Over the past six weeks, Iran and Iraqi militias have subjected Iraq’s Kurdistan Region to a massive campaign of airstrikes .
Regular drone and missile strikes have resulted in multiple deaths and caused significant economic and social disruption across the semi-autonomous region.
It has also exacerbated political friction between Erbil and other political forces inside Iraq.
According to Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT), a war monitor, there were at least 474 attacks on targets in the Kurdistan Region by Iran and the militias during the first month of the war. This resulted in 17 deaths and 93 injuries. Of this total, civilians accounted for 19 injuries, but no deaths so far.
The vast majority of attacks, 76%, targeted sites in Erbil governorate, and 19% hit Sulaymaniyah. There were just 11 attacks in Duhok and three in Halabja.
Three-quarters of the attacks involved one-way suicide drones, and 19% were missiles, with the remainder mostly cross-border shelling. Of the drone and missile attacks, 51% were intercepted.
Since that total was announced in late March, the attacks continued. For example, Erbil Governor Omed Khoshnaw announced that on the night of 1-2 April, there were at least 25 drone attacks on the governorate.
As indicated by CPT’s data, Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Iraqi militias are the two primary perpetrators. The second group falls under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) but does not include all of its affiliated groups.
Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and Saraya Awliya al-Dam appear to be most active in threatening and attacking the Kurdistan Region, along with Shabak and Turkmen militia groups.
The PMF is technically part of Iraq’s federal government but have their own separate command and control structures . The government’s inability to bring them under control is a major point of disagreement between Baghdad, Erbil, Washington, and, increasingly, the Gulf States.
According to CPT, “most attacks in Erbil and Duhok governorates were carried out by Iran-affiliated militia groups in Iraq, while most attacks in Sulaymaniyah were conducted directly by the IRGC”.
Overall, the targets have fallen into three broad categories: US political and military sites, Iraqi Kurdish civilian and Peshmerga facilities, and Iranian Kurdish bases.
Military sites that host US and Coalition troops, like Erbil air base, and political sites like the new US consulate were the most frequent targets, accounting for 38% of attacks.
The second largest number of attacks, with 36% of the total during the first month of the war, were on Iraqi Kurdish civilian and Peshmerga sites.
Several Peshmerga bases belonging to the Kurdistan Region’s security forces, which are not active participants in the current war, were hit. On 24 March, six Peshmerga were killed when IRGC missiles struck their base in Spilk in rural Erbil governorate. A Peshmerga base near Sulaymaniyah city was targeted repeatedly with drones and missiles.
Civilian sites are also targeted. While these include important economic drivers like oil fields and refineries, they are also the most ordinary of places.
In the early hours of 2 April, a drone crashed through the roof of a café in Erbil’s busy Iskhan district, which is known for its lively nightlife.
The attacks have also targeted Iranian Kurdish parties like the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). These account for 26% of attacks, but a substantial number of the casualties. These strikes are largely designed to deter any military action on the part of the parties. Counting the cost The impact of the air campaign against the Kurdistan Region has taken a number of forms, from the psychological worry that pervaded everyday life to economic hardship, whose impact will only grow if the war continues after Tuesday’s fragile two-week ceasefire pause.
The region has experienced multiple conflicts since the 1960s, so many civilians were relatively experienced with the uncertainty and danger posed by the war between Iran and the US. A common quip was that only the younger generation has to acclimatise.
Black humour aside, sleepless nights filled with drone interceptions and the noise of fighter jets have taken a toll. If they were able to, people in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah have tried to spend as much time as they can in smaller cities and towns that are less likely to be hit.
The war is also having a social and economic impact. Schools and universities have been closed for the last month as a precaution, with education switching to online learning. This year’s Nowruz holiday, the all-important Kurdish new year, coincided with Eid al-Fitr, but attracted few tourists to the Kurdistan Region because of the war. Combined with a rainy weekend, local celebrations were also mostly a washout.
Iraqi militias have attacked a number of energy facilities, including the Sarsang oil field and the Lanaz refinery. This has starved the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of revenue and caused problems for the international oil companies working in the region.
For civilians, however, the most consequential impact had been the precautionary decision to shut down production at the Khor Mor natural gas field. It provides most of the feedstock for the Kurdistan Region’s power plants and, without it, there were widespread blackouts. Additionally, it had caused major supply disruptions for cooking gas.
On Wednesday, officials confirmed that gas production would resume and full output restored in phases, pointing to a return to normalcy if the fragile ceasefire holds after a period of huge disruption. Implications for the future During the war, the Kurdistan Region was caught between two of its major foreign partners - Iran and the US - while facing pressure from a familiar antagonist in the form of the Iraqi militias. So far, most public anger has been reserved for the militias, which were doing most of the damage, and criticising them carries far less political risk than condemning Tehran.
The antagonism between Kurdish figures and the militias spiked following an attack on the private residence of Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani on 28 March. He was not present at the time, and no one was harmed in the incident, but it carried political weight.
“We call on the federal government to act on its responsibility, bring these outlaw criminals to justice, and curb the continued terrorist attacks carried out by these groups,” KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said on social media.
“I also call on the international community and our friends to support the Kurdistan Region in protecting its citizens and safeguarding the interests of the Kurdistan Region,” he added.
Moreover, the targeting of such a high-profile figure was a major warning in a new context where red lines about assassinating political leaders were crossed by the US and Israel, causing palpitations across the political elite in Iraq. It was widely condemned across the Iraqi political spectrum.
On social media, some Kurdish nationalist accounts had demanded that the Peshmerga take proactive actions against the militias in disputed areas , in contrast to the more cautious policy adopted so far.
The Kurdish leadership did not act on these calls, but tensions between the militias and the Kurdistan Region will be a major factor in the coming period, even following the ceasefire.
Iraq has still not formed a government following parliamentary elections in November 2025, with Baghdad and Erbil remaining at loggerheads over the budget, salaries, and energy.
While Kurdistan Regional President Nechirvan Barzani on Wednesday praised the two-week pause, stressing that the goal must be “lasting peace” in the region, a return to war may mean continued Iraqi militia attacks.
This could further undermine efforts to reach political agreements at the national level, while also plunging Iraqi Kurdistan into a period of uncertainty once again. Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and analyst based in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. He focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy Follow him on Twitter and Instagram: @wrodgers2 Edited by Charlie Hoyle