As the United States and Iran continue negotiations over the future of the Strait of Hormuz , Europe finds itself largely absent from the diplomatic table.
The latest rounds of talks, facilitated by Qatar and Pakistan, have focused on consolidating the June ceasefire and creating the conditions for reopening one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints .
Yet while Washington and Tehran negotiate the political future of the Gulf, European governments are quietly preparing for a different role: securing it.
Over the past weeks, France and the United Kingdom have accelerated efforts to assemble a multinational naval coalition that now includes commitments or planned contributions from Italy, Germany, Greece, Denmark and the Netherlands.
Rather than shaping the negotiations themselves, these countries are preparing to restore confidence among shipowners, insurers, and Gulf partners through mine-clearing operations, naval escorts, and maritime surveillance once the security situation allows.
The timing is significant. On 25 June, another reported Iranian attack on commercial shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz highlighted how fragile the current ceasefire remains.
Even if diplomacy succeeds, reopening the waterway will require more than political agreements; it will require security guarantees that convince commercial operators it is safe to return.
Europe's emerging coalition reflects a broader strategic shift. Sidelined diplomatically, European governments are seeking to become indispensable operationally. Whether that effort succeeds could shape not only the future of Hormuz but also Europe's role as a security actor in the Gulf. Why Europe chose to go it alone The future European naval deployment did not emerge from the negotiating rooms in Switzerland, but from the growing realisation in Paris and London that reopening the Strait of Hormuz would require more than diplomacy.
As the Iran war entered its final stages, and the closure of the Strait increasingly threatened global energy markets , French President Emmanuel Macron and then-British Prime Minister Keir Starmer began promoting the idea of a multinational maritime coalition to support the waterway's eventual reopening once political conditions allowed.
Over the following weeks, the initiative gradually expanded to include Italy, Germany, Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands and several other European partners. Following Starmer's resignation on 21 June, responsibility for the British contribution will pass to his successor.
At the time of publication, however, a new prime minister had yet to be appointed, leaving London in a period of political transition even as preparations for the coalition continue.
From the outset, however, Paris and London made clear that this would not become another US-led naval operation. Rather than integrating into the command structures of US Central Command (CENTCOM), participating governments have worked to establish a separate multinational framework with its own political mandate, command structure and rules of engagement.
The objective is not to replace Washington's security architecture in the Gulf, but to protect European interests without becoming directly associated with US military operations against Iran or exposing some of Europe's most valuable - and difficult to replace - naval assets to unnecessary escalation.
The distinction is driven by both political and operational considerations. Throughout the conflict, European capitals sought to avoid being perceived as parties to the war while preserving their ability to engage diplomatically with regional actors.
An autonomous command structure allows participating governments to present the deployment as a narrowly focused effort to restore freedom of navigation rather than an extension of Washington's military campaign. That approach is also expected to facilitate cooperation with key regional stakeholders such as Oman , while reducing the likelihood that Tehran would view European vessels as legitimate targets should tensions flare again.
That diplomatic dimension was further reinforced on 29 June, when Macron and Sultan Haitham publicly endorsed Franco-Omani cooperation on future mine-clearance operations aimed at securing maritime routes through the Strait.
The announcement highlights how any future European naval deployment will depend not only on military capabilities, but also on close political coordination with Oman, whose unique position as both a mediator and a littoral state makes it central to the implementation of any post-conflict maritime security architecture.
Maintaining an independent command also offers practical advantages. Much like Operation Aspides in the Red Sea, the proposed deployment is designed around a strictly defensive mandate centred on mine clearance, escorting commercial shipping and restoring confidence among shipowners and insurers.
It also enables participating states to operate under national rules of engagement and satisfy domestic legal requirements. In countries such as Germany and Italy, where parliamentary approval is required before deploying military assets abroad, a defensive maritime operation is politically far easier to justify than participation in a broader wartime coalition.
Rather than signalling strategic distance from Washington, the initiative reflects an increasingly pragmatic division of labour between allies. While the United States remains responsible for deterrence and high-intensity military operations, Europe is positioning itself to provide the specialised maritime capabilities needed once the fighting subsides.
It is precisely those capabilities - rather than additional firepower - that could prove decisive in turning a diplomatic agreement into the safe reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Europe's niche advantage If diplomacy determines whether the Strait of Hormuz reopens, mine warfare will determine whether commercial shipping returns.
Throughout the conflict, much of the attention has focused on Iranian missiles, drones, and fast attack craft. Yet naval mines remain one of Tehran's most effective strategic tools. Cheap to deploy, difficult to detect and even harder to clear, they allow Iran to disrupt one of the world's busiest maritime corridors without matching the conventional naval capabilities of its adversaries.
According to Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, a security analyst specialising in naval strategy, mines remain one of Tehran's most consequential fallback options should other forms of maritime pressure become less viable.
“A tactical mining campaign would leave much of [Iran’s] estimated stockpile of 5,000-6,000 mines intact for future use,” Mazzucco told The New Arab . “If air strikes and IRGC Navy boarding operations become less viable, mines offer Iran a durable, impactful means of disrupting traffic through Hormuz.”
Their effectiveness, however, lies less in their destructive power than in the uncertainty they create. “The mere possibility of mines creates caution across the shipping industry,” Mazzucco explained. “Even small numbers of mines can disrupt traffic because proving waters are safe is far harder than laying the mines themselves.”
This is what makes mine clearance both a technical and psychological challenge. Former French Rear Admiral Éric Lavault , who headed France's mine warfare and seabed operations, recently argued that even without definitive proof the Strait has been mined, the waterway must first be checked before commercial shipping can fully return to normal.
Depending on the number, type and location of any mines, he warned, reopening safe shipping lanes could take anything from days to several months.
