When Israel occupied southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000, maintaining control meant thousands of soldiers stationed inside the territory, with reinforced military outposts and daily clashes with fighters from a newly founded Hezbollah waging a guerrilla insurgency.
Nearly three decades later, the battlefield looks fundamentally different.
Today, Israel occupies swathes of southern Lebanon within a buffer zone it calls the " Yellow Line ". Entire border towns and villages have been razed, and hundreds of thousands of locals remain displaced.
But according to conflict analysts, Israel’s strategy no longer solely depends on a permanent military presence. Instead, it increasingly relies on surveillance drones, artificial intelligence, precision intelligence, and rapid strike capabilities that allow it to monitor, target, and shape the battlefield without maintaining the kind of occupation that proved unsustainable before 2000.
Meanwhile, Iran-backed Hezbollah is also trying to adapt to this new strategy. After suffering unprecedented losses to its leadership, weapons stockpiles, and militant infrastructure over the past two years, the Shia group is favouring decentralised, clandestine cells using FPV drones and anti-tank missiles, and has returned to guerrilla war tactics designed to impose as much damage as possible on Israeli forces.
According to Nasser Khdour, Middle East assistant research manager at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Israel appears to be shifting what military analysts describe as a "dynamic forward defence" - relying on surveillance, drones, and rapid precision strikes rather than maintaining large numbers of troops inside Lebanon.
"I don't think Israel wants to return to the old model of keeping permanent bases inside Lebanon," Khdour told The New Arab . "Those bases would be fragile and attacked by Hezbollah."
"Reducing troops doesn't mean reducing the capability to keep influence, monitoring and attacking."
Reshaping the battlefield: Structural changes to south Lebanon
While overall violence in Lebanon has declined since the trilateral framework agreement signed on 26 June , ACLED’s data suggests Israeli operations have become more deliberate rather than less frequent.
Israeli shelling, airstrikes, and drone attacks inside southern Lebanon fell sharply after 21 June, dropping from an average of nearly 60 attacks per day between 1 and 20 June to around seven per day between 21 June and 6 July.
During that same period, shelling and tank fire accounted for a greater share of Israeli operations than air and drone strikes, indicating Israel’s shift towards maintaining pressure around the buffer zone instead of keeping up frequent airstrikes.
Rather than only responding to Hezbollah attacks, Khdour said the pattern pointed to a broader military objective.
"Israel is not only responding to individual Hezbollah attacks now," he said.
"It appears to be seeking a broader campaign aimed at maintaining the buffer zone, preventing Hezbollah from reinforcing its positions in southern Lebanon, and weakening Hezbollah's strategic infrastructure north of the Litani."
North of the Litani River, Israeli forces have continued operating around strategic locations such as the Ali al-Taher Ridge overlooking Nabatieh. For weeks, Israeli troops have battled Hezbollah fighters to try and capture Ali al-Taher, where the Israeli military says a vast underground Hezbollah military complex is located.
ACLED also recorded a sharp increase in property destruction during the ceasefire period, something Khdour believes reflects attempts to reshape the reality on the ground.
Dozens of towns and villages in the buffer zone area have either been almost completely flattened or heavily destroyed.
Although he said there is little evidence Israel is building new permanent military bases inside southern Lebanon, the continued clearing of villages and destruction of infrastructure suggests it is preparing the terrain in ways that could support long-term military dominance even without a large and permanent deployment.
Hezbollah's new tactics: Fewer missiles, more drones
The assassination of much of Hezbollah's senior command structure, the destruction of significant parts of its missile arsenal and deep intelligence penetration - including the 2024 pager and walkie-talkie attacks – have fundamentally altered the group’s capabilities.
Khdour agrees Hezbollah has been significantly weakened, but he argues that this should not be interpreted simply as military collapse.
"I don't think this reduction in operations is only related to Hezbollah's reduced capability," he said. "Hezbollah understood that resuming the fighting would need a new strategy."
Rather than attempting to stop Israeli advances through conventional warfare, the group is increasingly relying on smaller guerrilla units equipped with FPV drones, anti-tank weapons and lighter equipment that can be moved discreetly between tunnels - several of which Israel has already blown up.
"One individual can fire an FPV drone and inflict significant costs on Israeli forces," Khdour said.
Between 2 March and 20 June, ACLED recorded more than 800 remote attacks against Israeli forces operating inside southern Lebanon. Nearly 47 percent involved drones, while around 53 percent involved rockets, artillery, and guided anti-tank missiles targeting Israeli troops, tanks, military positions and troop movements along the buffer zone.
"This was one of the reasons Israel expanded its operations during the final weeks before the latest ceasefire, including in areas north of the Litani River, such as the Beaufort area and Ali Taher Ridge, which overlook areas in the buffer zone and northern Israeli towns in the Galilee Panhandle," said Khdour.
According to Khdour, the use of FPV drones and guided anti-tank weapons demonstrates Hezbollah's effort to maximise damage with smaller, more mobile units rather than relying on mass rocket fire.
"Controlling areas and freedom of movement for Israeli forces doesn't mean a lot for Hezbollah now," Khdour said.
During the renewed fighting since March, ACLED’s data shows Hezbollah carried out more than 1,100 attacks against Israel, including projectiles intercepted by Israeli air defences. Although the group’s use of drones increased compared with previous rounds of fighting, rockets still accounted for around 70 percent of attacks, while drones made up roughly 30 percent.
Most targeted northern Israeli communities, reflecting Hezbollah’s continued strategy of disrupting daily life in HaZafon (northern Israel) and maintaining pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu’s government . The Israeli military claims that its buffer zone in southern Lebanon and expanded line of defence is to eliminate this threat against northern Israeli towns.
Technological superiority vs Hezbollah adaptation
Israel's technological superiority - from AI-assisted intelligence to surveillance drones and precision strikes - has transformed how it holds onto power across southern Lebanon.
But Khdour believes technology alone cannot eliminate an insurgency.
"Technology is now a central part of Israel's military strategy everywhere – in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria ," he said.
"But this capability has its limits. There is still room for operatives who want to fight and resist to continue."
Hezbollah's decentralised structure, greater operational secrecy and reliance on smaller combat cells suggest the group is already adjusting to Israel's intelligence dominance.
"We can't say just because Israel has the technology that means they will eliminate the group," Khdour said.
Whether Israel actually withdraws under the Washington framework agreement remains uncertain. But even if it does, some analysts believe the next phase of the conflict may not depend on permanent occupation at all.
Instead, based on current realities, southern Lebanon may become the testing ground for a new model of warfare, one in which surveillance, AI, and precision firepower seek to replace boots on the ground, while Hezbollah searches for new ways to survive - if it refuses to disarm.
Louay Faour is a journalist at The New Arab focusing largely on the Levant, with a particular interest in Lebanese affairs
Follow him on X: @LouayFaour
Edited by Charlie Hoyle