iran, while Iran was focused on managing its negotiating space," Palestinian political analyst Akram Atallah told TNA .
"In such a context, the Palestinian issue was not part of the deal.”
Gaza’s exclusion from the deal does not necessarily reflect marginalisation per se, he added, but rather the way international priorities are currently structured.
It does, however, leave Hamas in a complex position, unable to derive concrete gains from the shifting diplomatic environment despite maintaining regional ties.
"The understanding has effectively isolated Gaza from the main regional track," Mohammed Hijazi, a Jordan-based Palestinian political analyst, told TNA .
"Iran views Gaza as part of its axis of influence, but not as the central strategic arena compared to other files," he said
Washington's focus on containing tensions with Tehran has contributed to a relative decline in international pressure on Israel, allowing greater operational flexibility in Gaza.
Hijazi added that this prioritisation has had practical consequences. "With attention diverted toward US-Iran negotiations, Israel has benefited from reduced diplomatic pressure, which has translated into more latitude in its military operations in Gaza."
Meanwhile, indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel continue through Egyptian and Qatari mediation, but they remain constrained by unresolved core issues: prisoner exchanges, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, governance arrangements, and the future of armed factions.
Palestinian sources describe the current phase as part of a "second track" of negotiations, lacking firm guarantees regarding a permanent cessation of hostilities or a full Israeli withdrawal.
Mustafa Barghouti, Secretary-General of the Palestinian National Initiative, offers a different reading of the regional moment.
He believes that the US-Iran understanding reflects broader limits to escalation-based strategies in the region.
"What we are seeing is not only a bilateral understanding, but a sign of the failure of attempts to impose political outcomes through military escalation," he told TNA .
Barghouti argues that this shift could eventually influence the Palestinian file, but only if it is politically leveraged.
He stressed that the immediate priority remains ending the war in Gaza, ensuring the entry of humanitarian aid, reopening crossings, and launching reconstruction efforts.
"The continuation of the war is the core crisis, not a secondary issue," he said. Hamas between pragmatism, pressure, and uncertainty As the war continues and regional diplomacy shifts, Hamas appears to be navigating a narrowing set of options shaped by battlefield realities and diplomatic constraints.
Analyst Akram Atallah outlined three possible trajectories.
The first is an interim arrangement focused on a ceasefire, prisoner exchanges, and humanitarian aid, while deferring contentious political and security issues.
He described this as the most realistic option, though it does not resolve the long-term conflict.
The second is adherence to maximal demands, including a full ceasefire, complete Israeli withdrawal, and binding reconstruction guarantees, although this would be difficult without sufficient international pressure.
The third involves broader Palestinian or international arrangements for governing Gaza, potentially reducing Hamas's administrative role while preserving some form of political presence.
However, Atallah believes that this scenario faces strong Israeli rejection and internal Palestinian disagreement.
For Hijazi, Hamas is manoeuvring within an increasingly constrained political and military space, where external mediation and battlefield realities are narrowing its options.
"Israel is rejecting any future governing role for Hamas in Gaza, and this position is not limited to the current phase of the war but extends to the post-war equation as well," he said, noting that this reflects a broad consensus within Israel's political and security establishment.
He added that internal Israeli political dynamics, particularly the pressures of coalition politics and public sentiment after the war, may further incentivise escalation rather than compromise.
"In such an environment, even limited tactical openings are difficult to translate into strategic gains for Hamas," he said.
Despite these pressures, Hamas continues to present a dual message of flexibility and principle. On 17 June, spokesperson Hazem Qassem said the movement was showing "positivity and flexibility" in negotiations in Cairo aimed at reaching an agreement to end the war and facilitate humanitarian access.
Still, the broader regional context suggests a clear shift: Gaza is no longer at the centre of regional bargaining as it was in earlier phases of the conflict.
The US-Iran understanding reflects a wider reordering of priorities, in which regional crises are increasingly compartmentalised rather than integrated into a single negotiating framework.
In this evolving landscape, Hamas remains excluded from high-level regional arrangements but is directly shaped by their consequences.
As negotiations continue without decisive breakthroughs, the future of Gaza appears increasingly tied not only to mediation efforts in Cairo and Doha, but also to broader geopolitical recalibrations that are redefining the structure of the Middle East itself. Sally Ibrahim is a Palestinian reporter based in the Gaza Strip Edited by Charlie Hoyle