This asymmetry helps explain why European governments increasingly see themselves as uniquely positioned to support Hormuz's reopening. While the United States remains the dominant naval power in the Gulf, its dedicated mine-countermeasure capability has undergone a profound transition in recent years, with older minehunters gradually replaced by newer platforms and unmanned systems.
Several European navies, by contrast, have retained highly specialised mine warfare capabilities, including dedicated minehunters, autonomous underwater vehicles, explosive ordnance disposal teams and decades of operational experience in maritime security.
Those capabilities have been refined through successive European naval operations across the wider Middle East. Since 2008, Operation Atalanta has protected commercial shipping and countered piracy off the Horn of Africa , while EMASoH/Agenor has strengthened maritime situational awareness in the Gulf since 2020. More recently, Operation Aspides has provided naval escorts in the Red Sea in response to Houthi attacks against commercial shipping.
The scale of those operations also highlights their limitations. As of late March 2026, Operation Aspides had conducted more than 1,660 escort operations in just over two years. Yet only five European warships remain permanently deployed in maritime theatres directly exposed to the Gulf crisis: three under Aspides in the Red Sea and two under Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa.
Those figures demonstrate both the value of Europe's existing maritime architecture and the limits of relying on a small number of vessels to secure multiple strategic waterways simultaneously.
A dedicated Hormuz deployment would therefore represent less a departure from previous European naval operations than their logical evolution. Rather than creating new capabilities, it would concentrate existing expertise where it is now most needed.
Ultimately, reopening the Strait is unlikely to be a purely military challenge. Mine-clearance operations are designed not only to remove explosive devices, but also to restore confidence among shipowners, insurers and commercial operators. As Mazzucco observed, “fear and uncertainty are the weapons’ greatest force multipliers”.
In Hormuz, convincing the shipping industry that the waterway is safe may prove every bit as important as making it so. A coalition already taking shape Unlike previous European naval initiatives, the proposed Hormuz deployment is no longer a purely conceptual exercise. While political approval is still pending in several capitals, the coalition is already taking shape.
France is expected to provide the coalition's core capabilities. President Emmanuel Macron has indicated that Paris could deploy a maritime task force within days should negotiations between Washington and Tehran produce sufficiently stable conditions.
The French contribution would likely centre on the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, supported by frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and specialised mine-countermeasure vessels, reflecting France's long-standing naval presence in both the Gulf and the wider Indian Ocean.
The United Kingdom is expected to play an equally prominent role. London has endorsed the initiative from its inception and is likely to contribute high-end surface combatants alongside its specialised mine-warfare capabilities. Although the political transition following Keir Starmer's resignation has temporarily slowed decision-making, British military planning for Hormuz has continued, with the Royal Navy's Type 45 destroyer HMS Dragon among the assets already operating in the broader theatre.
Crucially, most of these assets are not intended to conduct offensive operations against Iran but to secure shipping lanes once political conditions permit.
Other European partners are also gradually positioning forces that could be reassigned should the coalition receive final political approval. Italy has signalled its willingness to contribute two mine-countermeasure vessels - ITS Rimini and ITS Crotone - while Germany has already repositioned the minehunter Fulda and the support ship Mosel towards Djibouti.
Greece is preparing to deploy the frigate Psara; Denmark has approved a military contribution that includes naval personnel and specialised capabilities; and the Netherlands has indicated its readiness to participate as discussions progress.
Rather than assembling a fleet from scratch, European governments are gradually stitching together assets that were already operating across the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean. This significantly shortens deployment timelines while allowing participating navies to build upon years of operational cooperation developed through Atalanta, EMASoH , and Aspides.
The geography of the deployment also explains why Djibouti has quietly become one of its most important locations. Situated at the entrance to the Red Sea, the country already serves as the principal logistical hub for several European maritime operations. As additional vessels reposition towards the region, Djibouti is increasingly emerging as the coalition's natural staging point, linking existing European deployments to any future operation in the Hormuz Strait.
For now, however, most governments remain deliberately cautious. Officials across Europe have repeatedly stressed that no deployment will take place unless the current diplomatic process demonstrates sufficient durability to allow naval forces to operate safely. In other words, the coalition is not waiting for ships – it is waiting for diplomacy. Waiting for the right conditions For all the progress made in assembling the coalition, European officials insist that no deployment will take place until the diplomatic track proves durable enough to support military operations. The mission is intended to secure peace, not enforce one.
Recent events have underscored why that distinction matters. On 25 June, Iranian forces reportedly launched another attack against commercial shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting how quickly the security environment can deteriorate despite ongoing negotiations.
For European planners, such incidents reinforce the need for caution. Mine-countermeasure vessels are among the least heavily armed warships in any navy and are designed to operate in permissive environments, not under sustained missile or drone attack. As Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto recently observed , “minehunters cannot defend themselves”.
Political uncertainty presents a second challenge. Although negotiations between Washington and Tehran have continued, many of the issues that fuelled the conflict - including sanctions, regional security arrangements and freedom of navigation - remain unresolved. European governments are therefore reluctant to commit high-value naval assets before they are confident that any ceasefire is likely to hold.
Even if political conditions improve, the ultimate test will be restoring confidence across the commercial shipping industry. As Mazzucco argued, “clearing Hormuz makes little sense if the waterway risks being mined again months later. Any mine-clearing effort depends on confidence that a ceasefire will endure”. For shipowners, insurers and energy traders, the perception of security will matter almost as much as security itself.
That reality explains why Europe has invested so heavily in preparing for a role that may never materialise - or may become indispensable at very short notice. If diplomacy succeeds, the multinational force now quietly taking shape across European navies could become the mechanism that transforms a political agreement into the safe reopening of one of the world's most strategically important waterways. Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi Edited by Charlie Hoyle